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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
2Two things have often been said about politics in new 
nations: the political elite is crucial and new nolities are fundamentally
unstable because they are also plural societies.^ Therefore the 
role of leadership in a stable plural society is worthy of special 
attention. This thesis studies this role in the Malaysian state of 
Penang. The method used is analytical, being an attempt to identify a 
few scores of the most important contemporary leaders in Penang, in 
order to analyse their social backgrounds to discover the bases for 
their leadership, its relation to the formal authority structure of 
government and to the racial communities, its contribution to the 
stability of the Penang society since independence, and the signs of 
change in this pattern. An attempt is also made to project the 
analysis into the future by a supplementary survey of the political 
culture of high school students - a source for the future elite - in 
Penang.
This theme is a restricted one for reasons to be mentioned 
below. It is not a political history, nor does it attempt to cover the 
whole political process in Penang, much less in Malaysia generally. In
1. Cf. JoS. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1948), pp. 304-11 and his article "Co-operation, 
Competition and Isolation," in Philip Talbot, ed., South Asia in the 
World Today (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), esp. pp.
76-7; and the conference papers on "Social and Cultural Pluralism 
in the Caribbean," published in Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, vol. 83, Art. 5 (1960) ^ pp. 761-91(3^  A leading scholar of 
the plural society in the Caribbean, M.G. Smith, maintains in one of 
the papers that ' . . . whatever the form of the political system, the 
different sectional values within a plural society are a profound 
source of instability.' Ibid., p. 776.
3the same token it is not an intensive study of the political parties in 
the State. Rather it is the application of some carefully selected 
methodological techniques to a short-run empirical situation in order 
to elucidate the leadership aspects of the Penang situation and to 
indicate the next step in the evolution of the leadership structure. 
What follows below, therefore, is a discussion of the reasons behind, 
the techniques used and the structure of this study of leadership in 
Penang.
As a necessary prelude to the later analytical chapters 
(in Part III), Part II introduces the state of Penang. More 
specifically, Chapter II examines its setting and the legal and 
institutional features of the state administration; and Chapter III 
provides an historical account of the changing pattern of leadership 
and the impact of election. These discussions together serve as a 
background to the subsequent analysis of contemporary leadership in 
Penang.
The reasons why Penang and not another state was chosen 
for study are less related to the substantive issues of leadership 
and politics there than to the background of this student. There 
are certain advantages for a Malaysian in investigating the phenomenon 
of power in his country. There is, of course, his basic understanding 
and familiarity with the context and, in some instances, his own 
participation in some of the processes under investigation. He is 
also in some ways less hampered by the difficulties of such a study
4than other social scientists might be, In the first place a study 
of leadership in Malaysia 'suffers' from inadequate precedents that 
may help to inform, instruct and even govern its focus, (This, of 
course, is true of the analysis of sub-national leadership in the 
developing world generally,) A second factor is the unfamiliarity 
with social science scholarship of this type on the part of those people 
who count, viz. the elite, senior bureaucrats, grass-root politicians, 
officials of various organizations, not to mention the ordinary people 
whom one can no longer consider irrelevant. There is, therefore, a 
general suspicion of modern social science scholarship which hinders it. 
One must either abandon the latter or circumvent the former. My own 
bias about the need of studying Malaysian politics dictates the latter 
choice. This has the practical result of selecting a venue with which 
I am most familiar.
By the nature of things one is not just simply a Malaysian, 
one is also a member of a stereotype communal group. This then is a 
third factor which conditioned my research strategy. The original 
intention was to concentrate on the three geographically contiguous 
states of Kedah, Penang and Perak. But this was quickly neutralized 
by an early field discovery. It was found quite impossible to make 
any headway in collecting data and conducting interviews with influential 
persons in the 'Malay' states of Kedah and Perak. It became clear 
that one could not fruitfully ask direct questions about power and 
influence in these communities. The typical response went something 
like: 'It is none of my business; and in any case, I cannot see why
5it should be yours.' One’s motives were suspect. Potential informants
fended off probing questions«, They evoked a characteristic Malaysian
political attitude: 'No one should rock the boat, which means that
everyone must sit down, and no one can even stand up to find out where
2the boat is heading,' In particular, a Chinese Malaysian finds it 
hard to talk frankly with a Malay Malaysian about questions of power 
and influence.
Partly as a consequence of these considerations it is decided 
to adopt a basically analytical methodology. This avoids a few possible 
research traps. Firstly, one does not have to rely on hearsays which are 
inevitably coloured by individual perspectives. Secondly, contradictions 
between verbal data are difficult to resolve satisfactorily and biases of 
one kind or another, including those of the researcher himself, may be 
inadvertently introduced, Thirdly, there is the danger of not obtaining 
a representative group of interviewees. On the other hand a study of 
leadership such as this one cannot comfortably adopt an ad hoc approach 
through dwelling intensively into such standard 'western' variables as 
political parties, pressure groups, legislative bodies and the like. It 
cannot be assumed that their relationships to leadership are the same in 
western and non-western societies. Therefore, an institutionally- 
oriented analysis of leadership in Penang is considered inadvisable,
Before discussing the methodological perspectives of this thesis in some 
details it is useful to examine briefly some trends in the study of 'new 
states' politics.
2, Lucian W, Pye, "A New Class in Malaya," The New Leaders, 
30 May, 1960, p, 14,
6The study of politics in emerging nations has grown very
extensive in the last decade for several reasons. In the first
instance, the number of such nations has grown dramatically in this
time. Secondly, they have provided a rich field for comparison of
political structures and functions under greatly varying social and
economic conditions. Thirdly, the collective experiences of these
nations have posed a series of questions about the formation and
maintenance of political societies and the achievement of orderly
political change within them. The emergence of these nations has
also encouraged comparative studies which are thought to be valuable
from two points of view. They can help in the explanation of
phenomena in a single country, by providing 'control' situtations
against which to test hypotheses. (For example, one is not
satisfied to conclude that political instability in one country is
due to the co-existence of a dominant minority race and a backward
majority race, if these conditions in another are accompanied by
political stability. Some other factors would have to be considered.)
Secondly, comparative studies may contribute to the development of
some general theories about politics - or about politics in new
nations - by providing large amounts of data from a variety of 
3situations.
3 . For some cogently-argued reservations on this point and the need
for 'middle range theories' see Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization 
and Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics, vol. 1, No. 1 
(October, 1968), pp. 37-51.
7However, there has been a tendency towards confusion in 
these trends, ’Models', or schemes for collecting and classifying 
data, have tended to be confused with 'theory', or explanatory 
generalizations suggesting causal relations between data, Analytic 
approaches have tended to be treated as theoretical framework instead 
of being steps towards developing them. And, in turn, concepts 
have tended to be confused with approaches. Some of these confusions 
can be traced to the nature of developing politics. This appears 
so esoteric and exotic that the first step of analysis has often 
been a concern with methodological issues. But such a concern has 
tended to obscure the need to be acquainted as fully as possible with 
the historical backgrounds and the social-cultural dimensions of the 
societies under examination. Indeed the availability of approaches, 
concepts and theoretical models has made it possible to pretend to 
analyse particular systems without an adequate factual understanding 
of how they actually function. Consequently the building of models, 
or theoretical frameworks, has tended to be regarded as an end in 
itself, instead of a means to understanding concrete political 
situations in particular places, Models or theories are then not 
treated as analytic devices to help explain concrete events and facts 
(some of which may otherwise appear empirically to be unrelated) but 
substitutes for them, In short, there is a confusion between ways 
of going about analysing and understanding a new political system and 
attempts at grand theory on this basis at one and the same time. It
8is, therefore, not surprising that there has been a proliferation
of models and theories unrelated to each other. It is almost as
if for ever> new nation there must be a new model or a new theo- 
4retical framework; and the resultant proliferation sponsors a 
methodological interest without regard to any particular body of 
empirical data. Therefore, understanding of real events is not 
really growing cumulatively. This is partly reflected in the 
absence of agreement on such basic concepts as political development 
or modernization and in the fact that models or theories of developing 
politics are chimerical.
It would be difficult to explain adequately why such a 
variety of models and theoretical frameworks has appeared in recent 
years. It may be partly because it has become the fashion among 
social scientists to invent their own theories, or partly because 
they have not been well trained in the actual intellectual approach 
and method of the natural scientists whom they are trying to 
imitate. (In the latter case, if the essence of politics is the 
manifestation of power in all its forms our ability to measure power
4, On this point Karl Deutsch says that 'We suffer from the curse 
of enforced originality which makes it a crime for a graduate 
student to replicate somebody else's experiment .... If 
physicists and chemists had not replicated each other's 
experiment they would still be in the age of alchemy.' Karl 
W. Deutsch, "The Theoretical Basis of Data Programs," in 
Richard L. Merrit and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p . 42.
9adequately is severely limiting) It may be partly because the 
extension of political studies from the European and American con­
tinents to the new nations has revealed so many new patterns of 
politics that the specialist on each area or country is tempted to 
think that he must devise a new theoretical framework for its 
understanding. Nevertheless the existence of these various schemes 
of analysis as well as 'older' approaches to the study of politics 
provides the empirical researcher with a choice of instruments that 
may be of help in analysing his material from appropriate points of 
view. It does not necessitate an interest in grand theorising about 
whole political systems across time or space. The question is: which
of the techniques or devices are in fact appropriate for work in a 
country like Malaysia?
One of the results of the divorce of theorising from empirical 
work is that 'conceptual frameworks' are often devised without regard to 
the practical possibility of obtaining the necessary data.^
Recognizing this we have therefore looked to certain earlier 
approaches to political analysis as a means of giving shape to our data 
and helping in their interpretation. These are: the 'formal-legal'
5, Cf. Robert E. Ward, ed., Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1964)„ The citations in this volume include some of the 
more useful journal articles on the problems of doing research in 
developing countries.
10
analysis of the structures of government; the 'power-elite' approach; 
and the analysis of 'political culture,' Each of these has been 
claimed to provide the basis for a completely self-contained analysis of 
a political system - that is, they are self-sufficient and mutually 
exclusive according to their inventors. Closer examination shows them, 
however, to be in some respects complementary. In any case, there is 
nothing to prevent data from the same society being arranged and inter­
preted according to any of these approaches - especially since some facts 
fit into one approach better than another.
In the research project leading to this thesis, I am not 
primarily concerned with adding to some corpus of 'general theory.'
Hence I have felt justified in adopting an eclectic attitude in my 
methodology, adopting different approaches according to their practicality 
in the field and the nature of the available data from other sources. 
Certainly not one of the approaches mentioned above can be applied to the 
different kinds of data available to provide a rounded picture of 
leadership in Penang, On the other hand, limitations and difficulties 
in the collection of the data make it impossible to pretend to offer a 
single comprehensive theoretical analysis of this polity. Hence what 
has been done is to concentrate on aspects of Penang leadership which 
have seemed important on an impressionistic basis; to collect as much 
material about the working of these aspects as was accessible in the 
available time by appropriate techniques; to analyse the data on these 
aspects broadly in terms of the appropriate approach; and then, 
supplementing these analyses by some more traditional, 'intuitive' 
perspectives, to arrive at certain conclusions about factors underlying the 
stability of Penang. Our orientation is therefore more practical than 
theoretical in the sense that theory is used as the handmaid of under­
standing, and not an end in itself.
The eclecticism in methodology adopted here has some precedents 
It has been claimed that 'the need to combine research techniques 
goes beyond the demands of this or any other single
11
study.' Other precedents can be observed in many other studies
even though they are usually implicit. But it is one thing to
use various techniques; it is another to use different approaches.
In the latter case there is at least the risk of contradictions,
or trouble in fitting conclusions from different aspects together.
But inasmuch as our interest is not the analysis of the ’whole
political system’ but only those aspects involving the phenomenon of
leadership in the context of a plural society the different
approaches used are aimed at explaining these aspects. The nature
of the methodology is dictated by the practical necessity of getting
data where possible and bringing to bear whatever analytical tools
seem appropriate. There follows a broad characterization of each
of the three approaches which have ’informed' different sections 
7
of this thesis.
6. Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p.x.
7. For ’a taxonomy of five approaches' (labelled differently from 
the ones used here) see Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to 
the Study of Political Development," World Politics, vol. XVII, 
No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 108-20. In this research note
the approaches have been classified in terms of political 
development, but the citations refer to numerous examples of 
the traditional approaches except that of the power-elite.
For a clear indication of how the power-elite approach can be 
included in Packenham's taxonomy of 'political development 
approaches' see Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political 
Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 406-19.
12
The first traditional approach used in this study is the 
3formal-legal approach. Traditionally this approach was concerned 
with public laws, constitutions and formal organizations of the 
state. It derived its perspective from two assumptions. First, 
the state is considered sui generis as a social institution; and 
second, the formal-legal structure was assumed to determine 
political behaviour in ways so fundamental that nothing else really 
mattered. With such a perspective the typical concern of those who 
used the approach was not actual political processes but the formal- 
legal rules and their presumed effects. Moreover the approach, as 
originally used, has a normative bias - it was concerned with what 
the formal-legal structures ought to be. For example, whether the 
legislature ought to be unicameral or bi-cameral; election on the 
basis of proportional representation or single-member constituency; 
presidential or parliamentary rule and similarly with all the other 
matters which are typically prescribed by constitutions. These then 
were the subject-matter of the formal-legal approach and it was 
partly discredited when actual political events, like the collapse 
of 'proper' constitutional governments in Europe, could not be
8. For the reasons supporting the earlier emphasis on the formal- 
legal method and the changing styles of political analysis see 
Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past 
and Present," in Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative 
Politics: A Reader (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 3-32.
13
adequately explained by those who used it. There were, of course,
other developments in the social sciences which contributed to its
decline. In the main it was the realization that the formal-legal
rules and structures of government did not constitute a set of
independent variables. Other factors besides formal rules and
institutions were seen to provide significant determinants of
political behaviour. However the decline of this traditional 
9approach should not obscure the fact that public laws and 
institutions continue to influence public behaviour, albeit not 
solely. Thus the approach is only discredited in its claim for 
exclusiveness and not in the 'political facts' it is concerned with,
All political systems or communities have rules and 
institutions, whether explicit or implicit, For this reason the 
formal-legal approach can still be useful in those situations where 
there is no great gulf between them and the actual political process."^ 
Such a situation prevails in Malaysia generally in the sense that 
government and administration are carried out largely in accordance 
with formal rules and established practices. Because of this as
9. For a rare study of developing politics using this approach 
see Dorothy Dodge, African Politics in Perspective (Princeton: 
Van Nostrand, 1966)"]!
10. Where such a gulf exists and is otherwise observed the formal- 
legal approach can highlight the tension created by the 
difference between ideal (constitutionally prescribed) and 
actual political processes.
14
well as wishing to present the formal political system, the approach is 
used in a section of Chapter II to analyse institutional and administrative 
structure in the state of Penang.,
The next approach used in this study is the power-elite method,'*''*' 
Because relatively greater reliance is made of this approach it will be 
discussed in greater details here„ The approach has been used for two 
purposes: to analyse the political system in terms of the general con­
figuration of power and to study the actions and interactions of the 
active participants in the system» (The two purposes are, of course, 
not mutually exclusive.) Although the approach is one of the oldest in
political science it has been pioneered in modern times by Karl Marx,
12Mosca, Robert Michels, Pareto and Lasswell. While it was originally 
coloured by normative bias, populist or elitist, it has become increasingly 
a mere research apparatus, particularly in its application to community 
power studies.
11. ’Elite' and 'power' are linked here because they are obviously 
connected. There is also the point that one can be an anti- 
elite but pro-power theorist such as Robert Dahl. See his 
studies, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," The American 
Political Science Review, vol„ 52, No, 2 (June, 1958), pp. 463-9; 
and Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
12» There are, of course, others who have contributed to the method­
ology of power-elite analysis. Among these are G. Catlin,
J» Schumpeter, Charles Merriam, C. Wright Mills, Floyd Hunter, 
Herbert Simon and James March,
15
The power-elite approach derives its perspective from one
broad proposition. The most crucial aspect of any political system
is its stratification - all societies are divided into those who rule
and those who are ruled. Political stratification is common to all
political systems and the understanding of this is basic to the
13understanding of anything else in the political systems. Thus 
the concentration on power and those who wield it satisfied what was 
viewed as a crucial requirement in the study of politics: the
identification of one single phenomenon which was common and central 
to all political systems. But precisely because of this - the 
demand for a comprehensive and ubiquitous phenomenon - the concept 
of power (and its related concepts of influence, authority, elite) 
has been so controversial. In this sense, however correct the 
perspective of the power-elite approach, its application has been 
problematic.
The characteristic problems highlighted by the approach 
are indeed central to the political system: the existence and
nature of the political elite; its values, scope of influence, and 
operational codes, its recruitment of new members and survival;
13. One is reminded of the opening sentence of Harold D. Lasswell, 
Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland: The World
Publishing Co., 1958): 'The study of politics is the study
of influence and the influential.'
16
the instrumentalities for and the basis of elite status and the 
choice of values to achieve it; the impact of the political elite 
on the stability or instability of the system; and under what 
conditions it changes.
Given such a range of issues there have been different 
procedures of analysis. At the micro-cosmic level the approach 
has been used to analyse power relationships in small groups and 
local communities, as well as for case studies of political leader­
ship and political decision. At the macro-cosmic level it has been 
used to analyse, sometimes statistically, the people in power in a 
country; and for large-scale comparison between ruling elites at 
different times and places. One of the difficulties of the approach 
is directly related to the divorce between its applications at these 
two levels. While the micro-cosmic application has developed some 
analytic tools for its purpose, the macro-cosmic application has no 
equivalent accomplishment. Consequently the latter continues to 
rely on direct observations of power relationship through 
assumptions about the constitution of the ruling elite. This is a 
questionable procedure because it assumes away some of the central 
issues of the power-elite approach, viz. who are the ruling elites 
and how do they maintain their status and exercise power. Therefore 
it is desirable to see if the analytic tools developed for application 
at the level of local communities can be applied at a level above this.
17
Without entering into the extremely complex and often
14abstract question of the nature of power, it is a truism to state 
that power in a community or society is exercised by individuals or 
groups. The question of power therefore resolves itself into 
the fundamental question of ’who governs?' Here it is not proposed 
to go further than this question. Thus we are solely concerned with 
those people in Penang who exercise political leadership irrespective 
of whether this leadership constitutes formal authority or informal 
influence or both. This latter caveat poses the problem of 
identifying leaders, a problem which is quite often resolved by 
definitional conventions. Before discussing the method by which 
political leaders are identified it is useful to consider the main 
approaches to the central problem of 'who governs?'
In general it may be said that there are two main approaches 
to the study of political leadership. One of these is 
characterized by the political elite studies undertaken mostly
14. Cf. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society 
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1950).
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by political scientists; the other by the community power studies
16pursued mainly by the sociologists. Essentially there are two 
main differences between the two approaches. Firstly political 
elite studies have tended to concentrate on leadership at the 
national level while community power studies, as the name suggests, 
have operated at the sub-national level, at the level of communities 
such as towns or cities. Secondly because political elite studies 
are pursued at the national level the problem of leadership 
identification is most often resolved by formal, a priori 
definitions; whereas community power studies are fundamentally
15. For recent surveys of the literature see, e.g., Carl Beck,
James M. Malloy and William R. Campbell, A Survey of Elites 
Studies (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, The
American University, 1965) and Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling 
Class (New York: Random House, 1963). See also T.B. Bottomore,
Elites and Society (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1964) and Dwaine 
Marvick, ed., Political Decision-Makers (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961) .
id. Most of the findings in this field are contained in the
following sources: Robert T. Daland, "Political Science and
the Study of Urbanism," American Political Science Review, vol.
57 (June 1957), pp. 491-509^ Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill and 
Charles R. Wright, Public Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler,
1961) ; Charles Press, ed., Main Street Politics, Policy Making
at the Local Level: A Survey of the Periodical Literature Since
1950 (East Lansing, Michigan: Institute for Community Development,
1962) ; Nelson W, Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and Charles M.
Bonjean and David M. Olson, "Community Leadership: Direction of
Research," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 9 (1964-1965), 
pp. 278-300.
19
concerned with the problem itself. This difference is mainly the
result of the level of analysis. At the local level formal authority
is seldom independent, partly because of external influence being
exerted upon it and partly because of the saliency of internal
informal influence. In these circumstances it is difficult to
define political leadership as the exercise of formal authority. It
is this difficulty which gives rise to the concern with identifying
leaders in community power studies. On the other hand, at the
national level formal leaders appear prominently and the organization
of the state itself sanctions the exercise of power by these leaders.
No doubt these leaders themselves are subjected to informal influence
by individuals and groups outside the government but the latter are
18
not usually included in political elite studies as in the case of 
community power studies. Therefore political elites are often 
defined as members of the highest national political body."^
17* For a concise discussion of this issue see Charles M. Bonjean 
and David M. Olson, op.cit.
18. Instead there is a whole separate field of interest or pressure
groups studies. See Henry W. Ehrman, ed., Interest Groups in 
Four Continents (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press,
1958) and Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1964).
19. To cite three recent examples: Marshall R. Singer, The
Emerging Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964); and
Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The M.I.T. Press, 1965), Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New 
Nation: Political Development in Israel (New York: Atherton
Press, 1964) .
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A less important difference between the two approaches is
the concentration of community power studies in advanced societies,
particularly the United States, whereas in the last few years it has
become popular to study the political elites of the developing areas
largely because of the view that
... while there are many factors which 
affect the propensity of a nation to 
develop, it is clear that regardless 
of the differences in social systems, 
one of the requisites for development 
is a competent elite.... A basic 
assumption ... is that factors affecting 
the calibre of the elites play a major 
role in determining the propensity of 
different countries for economic growth 
and political stability, and are worth 
analysing in depth regardless of the 
importance of other variables.^
While sociologists and political scientists studying 
leadership have tended to concentrate at the community and the 
national levels respectively there has been no conflict in their 
substantive findings. But where the latter have studied leadership 
at the community level, as in the well known study of New Haven by
20. See, e.g., P.C. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Thom Kersteins,
The New Elite in Asia and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966);
and Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in 
Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967)
21. Ibid., p . viii.
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22Robert Dahl, they have arrived at a different characterization of 
the community power structure from that of the sociologists. It 
is in this difference that one may discern the main weakness of the 
community power studies.
Sociologists studying community power structure tend to
conclude that it is ’elitist' or 'monolithic', being controlled by a
23small coterie of socio-economic dominants. Such an over­
simplified conclusion has been attributed to the fact that 'they
have often regarded political power mainly as a by-product or
24residual category of economic power.' These studies therefore, 
suffer from the assumption that the community political system is 
based solely on the economic system. Some communities, no doubt, 
are strongly oriented towards economic activities and individuals 
who control the economic resources are bound to be very influential.
22. Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). See
also Nelson W. Polsby, op.cit., chs. 6 and 7.
23. Robert Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1964), p. 8. For some confirmatory evidence on this 
point see for example, Robert and Helen Lynd in Middleton in 
Transition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937), p„ 77 ff. Floyd
Hunter in Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1953) concludes that Regional City 
(Atlanta) is governed by a covert economic elite. Other 
examples are cited by Nelson W. Polsby, op.cit. See also C. 
Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1956) and Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership, U.S.A. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959).
24. Robert Presthus, op.cit,, p. 34.
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25But this can hardly be said to be the case with all communities.
Without making a similar assumption political scientists studying
community power structures arrive at a very different conclusion --
26that they are essentially pluralistic.
While the approach of the community power studies tends
to over-simplify the findings about community power structures,
some of the political elite studies tends to over-emphasize positions
of formal authority. This is so particularly where the analysis
27largely concentrates on the formal elites. Often this avoids the 
thorny problem of leadership identification by settling on the highest 
level of formal national leadership. Formal national leaders are such 
a prominent group and the institutions they represent, such as the 
cabinet or parliament, are so central to the government that one is at
25. Indeed a comparative study involving an English and American city
concludes that in the former public officials are more influential 
than the economic leaders. See Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and 
Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and
an English City," American Sociological Review, vol. 23 (1958),
pp. 9-150
26. Robert Presthus, op.cit,, p„ 8; see also Robert A. Dahl, op.cit„;
and Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free
Press, 1961). Elsewhere Robert Presthus suggests that 'the tendency 
toward elitism [in the community power structure] was inversely 
associated with size [of the community].' Robert Presthus, 
Behavioral Approaches to Public Administration (Alabama: University
of Alabama Press, 1965), p, 55
27. Examples of such concentration are Marshall R. Singer, op.cit.;
Frederick W. Frey, op3cito; Lester G. Seligman, op.cit.; Robert 0. 
Tilman, "Policy Formation, Policy Execution and the Political Elite 
Structure of Contemporary Malaya," in Wang Gungwu, ed., Malaysia 
(Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1964), pp. 346-355; and Henry R. Glick,
"Political Recruitment in Sarawak: A Case Study of Leadership in a
New State," The Journal of Politics, vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb. 1966),
pp. 81-99.
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once justified in identifying them as leaders as well as in studying them 
’in depth'. It is precisely because of this that the approach is 
preoccupied with the formal authority positions. Here national 
prominence by virtue of office is often equated with ability to 
exercise political power as if this is unrestrained by and unresponsive 
to other social forces. Such an equation is unconvincing since it 
implies that formal political leaders constitute the ruling elite; 
or in other words, they monopolize power in the system. Moreover 
the emphasis on positions of formal authority also tends towards the 
assumption that power is solely derived from these positions and 
exercised through them. If this is not true of the advanced societies 
as indeed the literature on community power structures and interest 
groups would lead us to believe, then how much more true is it of the 
new nations where both the political institutions and the political roles 
are more diffuse and less formalized?
In most societies there are some individuals who are not in 
positions of formal authority and vet are capable of exercising 
political leadership. Whether in any particular society the top 
leadership includes more or less of this type of leaders vis-a-vis 
the formal leaders is a matter for empirical investigation. But 
the approach of the political elite studies which defines leaders as 
formal authority-holders precludes such a possibility.
The tendency to treat only formal leaders has also prevented 
useful discussions on the legitimacy of leadership, on how 
authoritative and how acceptable is the structure of leadership.
24
A corollary of this is the concentration on the authoritative or 
formal method as opposed to the informal methods by which leader­
ship is exercised. Generally speaking, formal leaders, outside 
of the totalitarian context, seldom monopolize power and for this 
reason they are likely to act informally as well as formally. Both 
informal leaders and acts of informal leadership and influence are 
found more frequently and are likely to be more effective in 
situations where political institutions and roles are new. One 
suspects that this is very much the case with a majority of the new 
nations» Here the formal leadership generally includes leaders 
who are otherwise influential members of the society be they tribal 
chiefs, communal (ethnic group) leaders or the educated 'elite*.
In such an eventuality the saliency of political authority is 
buttressed by the tradition of influence, and the legitimacy of 
political institutions is supported by the traditional structures 
of influence» This is perhaps the crux of permanence and stability 
among primitive and traditional political systems where there 
exists an indeterminancy between the political and non-political 
spheres of behaviour and influence»
Where formal leadership does not include otherwise 
influential leaders it risks the challenge and the opposition of the 
latter and is unlikely to be very effective short of 'overthrowing' 
the informal leaders» Even then such a leadership is precarious 
since it is primarily based on formal positions of authority which,
25
in most new nations, are not widely understood or appreciated and 
hence not popularly considered as legitimate.
Thus informal leadership, whether it is the inclusion of
influential members among the top leaders or the informal methods
by which authority and influence are exercised and compliance
28obtained, cannot be overlooked, This is what studies using the 
political elite approach, particularly as applied to studies of new 
nations, have tended to do,,
Another difficulty with the approach is the lack of
agreement on the definition of the term ’elite'. There is no need
to itemize the almost countless definitions that have been employed,
suffice it to mention a few which have recently been used in the
context of new nations. Reference has been made above to the equation
of the term political elite to members of the national parliament.
Another recent usage defines the African elite as '... those persons
who were western-educated and wealthy to a high degree relative to
29the mass of the population.' Still other studies have employed
28. Cf. Myron Weiner, "Traditional Role Performance and the Develop­
ment of Modern Political Parties," The Journal of Politics, vol. 
26, No. 4 (November, 1964), pp. 830-49. In this article Weiner 
suggests that the success of a local branch of the Congress 
Party is a function of the effective adaptation of traditional 
political roles and skills to the organizational requirement
of the party.
29. P.C. Lloyd, ed„, op.cit., p„4. Interestingly this basic defi­
nition is not subscribed to by the contributors to this volume.
26
the concept even more loosely to refer to the generality of those 
who achieve the highest rate of social mobility in the society 30
These different interpretations or usages of the concept 
of elite hint at the necessity for taking into account the formal 
authority-holders and other sectors of the political leadership.
This will enable one to see whether or not the former are in fact 
the larger element in the total leadership structure of the society 
and the roles played by informal leaders. This, however, requires 
a research strategy which leaves open the question of who in a 
society are authoritative and/or influential leaders. Such a 
strategy, as far as it can be determined, has so far not been devised 
for the study of leadership in new nations.
In the case of those new states which are also plural 
societies it is also necessary to take account of the relationship 
between the basic characteristics and the leadership structure of 
the society. Generally these societies lack cohesive governing
31elites because leaders are dependent upon various bases of power.
30. For example, R. van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian 
Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960j~
31. The point has been made that 1... in African and under-developed 
countries the total elite is essentially pluralistic....’ A.W. 
Southall, "the Concept of Elites and Their Formation in Uganda," 
in P.C. Lloyd, ed., op.cit., p. 342. Recall that this assertion 
has also been made by some who study community power structures 
in advanced societies, whereas those who study the 'total elite’ 
of these societies such as C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter 
arrive at a different conclusion.
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This does not, of course, imply that the leadership structure cannot
be effective, But that is partly a function of its composition and,
32as one writer has hypothesized, may determine its legitimacy.
These issues become particularly relevant in plural
33societies which are new nations. Here leadership is always
problematic and the potentiality for political instability is always 
34great. Where there is relative stability there is probably an
important function of the leadership structure. What this function 
is can be determined, even if only indirectly, by adopting an approach 
which concentrates neither on the abstract concept of power nor on 
the formal elite but on the composition of leadership. By looking 
at this composition some explanations may be deduced for the presence 
or absence of political stability. For this purpose we seek
32. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books,
1963), pp. 64-70.
33. For an outstanding study of these issues in such a context see 
Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in 
British Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
34. It has been observed that 'In today's underdeveloped areas, 
political upheavals are more apt to come through elite group 
initiative than popular protest,' Wilfred Malenbaum, "Economic 
Factors and Political DevelopmentThe Annals, vol. 358 (March, 
1965), p. 49, The African regimes that were overthrown in 
recent years were not victims of popular uprisings but of 
revolts by a section of the elite.
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35to apply the analytic method commonly used in community power studies.
Basically there are three methods by which leaders can be 
identified. Firstly there is the familiar positional approach which 
simply treats all those in positions of authority as leaders. The 
levels and types of positions selected as significant vary from one 
study to another. Secondly there is the reputational approach which 
attributes leadership to those who are reputed to be leaders 
irrespective of their positions in the society. This approach also
varies from one application to another since it is possible to ask 
any number of individuals from any walk of life to nominate leaders.
And thirdly there is the decisional approach which characterizes 
leaders as those who actually participate in decision making. Each
3 6of these approaches has been variously criticized for its inadequacy.
As a result recent community power studies have favoured a methodology
37which combines any two or all three approaches.
35, The best summary of this is contained in Charles M. Bonjean and 
David M. Olson, op.cit. See also W.H. Form and D. Miller, Industry, 
Labor and Community (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), pp, 517-33.
36, For a summary of these criticisms see Charles M, Bonjean and 
David M, Olson, op.cit.
37, For a succint argument for such a case see Robert Presthus,
Men at the Top, op.cit,, pp, 52-63.
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It is doubtful whether in the context of new nations it
is possible to rely on the decisional approach since great secrecy
is attached to the decision-making process. So far studies of
leadership have depended largely on the positional approach which
’precludes accepting the legitimacy of the leadership structures as 
38problematic.’ The methodology adopted for our analysis 
supplements the positional with the reputational approach, with more 
reliance on the latter, Such a methodology is more versatile than 
the conventional one of equating leadership with formal position. 
Primarily the methodology adopted here is intended to identify the 
leaders in order to analyse their social backgrounds. It also 
permits the analysis of the relationship between the leadership structure 
and communal politics generally.
38. Charles M. Bonjean and David M, Olson, op.cit., p, 283.
30
For this reason Chapter IV is devoted to the development of 
a methodology to study leadership in Penang. As will be seen 
later the techniques used in community power studies are suitable 
for the analysis of contemporary rather than past leadership. But 
since practical requirements exclude the analysis of past leadership 
in this way the gap is filled as mentioned earlier, by a straight­
forward historical analysis. This is done in the first part of 
Chapter III.
While the backgrounds of the leaders give a picture of the 
way leaders are recruited and from whence in the society, they do not 
adequately explain leadership competition. In particular, the social 
characteristics of the contemporary leaders do not by themselves 
’predict' who the future leaders may be and how they will be re­
cruited. For this reason, the second part of Chapter III is a study 
of electoral competition and its impact, current and potential, on 
the leadership structure.
Besides identifying the contemporary leaders in Penang so 
that their social backgrounds may be studied and their implications 
drawn (as in Chapter V) the techniques used also permit an analysis 
of how the leadership structure in Penang appears to the non-elite. 
This is the subject of Chapter VI which analyses the role of 
leadership perceptions.
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The third approach used in this thesis is that of political 
culture. The study of political culture is not new either within 
the discipline of political science or within the social sciences in 
general. The earliest writings on politics speculated on the 
societal conditions conducive to political stability and stable 
political change. Surely these conditions include the political 
culture of the polity. In more recent times the writings of 
Montesquieu, de Tocqueville and Bagehot, among many others, include 
more specific comments on political culture, or on those aspects of 
the general culture which bear on politics. From few decades ago 
until recently national character studies were very popular. This 
particular interest grew out of the belief that one can say something 
meaningful about the politics of a particular society by knowing its 
national character or national culture. In the last few years, 
however, there is increasing recognition in the literature that the 
basic general culture of a society is no longer a sure or even a 
good guide to its politics. The implication is that the general 
culture is not a variable independent of politics; that one cannot 
rely comfortably on the assumption that culture conditions politics 
and not vice versa.
The main reasons for such a development may be 
speculated upon:
32
(a) contributions of social psychology and social 
anthropology about the working of culture, its 
vulnerability and changeability;
(b) realization that more often than not the 
national culture is not totally integrated 
and that there are many sub-cultures, and
not necessarily compatible ones, in a society;
(c) national character studies are vague and not 
very useful in either explaining or predicting 
particular political developments;
(d) and perhaps more significantly the process of
nation-building in the new nations drives home
the point that indeed one can mould culture 
39by politics and that politics is not 
necessarily a captive of culture. To be sure,
the politics of these new states does not com­
pletely ignore the cultural settings of which
39. where this can be done without impinging on the more intran­
sigent features of the traditional cultures the process tends 
to be more stable and less disruptive. This particular set 
of problems is studied by David Apter in Ghana in Transition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) and The
Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic
Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
Also see McKim Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States," 
in Clifford Geert2 , ed., Old Societies and New States (New 
York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 27-56.
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they are a parte More often than not explicit 
recognition is made of the cultural traditions 
of the country and/or its sub-groups, and 
conscious attempts are made to mould the 
changes of these traditions in the direction of 
modernization and developmental change. (It 
does not necessarily follow that such attempts 
are always successful.)
Is it surprising, therefore, that not only is national character 
study becoming less popular in general, but also that no political 
scientist has successfully made such a study for a developing 
country? For one thing cultural heterogeneity which is 
characteristic of most, if not all developing countries, precludes 
the possibility of successfully making such a study.
But this is not saying that the focus on the relationship 
between culture and politics has been abandoned. In fact
what actually takes place can be characterized as a change in focus
from the vague concept of culture with its confusing usage in the social
40 41sciences to the more exact focus on political culture.
40c See A„L„ Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical
Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.:
Peabody Museum, 1952).
41. One good example of this is Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba,
The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
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The concept of political culture can be used on many levels 
42of analysis» The concept used in Chapter VII follows that 
developed by Almond and Verba, although it is slightly amended. 
Moreover instead of applying the approach at the level of the 
state it is applied to one group which can reasonably be said to 
constitute the potential elite and future activitists. This is the 
Sixth Form students of Penang» The analysis of the political 
culture of this group also includes, albeit inferentially, its 
future political impact.
The above exposition of the approaches used suggests that 
we are not relying on any one of them, or indeed on all collectively,
42» For a comparison of the definitions and usages of the concept 
between Almond, Beer and Macridis, see Young C. Kim, "The 
Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics," The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1964), pp. 313-36.
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in order to present a complete analysis of the ’whole political
system' of Penang. This would be ludicrous both in terms of the
eclectic methodology adopted and the fact that a state in a federation
43is never a system on its own. So our emphasis is on the sub­
national level. In this respect our concern is unlike most studies 
of developing politics which usually accept the nation-state as 
the basic unit. Besides the empirical reasons mentioned 
above, the sub-national unit is open to a closer examination of 
those issues which are central to the problems of political 
development, viz. leadership,^  authority, its legitimacy or 
acceptance, political competition and stability.^ Indeed 
the sub-national unit also permits the use of the method of
43. Indeed it has been suggested that one should not even consider 
a nation as an autonomous or closed system. Fred W. Riggs, 
op. cit., p . 171.
44. In a recently compiled bibliography of studies on leadership
there is only one 'non-western' item at the sub-national level. 
See Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Leadership: An
Inter-disciplinary Bibliography," in Edinger, ed., Political 
Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: John Wiley,
1967), pp. 348-66.
45. One writer has roughly the same notion in mind when he writes
'Ultimately, it is in the villages of Asia that the political 
foundations for ... change must be laid, sustained, and built 
upon.' Robert E. Ward, "Village Government in Eastern and 
Southern Asia: A Symposium," The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol.
XV, No. 2 (February, 1956), p. 175.
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Verstehen or in the words of Max Weber the achievement of explanation 
by [subjectively] interpretive [sic] understanding, as distinguished 
from external observation , , 0. ’ That here and there we have 
exploited our basic knowledge of and experience in the unit of 
study will be evident in the thesis.
In concentrating on Penang this thesis cannot claim to 
present an epitome of Malaysian leadership, let alone of Malaysian 
politics generally. This will become clear when the physical, 
social and institutional aspects of the state of Penang are 
characterized in the next chapter. Since it is not conceived 
as a case study few inferences are drawn about its bearing on 
national political leadership.
46, The concept of Verstehen was originally developed by Max Weber 
but there does not seem to be an exact English word equivalent 
to its meaning. Broadly it stands for various types of under­
standing of social acts which are not strictly derived from 
the acts themselves but from a subjective or normative frame 
of reference. On account of this Weber himself was conscious 
of its limitations as a tool of analysis and warned against 
reification of the concept and over-estimation of 'its 
cognitive value,' Nonetheless he considered it 'useful [and] 
indispensable [because] subjective understanding is the
specific characteristic of sociological knowledge,' Max 
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans, 
by A.M, Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: Free Press,
1947), pp„ 103-4, Cf. T, Abel, "The Operation called Verstehen," 
American Journal of Sociology, vol, 54 (November, 1948), pp. 211-8,
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CHAPTER I I .
THE SETTING
(A) The P h y sica l and S o c ia l Background
(B) The Legal and I n s t i t u t i o n a l  F ea tu res
o f Government.
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(A) The Physical and Social Background,
The history of the settlement of Penang by the East India 
Company and the subsequent expansion of British influence and rule 
in the Malay Peninsula has been treated in numerous studies.1 For 
our purpose the barest historical account of the evolution of Penang’s 
formal political status will suffice.
Largely on account of increasing trade opportunities with 
China and trade competition with the Dutch in the East Indies, the 
East India Company established a trading post on the island of Penang 
in 1786, under the charge of one, Captain Francis Light, who had 
traded up and down the Straits of Malacca for many years previously. 
When he first landed on Penang island he found the island thickly 
wooded and hardly any sign of human habitation. Two years later
1. To cite a few, C.D. Cowan, ’’Early Penang and the Rise of
Singapore,” Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiastic Society, 
vol. XXII1, Part II, (March, 1950); Lennox A. Mills, British 
Malaya, 1824-1867 (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House, 1925) ;
C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877 
(Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1960); C.D. Cowan,
Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political
Control (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Rupert Emerson,
Malaysia: A Study m  Direct and Indirect Rule (Kuala Lumpur:
University of Malaya Press, 1964) "2nd ed."; and K.G. Tregonning, 
The British in Malaya: The First Forty Years, 1786-1826 (Tuscon:
The University of Arizona Press, 1965),
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the population was estimated at ten thousand. This stream of
settlement was to continue right up to the modern era. In the main
there were two reasons why this huge migration took place. Firstly,
Penang began as a free port from the very beginning and this attracted,
as originally envisaged by the Company, a large number of traders.
Secondly, Penang began to have a reputation for security and order.
It began as a trading post and it remains to this day very much a
commercial centre, even though Singapore and not Penang was to be 'the
2mart of the East' after 1819. But its role as a political foothold 
was significant and there can be no doubt that it greatly facilitated 
the settlement of Singapore in 1819, the acquisition of Malacca from 
the Dutch after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 and the subsequent
3
establishment of British Residents and Advisers in the Malay States.
According to K.G. Tregonning, the Company had not anticipated
that the new colony of Penang would be anything but a convenient
trading post; and neither the Company nor the Crown had foreseen any
4political significance in the new settlement. Consequently in the
2. The phrase was coined by the Duke of Wellington, then Colonel 
Wellesley, to describe the potential of Penang after he visited 
the island in 1797; quoted in Rupert Emerson, op.cit., p. 74.
3. Rupert Emerson has made a classic study of these events. See 
ibid., chs. II-VI,
4. K.G. Tregonning, op.cit., ch. IV.
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first few years British rule on the island was haphazard and, to all 
intents and purposes, under the control of one man, Francis Light.
But he managed, more by his own ingenuity and understanding of the 
population than anything else. This was apparent in his self- 
initiated appointments of a 'headman’ for the Chinese community in 
1787.* 6 78 Five years later he had appointed headmen or Capitans for 
each of the three main communities on the island, the Malays, the 
Chinese and the Indians.6 Clearly the plural society of Penang 
was already coming into being at this early stage.
The functions of the Capitans were generally that of keeping
law and order in their respective communities and 'to administer justice
7in all cases not requiring an appeal to higher powers.' This Capitan 
administration officially ended and a British judicial system was
O
finally established on the island in 1808. With the growth of the 
settlement the problems of civil administration increased. In 1800 a
5o Ibid., p. 46. For an interesting study of Chinese Capitans, see
CoS. Wong, A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans (Singapore: Ministry of
Culture, 1963).
6. See V. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University
Press, 1948), p. 143,
7. This pattern was apparently copied from the Dutch who first 
introduced this system of indirect rule. See C.S. Wong, op. cit., 
p. 9.
8. For a short summary of this event, see K.G. Tregonning, op. cit., 
pp. 53-7.
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Committee of Assessors was formed to oversee the imposition and 
collection of taxes for the upkeep of public facilities on the island. 
From this committee was to evolve the Municipal, and later City,
Council of George Town.
1800 is also a landmark year in another respect. The original 
treaty by which the Sultan of Kedah first ceded Penang island to the 
British was vague. After one unsuccessful attempt by the Sultan to 
recapture the island and two other treaties the British acquired from 
the Sultan a strip of the mainland opposite the island. This was 
given the name of Province Wellesley.
The island became a Residency in 1799 and began to assume a 
political status wholly unanticipated some twelve years earlier. Six 
years later, the island was elevated to the status of a Presidency and
9henceforth was to deal directly with London on most matters. This 
development was largely dictated by the Anglo-French rivalry and the 
need to establish a naval base in the East to secure British interests. 
But in that very same year the Battle of Trafalgar was fought and 
British victory removed the need to make Penang a naval base. The 
Presidency of Penang was subsequently to lose its status.
9. This was an unduly complicated arrangement since Penang, as a 
Presidency, was junior to the three Indian presidencies and 
administratively under the Governor-General in Council in India.
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The Angle-Dutch Treaty of 1824 facilitated the incorporation 
of Singapore and Malacca into the Presidency of Penang and together 
they became known as the Straits Settlement Presidency, with Penang 
as the administrative capital. In spite of this increase in territory 
however the Straits Settlements lost its presidency status in 1830 and 
reverted to that of a residency under the control of the Presidency of 
Bengal, Six years later the seat of government in the Straits 
Settlement was finally transferred to Singapore in recognition of the 
latter's rise in importance both as a trading centre and a strategic 
area, The Straits Settlements remained under the control of the Bengal 
Presidency until 1867 when jurisdiction was transferred to the Colonial 
Office in London, This was to follow a few years later by British 
intervention in the Malay States, beginning with the Sultanate of 
Perak in 1874. By the end of the century the 'Federated Malay States' 
was organized with a federal administration centred in Kuala Lumpur.
This federation included Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang.
The other Malay States, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johore, Kedah and Perils, 
were later formed into the 'Unfederated Malay States.'
Thus towards the end of the nineteenth century, Malaya 
had three separate systems of government -- the Straits 
Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay 
States. The Straits Settlements, under a Governor in Singapore,
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each had a Resident Councillor,^  the Federated Malay States each 
had a British Resident, and the Unfederated Malay States each had 
a British Adviser. Penang's status as a Straits Settlement was 
to remain unchanged until the Second World War.
In 1941 Japan attacked and conquered Malaya. When 
British rule was re-established in September 1945 the country 
was placed under a military administration. This administration 
ceased the next year when a civilian form of government was constructed.
The tripartite political system of the country was radically 
altered and the divisions ceased to exist. In its place the ill-fated 
Malayan Union was inaugurated. The Union included all the states, 
except Singapore which became a Crown Colony. So for the first 
time since Penang was founded it was incorporated into a union with the 
rest of the States, and together with Malacca it ceased to be ruled 
from Singapore.
10. In Singapore the Resident Commissioner also acted as the Colonial 
Secretary and in the latter capacity he was the administrative 
head of the Straits Settlements.
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The resumption of civilian government under the Malayan 
Union was most unpopular in all quarters.^ The Malayan Union 
itself lasted less than two years. The last colonial government, 
the Federation of Malaya, was instituted on February 1st, 1948,
Like the Malayan Union the Federation included all states except 
Singapore. Penang’s position as a state in the Federation remained 
unchanged. Penang, like Malacca, had a British Resident Commissioner. 
With independence in 1957 the British Resident Commissioner was re­
placed by a Governor, both for Penang and Malacca. The first non-
12British governor for Penang was Raja Tun Uda Al-Haj. But unlike 
his former counterparts, the Governor of Penang is only the con­
stitutional head of the state and he exercises no actual executive 
power. The formation of Malaysia in 1963 did not alter Penang's 
constitutional position in the Federation.
11. For an account of the Malayan Union see J. de V. Allen, The Malayan
Union (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies Mono­
graph Series No. 10, 1967). See also T.H. Silcock and Ungku A. 
Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya," in W.L. Holland, ed., Asian Nation­
alism and the West (New York: MacMillan, 1953), pp. 267-347. For
an excellent account of the nature and course of the controversy 
brought about by the Malayan Union and the subsequent evolution of 
constitutional government, see K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the 
Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University in Malaya
Press, 1965), pp. 25-56. Two other relevant articles are: Victor
Purcell, "A Malayan Union: The Proposed Constitution," Pacific
Affairs, vol. XIX (March, 1946), pp. 35-8; and Gerald Hawkins, 
"Reactions to the Malayan Union," Pacific Affairs, vol. XIX (Sept., 
1946), pp. 282-5.
12. He retired on 31st August, 1967 after a ten years tenure.
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Geography:
The State of Penang consists of the island of Penang 
and the mainland strip called Province Wellesley. It has an 
area of approximately 395 square miles -- the island is 110 
square miles and Province Wellesley 285 square miles. The channel 
which separates the two territories varies in width from a minimum 
of two miles at the narrows on the north to ten miles in the south.
The island is dominated by a central hill mass which rises 
to a height of 2,722 feet at one point and which divides the island 
in a north-south direction. This central range is covered with 
tropical vegetation and, in the main, slopes gently towards the 
north-east. This relatively flat promontory was the original site 
of the settlement of the island. Today the city of George Town 
covers most of this area.. Along the coastline of the island, 
mudflats and mangrove swamps characterize the foreshores of the 
east and west, but on the north and south are rocky highlands, 
sandy coves and stretches of sand. There are a few small islands 
off-shore, the largest of them being Pulau Jerejak off the south­
east coast.
Province Wellesley is about seven miles in width and 
runs for about 40 miles from north to south. In the north it 
is bounded by the Sungei Muda (Muda River) and in the south in 
part by the Sungei Krian. The boundary which demarcates it from
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the State of Kedah on the east is an arbitrary line which bears no 
relation to any physical feature. The Province is mostly flat, the 
majority of the land being below the fifty feet contour line.
Except for the outcropping of Bukit Mertajam -- a hill which rises 
abruptly to a height of 1,700 feet -- the area is divided between 
the swampy estuaries of numerous rivers on the west and cultivated 
plains away from the coast. North of the Prai River the coast­
line is sandy and fringed with coconut trees. South of this river 
extensive mudflats and mangrove swamps prevail.
As in the rest of Malaya the climate of Penang is typically 
monsoonal. There is little variation in temperatures, the mean 
maximum being around 88°F and the mean minimum being around 74°F. 
There is no hot or cold season, but with the monsoons there are 
two wet seasons in the year. The maximum rainfall of 15 inches 
is obtained in the month of October, while February, being the 
driest, has an average of a little less than 5 inches of rain.
The humidity is high throughout the year, average maximum and 
minimum being 95% and 60% respectively.
Given its location and harbour Penang is an important 
communication centre. It is the northern terminal port for the 
country and used by both local and international shipping lines.
The airport of Bayan Lepas, situated on the southeast of the island, 
caters for regular air services to the east coast of Malaya, the
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other major towns, Thailand and, until Confrontation, northern 
Sumatra. The railway terminal at Prai, on the mainland, was the 
northern terminal of the Malayan railway system. In recent years 
a service has been maintained from Prai to Bangkok. The railway 
terminal was extended to Butterworth in October, 1968 in conjunction 
with the completion of the three deep-water wharves claimed to be 
the nation’s most modern port facilities.
For vehicular traffic the island is connected to 
Butterworth by a ferry system which is controlled by one of the 
three public corporations in the country, the Penang Port Commission. 
From Butterworth there are two main trunk roads, one running north 
to Thailand and the other south all the way to Singapore.
The State is highly urbanized, as we shall see sub­
sequently. The City of George Town used to be the largest urban 
centre in the country, but with independence and the rapid 
development of the Federal Capital it is now the second largest 
city in Malaysia. Almost half the total State population live 
and work within the city limits. The next largest town in the 
State is Butterworth, situated directly opposite George Town on 
the mainland. In recent years Federal development policies have 
promoted the status of Butterworth from a connecting point on the 
mainland for George Town to that of a minor industrial centre with
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1
modern port and rail facilities. The third largest urban area 
of the state is the town of Bukit Mertajam, which derives its 
name from the hill at the foot of which the town rests. From 
Bukit Mertajam the railway line from Prai/Butterworth branches 
north to Kedah, Perlis and Thailand, and southwards to Ipoh,
Kuala Lumpur and beyond. South of Bukit Mertajam is the town 
of Nibong Tebal, the administrative capital of the lower part of 
Province Wellesley.
On the island of Penang there are numerous small townships 
located largely along the main road which runs right round the island. 
Most of these developed from fishing villages and many of them still 
retain their original characteristics. The small township of Bayan 
Lepas derives its significance chiefly from the airport. All along 
the road to the airport from George Town are to be found settlements, 
as the human population overflows the city limit. Towards the 
foothills of the central range on the island is the town of Ayer Itam. 
This is famous for its Buddhist temples and the site of the 
funicular railway which climbs to the top of Penang Hill -- a resort 
and residential hill station which caters mostly to the rich.
The development of Ayer Itam can largely be attributed to the 
overflow of population from the city which has converted it into
a residential suburb.
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A Demographic Profile of Penang:
From the very beginning of the settlement of Penang the
island had attracted immigrants from the mainland states, especially
Kedah, as well as from China and India. Francis Light's original
13instruction from Bengal was to establish a free port. As a free 
port the island thrived and with this thriving came the beginning 
of a large population. Census figures, not absolutely reliable, 
show that the state had a population of over 26,000 in 1812, a large 
majority of these living on the island. Even though Province 
Wellesley was acquired in 1800, it only had a population of slightly 
over 6,000 in 1820. (See Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 for the 
distribution of population in the State).
13. Bengal had written to him, 'We desire you will refrain from 
levying any kind of duties or tax on goods landed or vessels 
importing at Prince of Wales Island [Penang Island], and it 
is our wish to make the Port free to all nations.' Quoted 
in K.G. Tregonning, op.cit., p. 110.
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Table 2.1 - Population of Penang.
Year Total
1812 26,107
1820 41*220
1833 86,275
1843* 1 91,978
1851 107,914
1860 124,772
1871 133,230
1881 188,245
1891 232,003
1901 244,094
1911 271,374
1921 294,215
1931 340,375
19432 413,207
1947 446,321
1957 572,100
Malays*
No. %
9854 37.7
19479 47.3
59045 68.4
62713 68.2
69680 64.6
71723 57.5
75216 56.5
90131 47.9
104355 45.0
103134 42.3
109937 40.5
105458 35.8
110237 32.4
124621 30.2
136163 30.5
165092 28.9
Chinese
No. %
7558 29.0
8920 21.6
11010 12.8
13822 15.0
24188 22.4
36222 29.0
36561 27.4
67354 35.8
86988 37.5
97471 39.9
110206 40.6
133234 45.3
169985 50.0
227167 55.0
247366 55.4
327240 57.2
Indians
No. %
7113 27.3
8874 21.5
10346 12.0
11496 12.5
9753 9.0
14132 11.3
18611 14.0
27202 14.5
35987 15.5
37774 15.5
45901 16.9
49656 16.9
53654 15.8
57050 13.8
57157 12.8
69035 12.1
Others
No. %
1582 6.1
3947 9.6
5874 6.8
3947 4.3
4293 4.0
2695 2.2
2842 2.1
3558 1.9
4673 2.0
5715 2.3
5330 2.0
5867 2.0
6499 1.9
4369 1.1
5635 1.3
10733 1.9
* Equivalent to Census category of "Malaysians". All other categories 
are used according to Census practice.
1. Combined figures of Penang Island for 1842 and P.W. for 1844.
2. Census taken during the Japanese occupation and cited in the 1947 
Census Report Appendix D.
NOTE: Absolute figures were obtained from the 1947 and 1957 Census
Reports, but percentages were computed independently.
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Table 2.2
Population of Province Wellesley Only
Year Total Malays Chinese Indians Others
1820 6,185 5,399 325 338 123
1844 51,479 44,271 4,107 1,185 1,286
1947 183,616 87,477 69,298 25,554 1,287
1957 233,234 104,401 97,554 28,389 2,890
We have noted earlier in this chapter that community
Capitans were appointed to keep the peace among their respective
communities. From the very start, therefore, Penang had a mixed
population -- the genesis of the plural society Malaysia is today.
But unlike the present composition the Chinese did not form a
majority. '... [T]he Indian community from the very beginning was
almost as large as the Chinese .... Penang was almost an Indian 
14port.' While this opinion is largely correct, it cannot be said
of the state as a whole (see Table 2.1). Rather it reflects the 
fact that within the port area, as a trading centre, there were as 
many Indians as Chinese. But in 1812 there were fewer Chinese and 
Indians in Penang than there were Malays. The Malays constituted 
38 per cent of the total population while there were slightly more 
Chinese than Indians. While it is clear that the Chinese and
14. Ibid., p. 165.
52
Indians, in the beginning, were attracted to Penang by its trading 
facilities, historical accounts do not give any adequate reason 
why the Malays migrated to Penang. However there is no doubt that 
the Siamese invasion of Kedah in 1821 caused a large outflow of 
Malays from that state, and most of them apparently came to Province 
Wellesley (See Table 2.2).^ Population figures for the state as 
a whole show that between 1820 and 1833 there was an absolute 
increase of 45,055 people, and a percentage growth of 109 per cent 
of the total population. Figures for Province Wellesley show that 
there were 6,185 people in 1820 and 51,479 in 1844. This con­
stitutes a growth of 732 per cent with the Malays accounting for 
720 per cent. So there can be no doubt that the Siamese invasion 
is responsible for the migration of Malays to Penang, in particular 
to Province Wellesley. The overall state figures indicate that 
during this period the Malays constituted the largest percentage of 
the population growth. (See Table 2.3). The Malay population 
growth figures for the entire period between 1812 and 1957 never 
top the 87.8 per cent recorded for this particular period.
15. Kedah was said to have a population of about 50,000 before the 
Siamese invasion. In 1839 its population had dwindled to 
21,000. These figures were given in John Crawfurd, Descriptive 
Dictionary of the Indian Islands (London, 1856) and T.J. Newbold, 
The British Settlement in the Straits of Malacca (London, 1839) 
respectively. Cited by M.V. Del Tufo in Malaya: A Report of 
the 1947 Census of Population (London, n.dT) [this is the 
official 1947 Census Report, and hereafter cited as such], p. 30.
IN
TE
RC
EN
SA
L 
GR
OW
TH
 O
F 
PE
NA
NG
 P
OP
UL
AT
IO
N 
BY
 R
AC
E*
53
m
-3
3 CM Os1 rH r-H CM OO rH1 CM rH CM1 CO <r m
ON
if)u rH
•C T3u
36
5
CM
ON 92
7
34
6 00
OsiD 14
7
71
6
11
5 CM
o 38
3
53
5 CMCO
vO 13
0 v£>
MD 39
8 CO
o
55 CM rH rH1 H1 r-H rH
1
CM1 in 19
47
•g
•r-l
0»a
c
x:
3o
tit
co
JJ
3
oa.
rH
•U
XJ<u
C/5
X5
■U
o
ä
w
S'?
S-S
CO CM ON o o sO rH 00 o <r r*. co
li
. CO s o1 26
. co
m
in
20
. £ 00 <* O ON
7
6
1 CM
15
0
7
4
3 ONP?
ON rH
ON
m , 7
8
5 r*-00
12
7
7
55
00
ON
ON ,3
96
10
7 005
rH rH r-H rH
1
00 00 r-H 00 CO CO co rHrH
o O co o <r O o ON 00 s£) in o m
OS <t
49
. m
vO
rH <r vO
m
v£>
00 46
. o
rH
ON 00 r-H
n- vo 63
.
CM
s£> s CM vOvO a ONco COON CO00 mco 00CM rHm CM ON00 ON 00CO o 00 CO o co n* vO <f o f"v r-H rH
rH CM CM o CM 8 ON O cm COCM vDCO r- o*n cm ON
r- 00 co rH co rH m rH ON s£> CO on o
CO
vO oO i co CM rH 27. CMco o1 24
. ON
1
o 19
.
34
. co
CM
in
CM
vO
vO
vO
m
00
s£>
vO
vO
ON
CO co
ON
<f
in
ON CM
rH
CM
CM ,8
03
ON
r-
,7
79
, 3
84
 
,5
42
O n
CM
ON
Os ON
co
CO SO CM co <r rH s£> i <t r-lrH r-H 00CM
Os CO vO CO sO 00 co CO CM CM r- <f o CM
57
.
10
9. NO 17
. in so r-H
<f 23
. m rHr-H 00 in
rH 00
CM
CO
CM
CO
rH
rH
m
o
CO
o
93
6
8
5
8 00m
-t i 0
1
5
, 7
58
,0
91
,2
80
rH
s , 16
0 cm
CO rH
00 rH
ON
r^ -
in in m mrH vO
00 m
m
CO
<r
CM
CM
CM
CM
vO CM CO
CO
in
CM
o co co r-H o rH rH rH r-H rH rH rH co r-*.
CM
00rH
CO
CO 00rH
m
00rH
vO
00rH 00
00
00rH
ON
00rH srH rHOS CMONrH COONrH O n ONr-H rH mO nr-H
1
CM O CO CO A O A A A 2 A rH A  A 1r^
2
CM
00
rH
CO
00rH är-H m00 vO00rH 00rH 0000rH ONCO grH rHON CMONrH co <rON ONrH rH ON
*'
Ma
la
ys
' 
an
d 
'O
th
er
s'
 c
at
eg
or
ie
s 
ar
e 
co
ll
ap
se
d.
 
Ea
rl
ie
r 
So
ur
ce
:
ce
ns
us
es
 h
av
e 
'M
al
ay
s'
 a
nd
 '
Ot
he
r 
Ma
la
ys
ia
ns
' 
fo
r 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
; 
Ce
ns
us
 R
ep
or
ts
 o
f
an
d 
'E
ur
oo
ea
ns
'.
 '
Eu
ra
si
an
s'
 a
nd
 '
Ot
he
rs
' 
fo
r 
th
e 
la
tt
er
.
54
The Siamese invasion of Kedah can also be said to have 
pushed the Malay percentage of the population from 37.7 per cent 
in 1812 and 47.3 per cent in 1820 to 68.8 per cent in 1833.
This last figure is also the highest one ever.
For the population as a whole the intercensal growth is 
a highly irregular one. In absolute numbers the greatest growth 
took place from the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion and 
occupation being responsible for a brief slowing of population 
increase. But in percentage of intercensal growth the peak period 
occurred a century earlier. The opening up of tin-mining areas in 
the adjacent state of Perak and the beginning of British intervention 
in the Malay States probably account for a peak period of growth in 
the last three decades of the nineteenth century. By 1901 the 
population of Penang had almost reached a quarter of a million.
In terms of racial categories no community constituted 
half of the population before 1820 (see Table 2.1). The early 
figures show that the Malays were the largest minority while there 
were about as many Chinese as there were Indians. One interesting 
fact about this period is the large number of Europeans and 
Eurasians in Penang. This is probably a reflection of the new 
status Penang acquired as a fourth presidency of India at this
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time
In 1820 Malays constituted 47.3 per cent of the total 
population. This percentage must have risen considerably a year 
later when the Siamese invasion of Kedah took place. By 1833 it 
was recorded that Malays were 68.4 per cent of the population -- 
there were a total of 59,045 Malays in the state with 75 per cent 
of them living in Province Wellesley. This Malay percentage 
declined steadily, decade after decade, until it reached 28.9 per 
cent in 1957. In two periods, 1891-1901 and 1911-1921, there were 
net decreases in the Malay population. (In the same two periods 
the Chinese community had the two highest percentage growths of its 
population. See Table 2.3). In the beginning of the latter 
period the Malay community was exceeded by the Chinese community in 
percentage of the total population. 1911 was the year which
16. This no doubt led to complaints about the top-heavy administration 
in Penang and the heavy cost involved. See K.G. Tregonning,
op.cit., ch. IV.
17. The classic studies of the Chinese in Malaya are written by 
Victor Purcell; see his The Chinese in Malaya, op.cit. ;
The Chinese in Modern Malaya (Singapore: Eastern Universities
Press, 1960); and The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965). A short but very illuminating 
study of the forces and factors which historically contributed 
to the migration of the Chinese to Southeast Asia is Wang 
Gungwu, A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese (Singapore:
Eastern Universities Press, 1959). For a more contemporary 
view of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Maurice Freedman,
The Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Longer View (London: China
Society Occasional Paper No. 14, 1965).
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marked this apparently irreversible trend in the population 
composition.
Contrary to impressionistic accounts, drawn largely from 
inflated reports of colonial officials, the Chinese were in the 
minority for well over a century after Penang was founded. To be 
sure, the tendency of the Chinese to settle in urban areas, 
particularly George Town, gave the impression that 'the vast bulk
1of the population ... came from the provinces of south-east China' . 
This was not true until well into the present century. On average, 
during the first century of its settlement only 25 per cent of 
Penang's population was Chinese. Up to the end of last century 
there were fewer Chinese than Malays. It is only from 1911 onwards 
that the Chinese outstripped the Malays in number, and they did not 
form an absolute majority of the population until 1931. The 
predominance of Chinese in Penang is therefore a recent phenomenon. 
(In Province Wellesley they are still in the minority.) However, 
it is largely correct to say that from the very beginning the 
Chinese population had increased very steadily, while the opposite 
is true of the Malays from 1833 onwards. By 1931 the Chinese
18. R.N. Jackson, Pickering: Protector of Chinese (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 17. Jackson gives the 
population figure in 1872 as 133,000 which is roughly correct. 
But in that year the Chinese constituted only 27.4 per cent of 
the population. His account is, therefore, wrong.
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constituted exactly 50 per cent of the total population,, This 
figure went up to 55.4 per cent in 1947, and 57.2 per cent for 
1957, making Penang the only state in Malaya with an absolute 
majority of Chinese.^
Largely on account of the East India Company, Penang in 
the beginning was 'almost an Indian port.' In 1812 there were 
almost as many Indians in Penang as Chinese. But the increase 
in the Indian community never really matched that of the Chinese. 
With the exception of the first period with census figures, there 
was only one period, between 1860 and 1871, when the population 
increase among Indians was higher than that of the Chinese. This 
can largely be traced to the need for cheap and plentiful estate 
labour around this time. The building of roads and railways 
around the turn of this century was also partially responsible 
for a large migration of Indians to Malaya. This was partly 
reflected in Penang where the intercensal increase of Indians 
averaged around 6,800 between 1871 and 1911.
In terms of percentage of the population, the Indian 
figure was 27.3 per cent in 1812. This declined for the next
19. In terms of percentage of Chinese in the population, Penang 
is followed by Selangor with 48.2 per cent and Perak with 
44.2 per cent for the year 1957.
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fifty years. It was 14.0 per cent in 1871 and increased steadily
until after 1921. The depression years of the late 1920s and early
1930s greatly affected the market for Indian labour and as a result
20Indian migration to Malaya decreased substantially. This generally
had an effect on the population increase of Indians in Penang since
21Indian migrants came through Penang. In 1938 the Indian
Government banned the migration of unskilled Indians to Malaya, and 
this must have affected the increase of Indians in Penang. In the 
four intercensal periods beginning with 1921, the increase among the 
Indian population of Penang accounted for an average of only 5.8 per 
cent of the total population growth. During the same time the 
Indian per cent of the population dropped steadily from 16.9 per cent 
to 12.1 per cent. Among other things, this shows that the increase 
among the Indians has not matched those of the Chinese and the Malays.
So far we have looked at population growth in Penang as if 
this were a function of migration alone. Since population growth in 
any intercensal period far exceeds the average rate of natural increase,
20. For a comparative study of the Indians in Burma and Malaya, see
Usha Mahajani, The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya 
(Bombay: K.K. Vora, 1960).
21. Cf. Kernial Singh Sandhu, "Indian Immigration to Malaya, 1786-
1957," in K.G. Tregonning, ed., Papers on Malayan History 
(Singapore: Journal of South-East Asian History, 1962), pp. 40-72.
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this growth can largely be attributed to immigration. But this 
does not necessarily imply that the population is transient. In 
general it can be said that until very recent times only the Malays 
were a 'settled' population. The other communities by and large 
were less so. In the early period the Chinese and Indians came to 
work or trade and after some time return home, shipping facilities 
being available with the increase in sea-borne trade. Later when
there were great demands for labour, Chinese and Indian migration
22itself became a 'business'. Entrepreneurs were quick to seize 
the opportunities in indentured labour and they no doubt contributed 
to the increase in immigrants. In an important sense Penang was an 
'eye-opener' for the immigrants, particularly the Chinese. As one 
historian writes:
The foundation of Penang in 1785 [sic] was an 
entirely new feature in Nanyang history. For 
the first time, a virtually uninhabited island 
was being opened up for development. There 
was never any question of the Chinese being 
merely middlemen. They were soon to become 
some of the chief inhabitants.^
22. Cf. Victor Purcell's studies of the Chinese cited earlier, and 
Maurice Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in
Nineteenth-Century Singapore," Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. Ill (1960-1961), pp. 25-48.
23. Wang Gungwu, op.cit., p. 18.
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In order to determine the settledness of the population
in Penang, it is necessary to look at the ratio of male to female
among the population, and the percentage of native-born. Neither
of these two items is an objective indicator of how transient or
how settled the population has been. Several qualifications are
therefore in order. As immigrant communities the Chinese and
the Indian cannot be expected to maintain a normal sex ratio. This
ratio is amenable to government regulation, as in the case of the
operation of the Aliens Ordinance of 1933 which permitted Chinese
women to enter Malaya free of quota restriction. But there is also
nothing to prevent women from emigrating. It is only over a long
period that the sex ratio can be a partial indicator of permanent
settlement. Also local-born children of immigrant parents are just
as likely to emigrate as their parents. In this respect it is
worthwhile to note two separate observations about the Chinese
community in Malaya in general. It was estimated that at least
seventeen million Chinese had immigrated to Malaya and Singapore up
to 1947 and yet the Census of that year put the Chinese population
24of the two territories at just over two-and-a-half millions.
Secondly, there has been a surprisingly high proportion of both
local-born Chinese and Indians who emigrated in the post-war 
25decade 1947-1957. Therefore the two items selected here can only
24. Cited by J.C. Caldwell, "The Population of Malaya," (Ph. D. 
thesis, Department of Demography, A.N.U.), p. 102.
25. Ibid., p . 100.
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give a general idea of how transient or settled the different 
communities in Penang have been through the years.
From 1851 onwards when figures for males and females
were recorded, only the Malay community can be said to have had a 
26normal sex ratio. (See Table 2„4). As for the Chinese there
Table 2.4
Number of Females per 1,000 population in Racial Categories
Year Malays Chinese Indians Others
1851 479 183 241 466
1860 487 253 224 430
1871 492 170 245 442
1881 497 186 250 430
1891 494 211 266 438
1901 500 252 293 465
1911 502 298 289 490
1921 500 354 300 431
1931 496 403 311 464
1943 506 473 360 520
1947 508 482 381 499
1957 508 496 391 422
Source: The 1947 and 1957 Census Reports.
26. This normality can also be said to obtain in the residual
category of 'Others', but this category constituted only an 
average of about 2 per cent of the population in Penang.
See Table 2.1
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were only 183 women per thousand in 1851. At the beginning of this 
century Chinese women constituted just over a quarter of that 
community. But with the advent of the Aliens Ordinance of 1933 
mentioned earlier, the disparity in the Chinese sex ratio began to 
disappear. By 1947 the Census shows that the sex ratio among 
the Chinese in Penang had achieved a greater normality. In contrast 
to the Chinese, the Indian proportion of males to females did not 
change as much. In 1851 there were 241 women per thousand Indians. 
This proportion increased slowly. By 1957 there were 391 women 
per thousand Indians. This is not a normal proportion and may 
reflect the fact that Indians still continue to visit or revisit 
India. This suggests that the contrast between the Indian and 
the Chinese communities may be a function of the types of political 
regimes in China and in India. Certainly after the commune system 
was introduced in China economic hardships played a role in dis­
couraging the Chinese from returning to China. Governmental 
restrictions on travel to Communist countries have had a similar
effect. No such obstacle is encountered by the Indians, some of
27whom continue to maintain separate families in India.
27. Today there are two general occasions when the harbour area 
of Penang is heavily congested: one is when the Mecca-bound
ship is in port, and the other is when the ship bound for 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay calls at Penang.
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Another index of population stability is the percentage 
of those born in Malaya (and Singapore) and those born in Penang. 
Figures up to 1947 are not available, but the table below for the 
years 1947 and 1957 is quite revealing.
Table 2.5
Percentages of Native-born and Local-born in 
Racial Communities in Penang, 1947 and 1957
Year Malays Chinese Indian
Native-
born
Local-
born
Native-
born
Local-
born
Native-
born
Local-
born
1947 98.8 92.1 70.0 65.9 57,8 51.3
1957 99.1 88.2 79.7 71.8 65.5 56.1
NOTE: Local-born are those born in Penang.
Native-born are those born in Malaya and Singapore.
It is clear that the Malay community is the most settled of the three 
major communities in Penang. At the opposite pole is the Indian 
community in which more than a third of the population is born 
outside Malaya, In 1947, 70 per cent of the Chinese living in 
Penang were born in the country; and by 1957 this proportion had 
reached almost 80 per cent.
The two indicators used here to portray the settledness 
of the population in Penang confirm the general impression that of 
the two major immigrant communities, the Chinese community is more
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settled. Both are however becoming less and less transient.
Geographically Penang is the second smallest state in
Malaya; in terms of population it is the fifth largest. It
is the most densely populated state in the country, with three
times the density of its nearest rival Malacca. It has also been
the most urbanized state in Malaya since 1911, the first year for
which figures are available. By the Census of 1931 more than
29half of its population lived in urban areas, and the figure reached 
64,1 per cent in 1957. Moreover in 1947 a majority of the 
population was enumerated as living in urban areas of 10,000 
people or more
All these factors are reflected in the growth of the 
four urban areas in Penang as shown in the table following. George 
Town was the largest town in Malaya until 195 7. Today only Kuala 
Lumpur has a larger population. The percentage growth of the four 
areas from 1911 to 1957 is phenomenal The population of the City 
of George Town has not increased as greatly as that of the other 
three areas. This is largely because its population density has
28. Cf. J.C. Caldwell, op.cit , pp„ 98-103; and 1957 Census Report, 
No. 14, ch. IV,
29. The definition of urbanization is controversial In Malaya the 
practice is to classify an urban area as that which is a 
gazetted administration area with a population of 1,000 or more.
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always been very high. This is confirmed by the amazing population 
growth rate of the adjacent area of Ayer Itam. As the population 
density of George Town reaches a saturation point, the population 
of Ayer Itam will increase at an even higher rate since it is 
more and more the suburb of the city. The population of Butterworth 
doubled during the decade 1947-1957, reflecting the post-war 
development of this area. Recent Federal development plans, will 
ensure an even greater growth rate in the decades ahead. The high 
duties collected on goods manufactured or processed on Penang 
island and imported through Butterworth to the mainland have so far 
resulted in the siting of eight out of ten major industries 
established in the state, between 1961 and 1966, in the Province 
Wellesley area. This suggests that the areas around Butterworth 
and Bukit Mertajam are likely to grow even faster than previously.
Table 2.6
Population Increase in Urban Areas with Population
of 20,000 or more, 1911 to 1957.
Urban Area Population in thousands % Growth
1911 1921 1931 1947 1957 1911-1957
George Town 101.2 123.1 149.4 189.1 234.9 132
Butterworth 3.9 4.1 13.5 21.3 42.5 990
Bukit Mertajam 4.4 3.9 5.3 12.3 24.7 461
Ayer Itam 1.0 1.2 2,3 13.5 22.4 2,140
Source: The 1957 Census
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Throughout Malaya the Chinese tend to concentrate in 
urban centres. According to the 1957 Census they comprised 
approximately 64 per cent of all urban population. The 
corresponding figures for the Malays and the Indians are 23 per 
cent and 11 per cent. The table below shows that the Chinese 
and Indian proportions of urban dwellers in Penang are even 
higher than those of the whole country. Correspondingly the 
Malay proportions are much lower than the national figure.
Table 2.7
Racial Composition of Urban Population 
for Penang in percentages - 1937 to 1957
Urban areas of 
1,000 population 
and over
Malays Chinese Indians
1931 1947 1957 1931 1947 1957 1931 1947 1957
15.0 13.8 13.7 64.0 69.9 70.6 17.9 14.4 13.7
Urban areas of 
10,000 population 
and over
n.a. 12.7 12.7 n.a. 71.0 71.0 n.a. 14.4 14.3
Source: The 1957 Census.
Racial composition of the four major urban centres in 
the State is quite irregular. The Chinese are clearly dominant 
in George Town, Bukit Mertajam and Ayer Itarn. In Butterworth 
where the Chinese constitute just over half the population, there
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are more Malays than Indians„ In the other three areas the Indians 
exceed the Malays.
Table 2.8
Racial Composition of Major Urban Areas in Penang in percentages - 1957
Malays Chinese Indians Others Total
George Town 11.4 72.9 13.6 2.1 100
Butterworth 24.0 51.1 22.4 2.5 100
Bukit Mertajam 10.0 77.1 11.7 1.2 100
Ayer I tarn 7.7 82.7 8.4 1.2 100
Source: The 1957 Census Report
The reverse is true of the rural areas. In 1957 the 
Malays comprised 56 per cent of the rural population, the Chinese 
33.3 per cent and the Indians 9.1 per cent. For the state as a 
whole, nearly 70 per cent of the Malays lived in the rural areas 
compared to a fifth of the Chinese and 27 per cent of the Indians
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Industry, Occupation and Free-Port:
Largely on account of its geography and its historic
evolution as the main trading centre of north-east Malaya, Penang's
30economy is atypical. According to one criterion it is the only 
state which can be considered as industrialized among all the
Malayan states. And yet it is also the state with the lowest
31percentage of the population economically active. These two
facts are due, firstly, to the preponderance of commerce and
services and the relatively small acreage under cultivation in the
state; secondly, to a relatively large percentage of the population
being below the age of ten. To a certain extent, they also suggest
that the economy as a whole has not kept pace with population increase.
Through the years fewer new jobs were available for those seeking
employment, giving rise to high rates of employment within the
32commercial and service sectors of the economy, marginal trading
30. An industrialized state as one with less than 35 per cent of 
active males employed in agriculture. Cf. 1957 Census Report.
31. According to the 1947 Census it was the lowest with 33.6 per cent. 
In 1957 Malacca was the lowest with 29.2 per cent, followed by 
Penang with 29.5 per cent. But if percentages of the economically 
active between the 15-59 age-group were used, then Penang ranked 
last among all the Malayan states for both 1947 and 1957 - the 
years on which Census figures are available.
32. In a confidential report on Penang's development commissioned by 
the Federal and State government of Penang, it is claimed that 
these rates are fast approaching redundancy. This report was 
prepared by ä Colombo Plan expert in 1964 but has not been 
publicly released largely, one may surmise, on account of its 
drastic criticisms of Federal and State policies with regard to 
Penang. Hereafter this report is cited as Colombo Plan Report 
on Penang.
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and a high ratio of dependent population.
In 1957 approximately 30 per cent of the total population
34was listed as economically active. This proportion increases if 
it is based on the population aged ten years and over. The Table 
below spells out the main types of activity engaged in by the 
population and by the different racial communities.
Table 2.9
Percentages of Population Aged 10 Years and Over in Selected 
Type of Activity in the Economy by Race.
Type of Activity All Races Malays Chinese Indians Others
Economically Active 42.6 40.3 40.0 57.5 56.5
Housewives and other 
unpaid houseworkers 34.2 37.7 34.8 25.0 25.7
Students 18.6 17.2 20.5 13.5 13.7
Other Activities 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.0 4.1
Source: The 1957 Census Report.
33. Of both children and females. Of the latter, only 16.2 per 
cent were economically active in 1957. This is abnormally 
low as the national figure (Malaya) is 34.1 per cent.
34. 'Economically active' is a term used in the Census to include 
all persons in employment and those 'not working but looking for 
work. '
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Contrary to general impression a lower percentage of the 
Chinese is economically active than of the two other races. More 
than half of the Indians are apparently engaged in gainful activities. 
But Chinese dominance in the economy stands out when we look at the 
racial proportions of the total economically active population. A
35majority of this is Chinese, and slightly over a quarter are Malays.
This is confirmed by the statistics on industries and occupations.
(See Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 below.) Because of the Chinese
superiority in numbers they form an absolute majority of those
engaged in five industries. But in the two agricultural industries
there are more Malays than there are Chinese. The Table on
occupations clearly shows that more than half of the economically
36active Malays are engaged in agriculture.
35. The exact proportions are 27.2 per cent Malays, 53.4 per cent 
Chinese and 16.7 per cent Indians.
36. This category includes padi-cultivation, rubber planting, 
forestry, hunting and fishing.
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Table 2.10
Percentages of Racial Distribution by Industries, 1957.
r
Industry Malays Chinese Indians Others Total
Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishing.
Agricultural products
59.8 38.6 1.4 0.2 100
requiring substantial 
processing.
40.6 33.0 25.8 0.6 100
Mining and quarrying. 12.3 76.1 9.2 2.4 100
Manufacturing. 9.9 80.4 8.8 0.9 100
Building and Con­
struction . 17.7 64.6 16.5 1.2 100
Electricity, gas 
and water. 35.2 27.9 34.1 2.8 100
Commerce 7.6 68.9 22.2 1.3 100
Transport, Storage 
and Communication. 24.7 45.9 27.5 1.9 100
Services 22.5 50.4 18.5 8.6 100
Source: The 1957 Census Report.
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Table 2.11
Percentages of Occupation by Race, 1957.
All Races'*- Malays Chinese Indians
Professional, technical 
and related occupations 4.6 3.8 5.0 2.6
Administrative, executive 
and managerial. 2.1 0.7 2.5 2.1
Clerical 6.2 3.6 7.4 6.5
Sales and related 15.7 3.8 20.8 20,9occupations. 
Agriculture 28.0 56.4 17.9 18.0
Transport and communication 6.2 6.5 5.8 7.2
Craftsmen, production pro- 21.8 11 6 26 0 27.8cess workers and labourers
Service, sport, entertain- 11.3 9.0 10.8 10.7ment and recreation.
Total“"' 95.9 95.4 96.2 95.8
1. Including 'Others'.
2. Percentages do not add up to 100 because three other categories 
in the Census, namely 'workers not classifiable by occupation', 
'not working but looking for work' and 'miners, quarrymen and 
related occupations', are excluded from this table. The last 
category is too insignificant numerically.
Source: The 1957 Census Report.
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In terms of occupations it is interesting to note that the 
Chinese are not concentrated in any particular occupation to the 
extent of the Malays’ concentration in agriculture. The same is 
also true of the Indians.
Penang is not known as an agricultural state even though
large areas of Province Wellesley are under cultivation. Yet fully
28 per cent of the economically active population are engaged in
agriculture -- a higher proportion than in any other occupation.
By and large commerce and services are the two most important
industries in the State. This is the logical result of Penang's
position as the only free port in Malaya and its historic role as
a trading centre and entrepot. In this respect Penang is quite
different from the country as a whole where more than half of the
economically active population are engaged in one form of
37agricultural activity or another. It is this contrast which
suggests that the problem of unemployment is more serious for Penang
than for any other Malayan state. According to one confidential
report the unemployment figure for the state was as high as 10 to
3812 per cent of the economically active population. By and large 
the government has failed to respond adequately to this problem.
37. In 1947 66 per cent of the population were enumerated as being 
employed in the agricultural industry; in 1957 the figure was 
59 per cent.
38. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit.
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Since independence the drive of the Federal government
to create new employment has been directed towards new industries,
largely of the secondary manufacturing types, and the opening up
of new land for cultivation. In the first instance Penang has not
39benefited from new industries as much as Selangor or Johore.
By 1966 only 10 new major industries had been established in Penang,
40providing employment for an estimated 3400 workers. This
represents only 6 per cent of the total unemployment figure of 54,300
41estimated for 1964. But because these industries are 'technology­
intensive ' and thus require trained technicians, not all of these 
workers are from within the State. State government activity in 
this direction has largely been restricted to the establishment of 
a pilot project called the Mak Mandin industrial estate in
42Butterworth. This is expected to yield fewer than 3,000 jobs.
39. The Colombo Plan Report on Penang criticizes this 'bias' as a 
hangover from the colonial days when the Federal government were 
seeking the establishment of a port and other industry-supporting 
facilities on mainland Malaya.
40. Information contained in the Appendix to His Excellency The 
Governor's policy speech to the State Legislative Assembly on 
22nd June, 1966. Cited hereafter as Appendix to Governor's 
Policy Speech, 1966.
41. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 53.
42. Appendix to the Governor's Policy Speech, 1966, p. 54.
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With regard to the opening up of new land for settlement
under the Federal Land Development Authority, Penang is the only
state in Malaya without any acreage developed or scheduled for 
43development. This is not surprising if it is recalled that
Penang has the highest population density of any state and all
suitable land was already under cultivation or other utilization
44before the F.L.D.A. schemes were introduced.
The lack of new employment opportunities in industry and
agriculture has meant that the commercial and service sectors of
the economy have continued to absorb an increasingly large percentage
of employment. There is every indication that since 1957 'Penang’s
combined employment rate in these sectors ... was already higher
45than that in the United Kingdom . . . This being the case, the 
economy of the state and, in particular, its employment structure are 
most vulnerable to external influences. As illustrated by 
Indonesian Confrontation and the consequent severance of trade 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, Penang experienced an immediate
43. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 58.
44. Cf. Robert Ho, "Land Settlement Projects in Malaya: An
Assessment of the Role of the Federal Land Development 
Authority," The Journal of Tropical Geography, vol. 20 
(June, 1965), pp. 1-15.
45. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 59.
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46redundancy of about 1,000 waterfront workers. The effect on the
47total economy was surely greater.
The high proportion of employment in the commercial and 
service sectors reflects the fact that trade is the lifeblood of 
the state's economy. In recent years Penang's trade has been 
decreasing steadily. (See Table 2.12 below).
Table 2.12 
Trade of Penang
Year Total Trade Entrepot Trade
1961 $1,830.2 m. $322.1 m.
1962 $1,841.3 m. $351.5 m.
1963 $1,839.2 m. $281.9 m.
1964 $1,777.7 m. $205,6m.
1965 (Jan.-Sept.) $1,481.6 m. $176.0 m.
Source: Development of Penang (mimeographed notes prepared
by the State Government, 1966).
46. Ibid., p . 60.
47. Unfortunately no statistics, beyond merely trading figures 
with Indonesia, are available for evaluating this.
77
This decrease in trade is matched by the decrease in shipping
handled by the port. The number of vessels (of over 75 net
registered tons) arriving in Penang port has decreased since
1961 and the figure for 1966 is lower than that for 1954. The
same is true of the total tonnage h a n d l e d T h i s  has inevitably
triggered some response from government. We have seen that the
Federal government has not been able to do much for the state in
49terms of new employment opportunities from pioneer industries.
The State government’s effort in encouraging industrial development 
has been equally inadequate in this respect. But there has been 
no serious agitation for new employment. What has agitated a 
section of the population has been the proposal to incorporate 
Penang into the so-called 'Principal Customs Area'. Such a step 
would revoke the free port status of the island. Whether or not 
this revocation will benefit the economy of the state as a whole is 
a matter of contention.
48. Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
of West Malaysia, February 1967, p. 82.
49. Up to 1964, out of a total of 90 Pioneer Status certificates 
granted to encourage new industries, only three went to Penang, 
while 59 went to Selangor and 19 to Johore. Colombo Plan 
Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 68.
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The proposal was originally prompted by considerations 
of Singapore's position in Malaysia.^ In its economic aspect the
idea of 'Malaysia' included common market arrangements among the 
different territories. Because these territories then included 
the free-ports of Singapore, Penang and Labuan, there was also the 
need to preserve the entrepot trade of these ports. The task of 
determining the feasibility of these arrangements was entrusted to 
a World Bank Mission in 1963.^  The Mission concluded inter alia 
that there was no contradiction between the establishment of a 
common market, the increase of public revenue and the preservation 
of the entrepot trade, on condition that the transition was smooth. 
A minimum period of five years was considered necessary for such a 
transition, and it was recommended that 'free zones' be created to 
safeguard the entrepot trade of Singapore and Penang. A Tariff 
Advisory Board was formed in 1963 to advise the Federal Government 
on the establishment of the common market. However the 
constitutional separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 
suspended moves towards the common market. No firm decision has 
been taken since a direct appeal to the Federal Prime Minister 
resulted in an assurance by him that the ' implementation of the
50. For a brief discussion of this, see Emily Sadka, "Malaysia: The
Political Background," in T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk, eds., The 
Political Economy of Independent Malaya (Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 
1963), pp. 28-58, esp. p. 57-8.
51. The Mission's report is contained in I.B.R.D., Report on the
Economic Aspects of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government
Printer, 1963) .
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proposal of Penang's entry into the Malaysian Common Market should
be kept in abeyance until such time as Penang could be persuaded
to accept it.' ^  Federal authorities have since echoed this
assurance, even though the State Government apparently decided
that no plebiscite would be held to ascertain the wishes of the
53people of the island. Instead the State Government has
requested ' a team of experts from the World Bank to conduct an
54economic survey of the State.' The issue therefore has been
' kept in abeyance.'
It seems that when the proposal was first mooted in 1963
there was a nearly unanimous opposition from ' ... political parties,
the Joint Chambers of Commerce, numerous local [on the island]
55associations ... [and] the man in the street.' It appears that
52. The Straits Echo, 28th November, 1963.
53. The decision was announced to the State Legislative Assembly in 
October, 1965.
54. Reported in The Straits Times, 25th November, 1965. This is a 
curious situation as such a survey has already been done and 
which included consideration of the common market proposal.
Three years later, the proposed survey has not even begun.
Ibid., 10th October, 1968.
55. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 75.
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the Penang Malay Chamber of Commerce was the only group to 
support the proposal
The threat of the loss of free port status has invoked 
several alternative proposals. An all-too-easy suggestion was 
the need to industrialize the state in order to prevent the island 
from becoming, in the cryptic phrase of a Federal minister, ' a 
fishing village.' Towards the third quarter of 1965 much publicity 
was given to an idea to construct a bridge or a causeway to link the 
island with the mainland. The arrival of a team of World Bank 
officials further spurred flamboyant expectations on the bridge 
proposal. No due consideration was given to the feasibility of 
such a project, its cost and, more important, its likely effect on 
the economy of Penang. But the matter was soon forgotten when the 
State Chief Minister opined that ' many of us may not live to see
5rthe completion of this causeway even if we decide to construct it. '
56. in the early part of September 1965 it was reported that even 
this group was wavering. A report in The Straits Times on 
8th September, 1965, indicated that it had changed its original 
stand. The next day the same paper reported that the Chamber 
planned ' to send a delegation to meet Tengku Abdul Rahman to 
appeal for the retention of the Penang free port status.' On 
13th September, The Straits Times reported that ' The Penang 
Malay Chamber of Commerce last night unanimously decided that 
Penang should join the Common Market.'
57. The Straits Echo, 1st November, 1965.
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Since the government has decided not to revoke the island's 
free port status, pending an economic survey of the state, vocal 
criticism of it has been largely confined to opposition political 
leaders. They maintain that the Federal Government is only 
interested in the extra revenue to be gained from the incorporation 
of Penang island into the common market and, naturally enough, that 
the State Government is incapable of protecting the interests of 
the people of the island. On the other hand government leaders 
answer such criticisms by saying that they 'will do all that is 
necessary and in the interests of the people.' The fact of the 
matter seems to be that no one is sure of the effects of the loss 
of free-port status. A confidential study came to the conclusion 
that it would have a very detrimental effect on employment, that the 
island already constitutes a ready-made 'free-zone', and that the 
proposed compensatory industrialization scheme ' bears little
5 8relationship to the type, or degree of industrialization required.'
One would expect that the issue of the free-port should 
be a central one in Penang's politics. But aside from questions 
raised in the State Legislative Assembly by opposition members and 
sporadic statements issued by them the matter does not seem to
58. Colombo Plan Report on Penang, op.cit., p. 76.
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59occupy publicly the attention of the population of the island»
It is therefore not surprising that the State Government was able 
to announce in late 1968 that Penang was no longer a free port. 
According to the Chief Minister, 'It is just a question of how 
many items (of goods) are not on the Customs list.' In spite of 
this admission, he went on to say that 'We will retain it [the free 
port status] so long as it will benefit the people and the state. 
The situation as a whole appears to confirm the opposition parties' 
claim that the Alliance State government is either unwilling or 
incapable of protecting the island's free port status. It has 
also been claimed that since the Alliance assemblymen are all 
elected in Province Wellesley and the rural areas of Penang island 
they have less qualm about the loss of the free port status.
59. There is, of course, no sympathy for the retention of the free 
port on the part of the population of Province Wellesley. On 
one of his visits to Penang the Chairman of the Tariff Advisory 
Board received a deputation of several associations from 
Province Wellesley which complained against the existence of 
the free port. The Straits Times, 12th November, 1965.
60: The Straits Times, 10th October, 1968.
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To sum up, Penang has many unique features as a state in the 
Federation of Malaysia* Historically it was the first British 
settlement in the Malay world* It has the highest density of 
population and the highest level of urbanization among the 
Malaysian states. But more significantly, it can be said in a 
general sense to be the only ’Chinese' state in the country, now 
that Singapore is no longer part of it. The Chinese community is 
almost twice and more than four times the size of the Malay and 
Indian communities respectively. Moreover a very large proportion 
of the Chinese was born locally. Assuming that local birth leads 
to enfranchisement, this has the obvious implication that they form 
the largest communal group of voters in the state. Even if this 
fact is vitiated somewhat by their concentration in urban centres 
(where traditionally the constituencies contain more voters than 
those in the rural areas), this is more pertinent in federal than in 
state or local elections. In the latter cases no political party 
can hope to succeed in an election without capturing a fair proportion 
of the Chinese vote in Penang.
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(B) The Legal and Institutional Features of Government:
Malaysia is nominally a federation. Her
constitution spells out separate as well as concurrent functions
for the federal and state governments. But as one writer puts
it, Malaysia ’breaks many of the "rules” which are generally
believed to constitute the essence of federalism.’1 2 For example,
the two Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak enjoy considerably more
autonomy than the states in western Malaysia (i.e. the former
2Federation of Malaya). Moreover there are significant internal 
differences between the governments of the remaining eleven states, 
due partly to the separate historical evolution of each system, 
and partly to the tripartite pattern of colonial government 
superimposed on these systems during the period of British 
influence. These differences are best seen in the position of 
the heads-of-state and in the system of local government. A 
brief analysis of these will serve as a useful introduction to 
the sections that follow.
1, R.S, Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p, &. Milne elaborates on this in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of his book. For an excellent summary of the 
evolution of constitutional government in Malaya, see K.J. 
Ratnam, ep.cit., ch. II.
2, Cf. Emily Sadka, "Malaysia: The Political Background," op.cit.
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Constitutionally, a unitary as opposed to a federal
system of government is impracticable in Malaysia given the fact.
that nine of the thirteen states have hereditary Malay rulers.
The other four, Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak, have
3appointed governors. Among the states with Malay rulers the
succession rule differs from state to state. In Perak, for
example, the heads of three identifiable Royal Families succeed
4to the throne in rotation. In Negri Sembilan the Ruler is 
elected from among the male members of the Royal Family. In the 
other ’Malay' states royal succession is simply by right of 
primogeniture. State governors are appointed by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong, the sovereign authority in the country, who can 
also remove them from office if two-thirds of the State Legislative 
Assembly concerned so advise him. As State Executives the functions 
of the Rulers and Governors are largely similar. But in matters con­
cerning Islam, the State Religion, there is a difference. The Rulers 
are Heads of the Religion in their states, while the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong occupies this capacity in the other states. The constitutional 
implication of this is that a non-Muslim is not barred from being 
appointed Governor.
3, In Sabah the head of state is called the Yang di-Pertuan Negara.
4. For some historical irregularities see J.M. Gullick,
Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (London: The
Athlone Press, 1958), pp. 56-7.
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In local government there exists a variety of structures 
throughout the federation. The first type of local authorities 
were the Municipal Commissions established in the Straits 
Settlements around the middle of the nineteenth century.^ The 
legal landmark of the introduction of municipal government is 
the Straits Settlements Municipal Act of 1857. Towards the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century local authorities were set up 
in the 'Malay' states. They were originally called Sanitary 
Boards but they were later renamed Town Boards under various 
Town Boards Enactments passed by the state governments. In the 
Straits Settlements local government took a further step forward 
with the passing of the Municipal Ordinance in 1913. For the 
first time local government was extended to the rural areas with 
the creation of Rural Boards. These various local authorities 
persisted until 1950 when the Local Authorities Election Ordinance 
drastically changed their composition, providing for partially- 
elected local bodies. It did not, however, systematize the
5. In Penang a 'Committee of Assessors' was formed as far 
back as 1800 but it had no legal status.
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, 6 total structure.
The following table clearly shows the multiplicity 
and variety of local authorities; it also indicates the 
special position of Penang where the whole state is covered 
by local government bodies all of which are financially 
autonomous.
6. This led to the creation of the National Council for Local 
Government in 1960. The Council's main role is to unify 
local government practices throughout Malaya and its 
decisions are constitutionally binding on both the federal 
and state governments (excluding Sabah and Sarawak). But 
apparently the Council has not accomplished much and in 
1965 a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Local Government 
was created with the following terms of reference: '(1)
to enquire into and to consider whether the continued 
existence of any category or categories of local authorities, 
and in particular any local authorities in which the capital 
of the State is situated, serves any useful purpose; (2) 
to report on the foregoing matters and to make such 
recommendations as in their opinion the circumstances 
require, taking into consideration the adequacy or other­
wise of the existing laws with regard to local authorities.'
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Table 2.13
Local Authorities in Malaya*
Number Name Location Financial
Status
1 City George Town, Penang autonomous
3 Municipalities Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and 
Town and Fort of Malacca
autonomous
25 Town Councils In all states except 
Penang and Malacca
autonomous
11 Town Councils -do- non-autonomous
5 Town Boards -do- autonomous
32 Town Boards -do- non-autonomous
4 Rural District 
Councils
In Penang autonomous
3 Rural District 
Councils
In Malacca non-autonomous
296 Local Councils In all states except 
Penang and Malacca
non-autonomous
181 New Village 
Committees
-do- non-autonomous
*In Sabah there are Town Boards and District Councils; and 
in Sarawak there is the Kuching Municipal Council and 23 
other District Councils. Unlike those in any of the other 
Malayan states these local government bodies in Sarawak also 
constitute 'electoral colleges’ which elect representatives 
to the State Assembly (Council Negri). This special function 
will terminate when direct election is held in Sarawak.
Source: R.S. Milne, opcCit., p. 167. I have added the
information under 'Location'.
The Penang State Constitution:
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With the exception of the question of Royal Succession 
in the ’Malay’ states and the appointment of governors in the 
former ’British’ states the state constitutions in Malaysia are 
largely similar. They are all subordinate to and guaranteed by 
the Federal Constitution. However, those of the 'Malay' states 
were formally granted to them by their sovereign rulers, while 
the others were promulgated as part of the Federal Constitution.
The Penang State Constitution contains 37 articles 
grouped under four headings: 'The State Government', ’The
7Legislature', 'Financial Provisions', and 'General Provisions'. 
It is mainly concerned with the position and executive authority 
of the Governor, the composition of the Executive Council and 
the Legislative Assembly, state revenue and expenditure and 
constitutional amendment.
The Constitution empowers the Legislative Assembly to 
make constitutional amendments by a two-thirds majority vote, 
and to make ordinary Enactments by simple majority vote. Its
7. The constitution also includes a section entitled
'Transitional Provisions ' which deals with the transfer 
of power. For all practical purposes this section is 
now void.
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competence is to make laws pertaining to 'state* matters, but these 
are not specified in the state Constitution, which does not other­
wise distinguish between the legislative powers of the federal andg
state governments. Most state powers and responsibilities are
9defined only in the Federal Constitution. This reflects the 
supremacy of the Federal Constitution and Government. The following 
table illustrates the relation between federal and state powers.
Table 2,14 
Legislative List*
Authority Number of Subjects
State ^ 107
Concurrent ^ 51
Federal/State 15
Federal 345
T 0 1r A L 518
*This list is not exhaustive.
^Mutual agreement between Federal and State government is 
mandatory.
2Depending on circumstances, e.g. Federal as well as State 
governments can set up Commissions of Enquiry.
Source: Malaysia: 1965 Official Year Book, pp. 596-603.
8. This would seem to create a situation of perpetual conflict 
between the two. But in practice federal-state disagreements 
have been very rare. There are two main reasons for this: 
firstly, the overwhelming position of the Federal Government 
vis-a-vis the states, especially in matters of finance; and 
secondly, the Alliance Party has always controlled the Federal 
Government and most of the state governments. For a concise 
analysis of Federal-State relations, see R.S. Milne, op.cit., 
ch. 5.
9. Cf. H.E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore: 
Malaysia Publications, 1964).
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The subordination of the state constitutions to the 
Federal Constitution is further ensured by the provision that 
during a period of declared Emergency the Federal Government can 
legislate on 'state* subjects10 except on matters concerning the 
religion and customs of the Malays.* 11
It is therefore not surprising that the Penang State
Constitution is hardly referred to by anyone. By failing to list
the subjects over which the state has legislative competence it
12succeeds in avoiding conflict with the Federal Constitution,
In the last decade there has been no occasion when it was necessary
to cite its provisions in any dispute. And generally only a very
13small minority knows of its existence and fewer still have the 
need of consulting its provisions. It is a formal document and 
has little relevance to the daily activities of the government.
10. For a list of these subjects see ibid., pp. 135-137,
11. These are constitutionally reserved to the Conference of 
Rulers on which all heads-of-state are represented. For a 
description of the Conference see R.S. Milne, op.cit., pp.
146-7.
12. This is not saying, of course, that there have been no 
Federal-State disputes elsewhere on constitutional matters.
So far there have been two such incidents, one regarding the 
formation of Malaysia itself and the other concerning the 
position of the Chief Minister of Sarawak. See H.E. Groves, 
op.cit., p. 132 and R.S. Milne, op.cit., pp. 145-6 respectively,
13. My observations indicate that in Penang more people are 
aware of the Federal Constitution than of the State 
Constitution.
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The State Executive:
The replacement of the British Resident Commissioner by
an appointed Governor in 1957 brought about a change in the actual
functions of the executive head of the government. Unlike his
predecessor the Governor is merely the titular head and he
exercises no direct authority over the affairs of government.
His functions are similar to those of any constitutional head-of-
state and they are largely ceremonial. He is above political
controversy and is the fountain of honour. He exercises the
14prerogative of mercy in respect of all offences except those 
committed against the laws of Islam,^
In exercising the executive authority of the state the 
Governor appoints an Executive Council to 'advise' him. All 
members of the Council must belong to the Legislative Assembly 
but they may be dismissed from the Executive Council by the 
Governor.^ The Chief Minister holds his office by virtue of his 
command of majority support in the Assembly even though his
14. He is, however, bound to follow the advice of the State 
Pardons Board.
15. The prerogative for such offences belong to the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong by virtue of his position as the Head of 
Religion (Islam) in Penang. The same is true of Malacca, 
Sabah and Sarawak.
16. So far only one member of the Executive Council has been 
dismissed.
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appointment is theoretically at the discretion of the Governor»
With respect to only one other matter is the Governor 
constitutionally empowered to act in his own discretion and 
that is 'the withholding of consent to a request for the 
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.' So far the Governor 
has never used his discretion without consulting the Chief Minister.
The Executive Council is the state equivalent of a
cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature. It may
consist of no more than eight and no less than four members. The
influence of the Chief Minister is paramount in its deliberations,
subject only to a general deference to the desires of the federal
17Prime Minister when these are known. It meets at least once a
week, but has no formal rules of procedure, decisions being reached 
by consensus rather than voting.
As in similar Executives elsewhere, each member of the 
Executive Council is responsible for a functional 'portfolio' 
covering one or more administrative departments, such as land, 
social welfare, agriculture and so on. They bring departmental 
recommendations to the meetings and introduce relevant legislation
17. Interview with an official.
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in the Assembly. The fact that they invariably sponsor the 
recommendations of their departmental officials tends to confirm 
the general impression that members are not sufficiently familiar 
with the functions of their departments to advance policies of 
their own. Since officials are in touch with their counterparts 
in the other states as well as those at the federal level uni­
formity in policies is often obtained in this fashion. Moreover 
the presence of three officials, the State Legal Adviser, the State 
Secretary and the State Financial Officer, also ensures that the
Council's decisions are not out of line with general federal
. . . 18 policies.
18. It is difficult to determine how influential these officials 
are. Informants said that the views of the Legal Adviser 
' usually carry weight ' and the information provided by the 
other two is often decisive even though they generally 
refrain from recommending any decision.
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The State Legislative Assembly:
Unlike the Federal Parliament the Legislative Assembly 
is unicameral. It consists of 24 members each representing a 
state constituency. To all intents and purposes it is modelled 
after the Federal House of Representatives. There is, however, 
one difference in that the three government officials who sit in 
on Executive Council meetings also attend all Assembly meetings. 
These three officials enjoy no voting power although the Legal 
Adviser can and does participate in the Assembly's deliberations; 
his participation mainly involves clarification of legal issues.
In exercising its legislative power, the State Assembly
tends to seek uniformity with legislation in the other states, some
19of which was enacted prior to independence. Its main concern is
with the passing of Supply Bills authorising state government
expenditures, and with question time when questions are addressed,
20
mainly by Opposition members, to the Chief Minister. Questions
19. For example, Penang did not have a law controlling petition 
writers which exists in other states. Johore was said to 
have such a law since 1938, Perils since 1954, Trengganu, 
Negri Sembilan and Kedah since 1956, and Perak since 1958. 
So accordingly a Petition Writers Enactment was passed in 
1965 to come into line with the existing practice in the 
other states.
20. There have been occasions when questions were also raised 
by government back-benchers.
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are normally submitted to the Clerk of Council a fortnight before
the Assembly meets and the Speaker retains the right to allow or
21disallow any particular question. Aside from questions 
Opposition members also raise numerous issues in their adjournment 
speeches.
Although in theory any member can introduce Bills, in 
practice private members rarely do so, and all legislation so far 
passed has been initiated by the members of the Executive Council, 
and unanimously supported by the Government back-benchers in the 
Assembly.
The Assembly meets about two or three times a year, the
significant occasion being the session when the annual state budget
is considered. The Assembly conducts its deliberations in either
English or Malay as provided by Article 152 of the Federal 
22Constitution. Assembly meetings are conducted with great 
formality and one is struck by the great concern with procedural 
matters. They are seldom attended by members of the public
21. In practice the Clerk conveys all questions to the Executive 
Council which decides whether or not to allow a question. The 
most common ground for disallowance is that the matter raised 
is under federal jurisdiction.
22. It is not unusual to hear a speaker using both languages in 
the course of a speech.
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because no disturbing issues have arisen in them so far.
Members of the Government confess that the meetings are a 
necessary inconvenience; whereas members of the Opposition find 
them a useful forum for articulating their points of view. Dramatic 
walk-outs and vociferous protests by the latter do occur often enough, 
but these are vitiated by Alliance party solidarity both among the 
government members in the Assembly and between the Federal and 
State governments.
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The State Government Machinery:
In its broad outlines the machinery of government in
Penang largely resembles that of the colonial administration.
As stated in the Federal Constitution the main task of a state
government is to develop its natural resources. To do this
the state administration is divided into 16 departments. They are
the State Secretariat, Agriculture, Land, Drainage and Irrigation,
Fire Brigade, Forest, Game, Gardens and Plantations, Government
Toddy Shops, Public works, Public Works-Water Supply, Religious
Affairs and Courts (Islam), Social Welfare, Town and Country
Planning, Treasury and Veterinary. The State Secretariat is the
main co-ordinating body which maintains executive control over
the other departments and their staffs. Matters of administration
are under the direct charge of the State Secretary who has always
been a member of the Malayan Federal Civil Service. There are, of
course, other departments in Penang which are outside the control
of the State Secretariat. These are the federal departments
dealing with such matters as education, customs, health, and so on 
23in the state. Besides there are departments which serve both
23. There is a curious tendency in Penang to regard all federal
departments in the state as parts of the state administration. 
The departments always disclaim that they have anything to do 
with the state government beyond the normal consultations.
But the state government talks as though they are part of the 
state machinery; this being done mainly for propaganda 
purposes. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the 
publication of Penang Today: A Report of Government
Achievements by the State Government prior to the 1964 
General Election. In this report no distinction was made 
between federal and state expenditures.
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the State and the Federal Governments, the best example being the 
Public Works Department.
Penang has its own State officials who belong to the
State Civil or Clerical Services. Apart from these there are
local officials who are recruited and employed by local government
authorities. Under an agreement which pre-dated independence,
personnel may be interchanged between the Federal and the State
24governments or between any two State Governments, Hence there
are members of the State Civil or Clerical Services who are serving
Federal Departments in the State as well as M.C.S. officers who are
25on secondment to departments in the State. Civil servants on
secondment are paid by the agencies to which they are attached,
though retaining tenure in their original Service. Despite the
complexity of these arrangements, it is generally acknowledged that
conflicts seldom arise; when they do the practice is to defer to
26the Federal Government."
24. Cf. Robert 0. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, op.cit., 
ch. 4 and Appendix B.
25. Tilman has calculated that the Federal Government has four times 
as many bureaucrats as all the eleven Malayan States combined.
See ibid., pp. 86-7.
26. Interviews with several senior officials in Penang. Cf. ibid., 
p. 87, fn. 12.
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Government revenues are derived from two main sources: 
revenues collected in the state and allocations from Federal funds. 
The chief sources of state revenues are excise, licences and the 
supply of water. These are, however, never adequate for the 
State. For the last few years allocation from the Federal funds 
has amounted to around 40 per cent of the annual state revenues.
In addition the State Government has also received periodic grants
from the Federal Government for development works and low-cost
, . 28 housing.
27. The Federal Government makes two types of annual grants to all 
states. One is the Capitation grant based on population and 
the other is a grant for the maintenance of roads in the state. 
On top of this the Federal Constitution also provides that the 
Federal Government must pay ten per cent of export duty on tin 
to the state in which the ore has been mined. Because Penang 
does not produce tin it does not receive any revenue on this 
count.
28. The Federal Government is the chief, and in practice the only, 
source of loans for the State Government. The Federal 
Constitution has a provision which enables any state government 
to raise a loan from a bank but only with the approval of the 
Federal Government.
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Local Government:
The State of Penang is divided into five administrative 
Districts. Penang Island is divided into the North-east District 
and the South-west District, and Province Wellesley into P.W. North, 
P.W. Central and P.W. South. These five districts roughly coincide 
with the jurisdictional boundaries of the five local authorities of 
the State. The table below shows the administrative division of 
the State.
Table 2.15
Administrative Division of Penang
District
Area
(approx.) 
in Sq. 
miles
Location of 
District Office
Local
Authorities
Population
(1957)
North-east 46 George Town City Council of 
George Town*
291,863
South-west 64 Balik Pulau Rural District 
Council, Penang 
Island.
47,003
P.W. North 102 Butterworth Rural District 
Council North, 
P.W.
110,836
P.W. Central 94 Bukit Mertajam Rural District 
Council Central, 
P.W.
75,337
P.W. South 90 Nibong Tebal Rural District 
Council South,
47,061
P.W.
*The territorial jurisdiction of the City Council of George Town 
covers only a fifth of the North-east District but four-fifths 
of the District population. The rest of the District is 
covered by the Rural District Council, Penang Island.
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Each administrative district is headed by a District 
29Officer who is usually an M.C.S. official. It has been claimed
that he is ’in practice, the most important administrative official
n  . ,30 In this role he isconnecting the people to the Government.’
assisted by an Assistant District Officer (usually a state government 
official), several Penghulus and many Ketua Kampongs. Before touch­
ing on the functions of the District Officer it may be useful to say 
a few words about the junior officials who assist him.
The Penghulus used to be traditional headmen of their areas
but this is getting to be much less common since they now belong to
the State Civil Service and must have certain minimum qualifications.
The 'bureaucratization' of the Penghulus is a recent innovation in
Penang. There is now 'a proper scheme of service for the 
31Penghulus.' They must have at least a lower Certificate of 
32Education, be selected by the Public Services Commission, and 
'cannot indulge freely in politics.' Their general function 
is reflected by the fact that they are 'in reality junior 
land officers.' The number of Penghulus for each
29. In the case of the North-east District the State Commissioner 
of Land and Mines acts as the District Officer for that part 
of the district which is not covered by the City Council of 
George Town.
30. Charles Gamba, "Government in Malaya," Public Administration, 
vol. XII, No. 1 (1953), p. 32.
31. Most of the information on the Penghulus and Ketua Kampongs
is obtained from an Assistant State Secretary who was formerly 
a District Officer.
32. This is obtained after successful completion of three years 
of secondary education.
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district is roughly determined on a population/area of padi land basis.
Even though Penghulus are now Division III government servants the idea
that they wield local influence is suggested by the fact that they are
34never transferred from one district to another.
Ketua Kampongs, as the name suggests in Malay, are village
elders. They are not government servants and receive only a token
allowance once a year, There is no systematic basis for their 
35appointment. As far as can be determined they were first
recognized by the District Officer during the Emergency when the
36Home Guard units were organized. Since the Emergency their
main functions have been to serve as a 'listening-post' for the 
District Officer and to disseminate information and government 
regulations to the villages, but even these functions are now 
being performed more and more by the elected local councillors.
33. There are three Penghulus in each of the two districts in 
Penang Island, seven in P.W. North, five in P.W. Central and 
four in P.W. South.
34. it is difficult to determine for sure whether Penghulus, and for
that matter Ketua Kampongs and District Officers, influence the 
political loyalties of the people they normally come into contact. 
For one thing, the norm that civil servants are politically neutral 
prevents frank answers to questions along this line. But on this 
point, see K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary 
Election of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967),
pp. 189-190.
35. Previously they were appointed by the District Officer.
Nowadays this power is vested in the Chief Minister.
36. Home Guards were civilians who were armed by the authorities 
and paid a nominal salary to protect their villages against 
terrorists.
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Ketua Kampongs are nowadays made heads of ?Kampong Development 
Committees' and in this connection they assist the District 
Officer, who is the chairman of the District Rural Development 
Committee« They also assist in getting padi-planters to adhere 
to the gazetted dates for padi-planting, in persuading them to pay 
up their land dues and in helping to launch health campaigns in 
the rural areas.
The role of the District Officer has changed drastically 
since the war. Before the establishment of fully elective local 
authorities in 1961 he was invariably the chairman of the authority 
in his district. Since then this role has been taken over by an
elected member. Between 1961 and 1965 the District Officer acted
as secretary of the local councils, a post which has been sub­
sequently taken over by a full-time employee of the local council.
Because of these developments district administration is now mainly
37concerned with land administration, and district officers are 
administratively attached to the State Department of Land and 
Mines. Besides serving primarily as Collectors of Land Revenue 
and performing the other functions connected with land administration,
37« 'The term "land" in Malaysia is used to denote the system 
whereby ownership of immovable property is established, 
transfer of ownership is arranged and general control of the 
use of land is applied. ' Malaysia: 1965 Official Year Book,
op.cit., p. 130.
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the district officers also act as the local Registrars of Marriage 
and Adoption, ex-officio First Class Magistrates, and Chairmen of 
the Rubber Licensing Boards and of the District Rural Development 
Committees.
With the exception of the City Council of George Town
the other local authorities are of fairly recent origin. The
Municipal Ordinance of 1913 created Town Boards for Butterworth and
Bukit Mertajam and two Rural Boards, one for Penang Island and the
other for Province Wellesley. Even then local government, outside
of George Town, was rudimentary and for all practical purposes can
be considered as merely an administrative arm of the State
Government. In 1953 the two Rural Boards were replaced by four
Rural District Councils - one for Penang Island and three for
Province Wellesley. The Town Boards were also renamed Town
Councils. In 1961 when fully elected local authorities were
instituted throughout the state the Town Councils of Butterworth and
Bukit Mertajam were incorporated respectively into the Rural District
38Council North (P.W.) and Rural District Council Central (P.W.).
At the same time all local authorities in the state became financially 
autonomous. Financial autonomy merely implies that the local
38„ Prior to this the Municipality of George Town had three
elected Commissioners. Municipal elections were cancelled 
in 1913 and re-introduced in 1951.
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authorities maintain their own funds. This does not, however, 
mean that the local authorities are completely independent of 
the State Government.
Local authorities are ’creatures of statute’ passed
by the State Government which exercises supervisory control.
This control is obtained through the provisions of the Municipal
Ordinance, binding on all local authorities, which require the
prior sanction or approval of the State Government on such matters
as the budget, by-laws, loans, purchase of lands and appointment
of senior staff. Furthermore all the local authorities, except
the City Council, are also dependent upon the State Government for
technical expertise and personnel. Thus in such activities as
public health, public works and street lighting they call upon the
39appropriate departments of the State for assistance„ And many
40members of their staffs are on secondment from the State Government,,
Most of the decisions of the local authorities are made in 
committees and are then confirmed by the full councils which must
39o In some cases the assistance is rendered by Federal departments 
such as the Jabatan Kerja Raya (Public Works Department) and 
the Lembaga Letrik Negara (National Electric Board).
40, This practice is declining as new local government employees
are not recruited through the State Civil or Clerical Services. 
There is no uniform term of service for local government 
employees with the exception of those in the City Council.
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meet at least once a month. The City Council has ten standing 
committees but the other councils have an average of eight standing 
committees. Some committees meet as often as fortnightly while 
others meet only once or twice a year. The most important 
committees are those dealing with such matters as assessment, 
assessment appeals, licensing, finance, town planning and building.
At this juncture it is perhaps appropriate to make
some general remarks about local government in Penang. First, the
City Council of George Town is by far the premier local government
institution in the state. It is also the oldest and perhaps the
largest in the country. It is responsible for the welfare of
almost half the population of the state and its annual budget is
not only larger than that of any of the other four local councils
but also than that of the State Government. It has a well
established administration and its staffs are not subject to
transfer to other government bodies nor are they on secondment 
41from outside. On the other hand the other local councils are
of fairly recent origin and general observation reveals that their 
administrative establishments are inadequate to perform the 
numerous tasks entrusted to them. The problems of a weak
41. With the exception of the City Assessor who is "on secondment 
from Britain".
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administration are further aggravated by an elected council whose 
members view their role as one of exerting pressure on the 
administrators on behalf of their constituents. As a result 
there is an emphemeral air about local council administration.
Second, at the administrative level the relationship 
between the State Government and the local councils is co-operative 
and informal. Administrators at both levels are in constant 
touch with one another and informal consultations often take place 
between them. At the political level party solidarity has 
permitted an easy relationship between the State Government and 
the four Rural District Councils, all of which are under the 
control of the Alliance Party. The major difficulties in state- 
local government relations in Penang have developed between the 
Opposition-controlled City Council and the Alliance State 
Government over such symbolic issues as Council's refusal to 
participate in the national celebration over the end of the 
Emergency and the formation of Malaysia.
Third, the total picture is one in which state and 
local governments are institutionally and legally separated, 
but in practice largely interdependent. Government at both 
levels remains more administrative and less political partly
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because of the legalistic legacy of British colonial rule and partly 
because the politicians are new to their roles while the administrators 
are not.
In conclusion, it may be said that party government at the 
state and local levels is less involved in legislating and applying new 
policies than in adhering to 'established’ ones. In the case of the 
Alliance State Government the broad policy lines or objectives are 
largely laid down by the Alliance Federal Government. This further 
enhances the practice of ready and unquestioned acceptance of the con­
stitutionally predominant position of the Federal Government. To a 
very large extent this practice makes it difficult for the various
branches of the state Alliance to influence directly the policy
42'decisions' of the State Government. There is the suggestion that 
in Penang there is a need to prevent the Chinese partner of the Alliance, 
the M.C.A., from exerting undue influence on the State Government to the 
supposed detriment of the other two partners. If this is true there 
are undoubtedly significant implications for the Alliance party in 
Penang, in particular the M.C.A.
42. This was confirmed in several separate interviews with the Chief 
Minister and members of the various Alliance party branches.
110
As for party government at the local level it may be said
43that the provisions of the Municipal Ordinance and the superior
position of the State Government leave little room for the strict
pursuance of party policies or objectives. This point, of course,
is more relevent when the local authority is controlled by an
opposition party as in the case of the City Council of George Town.
45Even here the following statement is revealing:
[The] forceful exchange of hot and harsh words 
[in Council meetings] is all the more surprising 
when in our various Committees, away from the 
full glare of the public, we have worked quietly, 
industriously and amicably. All members ... con­
tribute to the deliberations; and the decisions 
taken reflect the reasonableness of all members 
and so underline their basic interest in working 
for the betterment and progress of the City, with­
out wishing to score a political point over their 
adversaries.
This Council has a fairly [well] defined duty to 
perform and if ... members seek publicity for their 
political ideologies [their] politics . . . could 
stand in the way of efficiently discharging the 
responsibility entrusted to them by the people of 
the City.
43. Cf. Report of the Commission (Commission of Enquiry to Enquire into 
the Affairs of the City Council of George Town, Penang), (Alor Star 
Government Printing Department, 1967), p.9.
44. A former Socialist Front Mayor claimed in an interview that there 
was 'really no room to pursue party policies in city government.'
45. Statement delivered by the Mayor at the Council Meeting on 29th 
April, 1966.
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From observations, the various committees of the City Council, each
of which roughly reflects the party composition of the Council,
generally make their decisions more on the basis of technical advice than
46on the adherence to party policy or ideology.
All these, of course, do not mean that state and local
governments are a cut-and-dry business. In terms of institutions
and structures there is a great amount of rigidity. But, within
this structural rigidity party government at both levels involve making
an innumerable number of decisions. These may be summed up as the
collection and the expenditure of public money for the public's
protection, welfare and convenience. In making these decisions,
precedents and technical requirements are as much controlling factors
as the wishes of the majority party. But this is not to imply that
the latter is ignored or is insignificant. Within existing laws and
by-laws, established practices and budgetary constraints there is
obvious room for preferences. But where such preferences are made
47it is not always clear that party wishes are always fulfilled.
46. For some observations on this score, see Report of the Commission, 
op. cit.
47. In the case of the Socialist Front-controlled City Council, see 
the decisions reviewed in ibid., pp. 12-68.
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Indeed some claim that the private wishes of influential party leaders
are often as determining as party considerations, even if these wishes
48are not always self-serving* Indeed, in strictly local matters such 
as approval of building applications or lisences it is difficult to 
distinguish between the two. Even so, the ability of the party 
leaders to prevail, particularly in matters concerning their 
constitutency or constitutents, is important for their leadership 
status. But such a status is not always synonymous with elective 
office and the ability to prevail in the councils of government. In 
a plural society, with a relatively short experience of constitutional 
government, other factors also count.
48, Interviews with politicians and officials who, understandably, 
wish to remain anonymous, even though they neither elaborate 
nor substantiate this kind of claim.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF LEADERSHIP AND ELECTION
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An analysis of contemporary leadership in Penang can 
usefully be preceded by a brief account of leadership during the 
colonial period. This is because the devolution of power to the 
local leaders was achieved without any political disruption 
even though the nature of leadership was modified by the introduction 
of election and the establishment of representative bodies.
Leadership in a colonial society and in an independent plural 
society can hardly be the same; yet to understand the latter one 
must know something about the former*. Analysis of past leader­
ship pattern also helps to explain the changes brought about by 
independence and the introduction cf competitive politics.
Rupert Emerson has characterized the British colonial
government as one of ’direct rule’ in the Straits Settlements
2and ’indirect rule’ in the Malay States . He meant not so much
1. For an excellent analysis of the traditional Malay structure of 
power in Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan see J.M. Gullick, 
Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, op. cit.
Robert 0. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, op. cit., 
is an outstanding study of the evolution of the administrative 
elite. For a pioneering study on the national elite see 
Tilman’s article "Policy Formulation, Policy Execution and the 
Political Elite Structure of Contemporary Malaya," op. cit.
Lucian W. Pye has written a short general essay on the problem 
of intellectual leadership in "A New Class in Malaya," The New 
Leader, May 30, 1960, pp. 12-4. The only study of sub-national, 
albeit formal, leaders is Henry R. Glick, "Political Recruit­
ment in Sarawak: A Case Study of Leadership in a New State,"
The Journal of Politics, vol. 28, no. 1 (Feb., 1966), pp. 81-99.
2. Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, op. cit.
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3the method by which the government was administered , but that in
Penang, as in Singapore and Malacca, there did not exist an
indigenous, traditional, Malay authority structure through which
British rule had to be exercised as in the Federated and Unfederated
Malay States. It is mainly in this particular sense that British
rule in Penang can be described as ’direct’. Even then two
qualifications can be made. Politically this rule did not ignore
the existence of the traditional structures of influence in the
various communities. This was motivated primarily by two related
aims; to interfere as little as possible with the social life of 
4the communities and, as a matter of administrative expediency, 
to rely on community leaders to keep the peace in the local society.
3. It is debatable whether there was indeed any difference in 
administrative practices between the Malay States and the 
Straits Settlements. On this point Emerson writes, ’... 
as far as administration was concerned, they [the Federated 
Malay States] were substantially indistinguishable from the 
Crown Colonies.’ Ibid, p. 375.
4. There have been varying views as to whether or not the colonial 
government was practising the imperial principle of ’divide and 
rule.’ Apparently K.G. Tregonning has argued that ’divide and 
rule' was the British policy. See Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy 
and Rural Development in Malaysia (Berkeley § Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 44, fn. 38. But if 
this were true it is reasonable to add that it was more out of 
omission than commission. Gayl Ness, in ibid, p. 44, states 
that ’the divide et impera theory attributes to the administration 
far more consistency, Machiavellianism, and perhaps even more 
intelligency than existed in fact.1 Robert Tilman has made a 
similar point in Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, op. cit., p. 
26. On this point Emerson writes, 'Even the ancient maxim of 
divide and rule need scarcely be brought into play where the 
population to be ruled is itself so little likely to unite.'
Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 283.
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Economically direct rule was tempered by a laissez-faire policy in 
all matters except migratory labour.
The policy of minimum interference in the local communities
gave rise to two patterns of leadership during the colonial period -
a colonial elite of authority and a local racially-fragmented elite
of influence. In a colonial system it was to be expected that
formal authority would be concentrated in the colonial officials who
dominated all the important bodies of decision-making, particularly
the Legislative and Executive Councils of the Straits Settlements.
Besides the ex-officio members these Councils also included a
number of unofficials° or "local representatives". Even though the
unofficials were specifically given certain functions in the annual
consideration of the budget5 6 7their chief role seemed to be restricted
to the articulation of ’the wants and sentiments of the different
7elements of the community' .
5. After 1924 there were three unofficials in the Executive Council 
and thirteen in the Legislative Council. Except for the two re­
present atives of the Singapore and Penang (European) Chambers cf 
Commerce all the unofficials were nominated by the Governor.
From 1933 one of the three unofficials in the Executive Council 
was a Chinese. On the Legislative Council the European community 
was represented by seven unofficials, the Chinese by three (one 
from each Settlement), and the Malay, Indian and Eurasian by
one each.
6. S.W. Jones, Public Administration in Malaya (London: Oxford
University Press, 1953), pp. 80-1.
7. Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 279. Emerson also quotes the following
statement from the Secretary of State for the Colonies: ’The
Unofficial minority does all that is required, or can be permitted, 
by resisting and calling attention to anything which the public may 
deem objectionable in the Government Policy.' In the Straits 
Settlements such an official attitude remained unchanged until 
after World War II.
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Now and again an individual unofficial was able to obtaing
redress for his community by voicing complaints in the Council .
For the most part, however, the unofficials served merely as a link 
between the government and the local population and their presence in 
the Council added an element of constitutionality to the proceedings. 
This link was significant primarily because the bureaucratic nature 
of the authority wielded by the colonial elites, both in terms of its 
source and the manner in which it was typically exercised, effectively 
insulated them from an overwhelming majority of the people.
Who were these unofficials and what was their standing
within their respective communities? It has been claimed that
*... even if they are not handpicked for their complacent acceptance
9
of things that be, [they] are chosen from the highest strata ....•
8. In 1929 the government established Kampong Melayu (Malay village)
on the eastern outskirt of the Singapore municipality. This 
was the result of complaints voiced in the Council in 1927 by the 
sole Malay member, Eunos Abdullah, who was also the first 
president of the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay 
Union). See S.S. Legislative Council Proceedings (1927), pp. 
B24-25 ff. Cf. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 188-94.
Another example is the passage of the Straits Settlements 
Labour Ordinance of 1923 which sought to protect Indian labourers. 
According to one source the Indian member of the Council, P.K. 
Nambiar, was instrumental in securing this legislation. Cf.
Usha Mahajani, op. cit.. pp. 121-22.
9. Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 280.
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By and large this is true, at least in the eyes of the colonial 
administration. The unofficials appointed from Penang to the Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council during the inter-war years were 
Lim Cheng Ean, P.K. Nambiar, H.H. Abdooleader, all prominent lawyers, 
and Khoo Sian Ewe, an English-educated son of a Chinese Capitan who 
has been described as ’a "doyen" of contemporary public men in Penang.’^  
Similarly, at the local level, appointees to the Penang Municipal 
Commission were drawn from the ranks of the professionals and the
well-to-do English-educated. They included such people as Khoo
11 12 i xSian Ewe, Dr. Ong Huck Chye , Lim Eow Thoon , Yeoh Cheang Aun ,
14 ISHeah Joo Siang , Dr. Lee Tiang Keng , H.H. Abdoolcader, Dr. K.
Mohd. Ariff^, Dr. N.K. Menon1 ,^ and Capt. S.S. Alsagoff1 .^
10. C.S. Wong, op. cit., p. 25.
11. He was a medical practitioner who was first appointed to the 
Municipal Commission in 1931 as the representative of the Chinese 
Town Hall; he was subsequently re-appointed in 1934 and 1946.
12. A wealthy English-educated businessman, he was a founder member 
and first Secretary of the Penang branch of the Straits Chinese 
British Association formed in 1920. He was the representative 
of the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce on the Municipal 
Commission in 1931, 1934 and 1946.
13. A leading member of the Penang Chinese Town Hall, he was appointed 
to the Municipal Commission in 1931.
14. He was a very wealthy English-educated businessman and leader of 
the Straits Chinese British Association. He served on the 
Commission as its representative from 1934 to the outbreak of 
W.W. II.
15. A private medical practitioner, he was appointed to the Municipal 
Commission in 1946 as the representative of the Straits Chinese 
British Association. In 1948 he was also appointed to the Penang 
Settlement Council and the Settlement Executive Committee. He 
later served as the Malayan Ambassador to Japan.
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In recognition of their public services these colonial
appointees were also made Justices of the Peace. Besides this kind
of recognition the positions of the unofficials were further
buttressed by their close association with the colonial elites, an
association which was denied to all but a very few. Their rank was
very small because of the largely circumscribed and symbolic roles
they were supposed to play. As symbolic spokesmen of the various
communities and interests it was not necessary for them to show any
tangible proof of mass support. In a situation in which the general
19population did not deem it proper or even safe to make demands on
19. Such an attitude is reflected in an article in a Malay monthly 
magazine published in 1934. Part of it went like this: fOne
of the cries we hear is about politics. We’re surprised that 
Malays should want to waste their time on such profitless matters.
We all know that Malaya is ruled by the English, who are clever 
and experienced at this sort of thing. Their government is very 
fair, and within their strength and justice we can live indefinitely 
until life is peaceful and safe. What more do we want? Are we 
cleverer than the English? What’s more, forbidden politics is 
a dangerous game, for all it causes is trouble. For these reasons, 
talk about politics is just not wanted in this country.’ Cited 
in William R. Roff, op. cit., p. 187, fn. 27.
16. One of the very early medical doctors of the Muslim community in 
Penang, he was appointed to the Municipal Commission in 1946. He 
also served on the Settlement and Nominated Council of Penang and 
played a prominent role in the Muslim Advisory Board after the war.
17. A private medical practitioner, he was a Municipal Councillor from 
1952 to 1955. He was also appointed to the Penang Settlement 
Council and the Settlement Executive Committee.
18. A leading member of the Muslim community, he was a recipient of 
the M.B.E. and was appointed to the Municipal Commission in 
1934.
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the government the unofficials fulfilled their roles by their mere 
presence. If they spoke out against the administration it was more 
because of their own feelings of what the administration should do 
than because of demands emanating from their respective communal 
groups. But this they did very seldom. Their dependence on the 
patronage of the colonial elites, in the face of local passivity 
towards governmental policies, meant that they did not have to build 
up any kind of mass support. At the level of the state these factors 
combined in time to create an elite of local professionals, western- 
oriented if not also foreign-trained. Thus advanced education,
occupational status, wealth and honour made them a conspicuous 
group to whom the colonial administration naturally turned for local 
leadership. And largely because of this they were socially 
acceptable to the colonial elite with whom they associated as fellow 
members of Councils and exclusive clubs (such as the Penang Turf 
Club, the Penang Polo Club, Rotary, etc.). Although these activities 
bestowed them a vicarious prestige the unofficials could hardly be 
considered as true representatives of the local communities. So 
while they commanded respect they wielded, in time, less and less 
direct influence in their respective communities. This was due 
partly to the changes taking place in these communities.
With population increases and demographic changes, each 
of the communities evinced increasingly complex social characteristics. 
In the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities there were divisions
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between the local and foreign-bom, with the former tending to be
English-educated and British-oriented and the latter communally-
20educated or illiterate and oriented towards their homelands. With
increasing political consciousness there were divisions between those
who sought to come to terms with the colonial administration and
professed loyalty to Britain and ’British subjects’ and those who
were oriented towards either the emerging nationalistic politics of
China or India, or the more localized issue of cultural preservation
and enrichment of their transplanted communities^ . Even in the
indigineous Malay-Muslim community there were divisions between the
Muslim reformists and traditionalists, between the urban-based
proto-Malays (Jawi Peranakan) and the ’pure' Malays of the rural 
22areas
20. Unfortunately the social and cultural history of Penang and 
Malaysia generally has been inadequately researched to permit 
more precise analysis of the political impacts of the divisions 
within the communities. However, what is important here is
to recognise the increasing social complexities consequent upon 
population growth and length of settlement.
21. Cf. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, op. cit., Diana Tan, 
’’Some Activities of the Straits Chinese British Association 
Penang 1920-1939,” Peninjau Sejarah, vol. 2, No. 2 (1967),
pp. 30-40; Usha Mahajani, op. cit., passim; S. Arasaratnam, 
"Indian Associations and the Growth of Leadership among Malayan 
Indians,” Journal of the Historical Society (University of 
Malaya, Kulala Lumpur), Vol. VIII, 1969/1970), pp. 1-7.
2 2 . Cf. William R. Roff, op. cit., passim.
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Within these larger dichotomies, and sometimes re­
flecting them, there were subtle competitions for leadership and 
influence. Particularly during the inter-war years numerous proto­
political associations were formed and became intermittently active.
They included such bodies as the Penang branch of the Straits
Chinese British Association, the Penang Chinese Town Hall, the
23Chinese Chamber of Commerce, two Penang Indian Associations , the
Penang Peranakan Club, the Penang Muslim League, the so-called
24Penang Muslim Recreation Club, two Penang Malay Associations and
25various branches of pan-Malayan Malay associations . Besides
these, there were also a host of clan, dialect-group, religious and
26surname organizations in the Chinese community . All these 
groupings clearly reflected the growing heterogeneity of the various 
racial communities which made it difficult for any group or faction 
to act as spokesmen or representatives. Eut still there were com­
petitions for colonial recognition of this role. These efforts 
were largely futile. While they lasted, they only served to high­
light a difference in interest between the local-born ’British subjects' 
and their migrant compatriots.
23. One seeking to represent specifically the interests of the local- 
born Indians and the other the Indian community as a whole. In 
the Chinese community a parallel competition existed for a while 
in the 1920's between the Straits Chinese British Association and 
the Penang Chinese Town Hall.
24. William R. Roff, op. cit. p. 242.
25. Ibid., passim.
26. The largest of these organizations were kongsi and hcay kuan, the 
former consisting of members with the same surname and the latter 
of members originating from the same district or province in China.
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In spite of the growing heterogeneity of the various
communities, or perhaps because of it, the colonial administration
adopted the straight-forward policy of recognizing and appointing
the best English-educated and most westernized individuals as their
communities’ representatives. In the Straits Settlements Legislative
Council the small number of unofficial seats prevented any specific
consideration of interest representation. Here the Chinese
communities of the three Straits Settlements were represented by an
unofficial each; and there were a Malay, an Indian and a Eurasian
unofficial. In the Penang Municipal Commission there was a nominal
27recognition of interest , but even this was restricted to the Chinese 
community. On the whole, whether in the Legislative Council or the 
Municipal Commission, the unofficials were recognized as representing 
their racial communities as a whole.
Such a recognition no doubt bestowed prestige end honour 
upon the unofficials even though they were no longer truly representing 
the increasingly heterogeneous local communities. So long as the 
colonial system existed they commanded respect. Whether or not they 
also wielded direct influence in their respective communities was 
another matter. It is difficult to say for sure. In the realm of 
interaction between the colonial administration and the local
27. Thus three unofficials were appointed as representatives of the 
Straits Chinese British Association, the Penang Chinese Town Hall 
and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
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communities their positions seemed logically important. But such 
a realm was a limited one since the general colonial policy was 
minimum intervention or involvement in the internal affairs of the 
local communities. Not surprisingly, therefore, there was another 
rank of local leaders or community influentials within each of the 
racial communities.
In the absence of any adequate social history of Penang 
only the broadest picture can be drawn of the community influentials 
here. Little is known about their identities or ranks, as only
28passing and fragmentary references were made to them here and there
Among the Chinese the community influentials included successful
businessmen or merchants, Chinese school-teachers and the leading
activists of cultural and religious organizations. The most prominent
of these was the first group which included such people as Yeap
Chor Ee, Lim Lean Teng, and in more contemporary times, Saw Seng Kew,
29Saw Choo Teng and Loh Boon Siew, all of them reputed millionaires.
With little or no English education, Chinese community influentials 
based their leadership on the support and patronage of Chinese schools 
and cultural organizations. As for the other two groups their 
leadership was largely a function of their roles in propagating 
community values.
28. Cf. C.S. Wong, op. cit.; William R. Roff, op. cit.; S. 
Arasaratnam, op. cit..
29. The last three became top leaders of the Malayan Chinese 
Association in Penang in the 1950's and 1960's.
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In the smaller Indian community a similar pattern of 
community influentials was also present, although its rank was 
obviously much smaller. Here wealth was also a significant factor, 
particularly as expressed in the building and support of Indian, 
mostly Tamil, schools and temples. In recent years the most 
outstanding Indian community leader has been N.T.S. Arumugam Pillai, 
a millionaire estate owner and President of the Malayan Indian 
Congress in Penang30.
In the Malay-Muslim community, the community influentials
were mostly kampong or village headmen, religious leaders and Malay
school-teachers. Often in the rural areas the roles of headman and
religious leader were combined. In George Town itself the community
influentials were largely composed of Arab-Malays who were religious
teachers, opinion-makers or journalists and later successful merchants.
31They included such people as Sayyid Shaykh Al-Hadi , S.M. Zainal 
Abidin32, Sheik Ali Baladram33, Ahmad Maliki34, S.M. Aidid35 and
30. A migrant from South India he is the president and trustee of 
several Indian temples and chairman of numerous Indian schools, 
some of which are named after him.
31. One of the leading founders of the Madrasah Al-Mashhor, ’perhaps 
the most distinguished relious school in Malaya.’ William R.
Roff, op. cit., p. 82.
32. Although an English-educated teacher he was very active in Malay 
literature and cultural affairs. Cf. ibid., pp. 216-18. He later 
became Chairman of Penang U.M.N.O. and successfully contested the 
1955 Federal election.
33. He later became President of the State Religious Court.
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36Syed Hassan A idid . A fte r th e  war most of th e se  community 
in f lu e n t ia l s  were appoin ted  to  o f f i c i a l  b o d ie s , p a r t i c u la r ly  the  
Muslim Advisory Board; and some, l ik e  S.M. Z ainal A bidin,
S.M. A idid and Syed Hassan A id id , became lead e rs  o f th e  U nited 
Malays N ational O rgan ization  in  Penang.
Thus b e sid e s  th e  u n o f f ic ia l s ,  th e  p ro fe s s io n a ls  and th e  
w e ll- to -d o  E n g lish -ed u ca ted , a l l  o f whom can be d esc rib ed  as 
w e s te rn -o r ien ted  or o r ie n te d  towards th e  c o lo n ia l a d m in is tra tio n , 
th e re  was ano ther rank o f lo c a l le a d e rs . Before th e  war the 
l a t t e r  h a rd ly  in te ra c te d  w ith  the  c o lo n ia l e l i t e s  which was the 
b a s is  o f le ad e rsh ip  of th e  form er group. In s te ad  th e i r  influep.ee 
was derived  from w ith in  the  lo c a l communities through th e i r  patronage 
and involvem ent w ith  communal causes and a s s o c ia t io n s . I t  was th i s  
group which e v e n tu a lly  emerged in  th e  1950's and 1960's  as the  
s ig n i f ic a n t  le ad e rs  of th e  s t a t e .  S evera l f a c to r s  were 
re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th i s  developm ent.
36. A very  su c c e ss fu l businessm an he has been p a tro n  of numerous
Malay a s s o c ia tio n s  and in  1952, he succeeded S.M. Z ainal A bidin 
as Chairman of Penang U.M.N.O.
34. He l a t e r  became P re s id e n t o f th e  S ta te  R elig io u s  A ffa irs  
Department and th e  Is lam ic  R elig io u s  C ouncil.
35. He a lso  served  on th e  S ta te  Is lam ic  Court o f  Appeal and was a 
p a s t  p re s id e n t o f th e  Penang Malay Chamber o f  Commerce.
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In the first instance Japanese victory and occupation of
Malaya and the subsequent controversial attempt to reorganize the
37British colonial administration in the form of the Malayan Union
38had accelerated political consciousness in the local society . This
change could not have gone unnoticed for long. The outbreak of the 
39Emergency in 1948 ‘ dramatically demanded that the government must be
more closely identified with the people. This had the practical
result of appointing, besides the westernized professionals, the
40community influentials to the councils of government " community
Advisory Boards and other public committees^1. Another consequence
of this development was an ’unofficial’ majority in the Penang
42Settlement Council formed in 1948 . As for the Municipal
Commission, renamed the Municipal Council, the introduction of 
election in 1951 led to an elected majority of nine councillors 
and six appointed councillors.
37. Cf. J. de V. Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale
University Southeast Asian Monograph, 1967).
38. Cf. T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, op. cit.; Wang Gungwu, 
"Malayan Nationalism," op. cit.; William R. Roff, op. cit.
39. Cf. Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956); Anthony Short, "Communism 
and the Emergency," in Viang Gungwu, ed., Malaysia: A Survey,
op. cit., pp. 149-60.
40. These included Town and Rural Boards.
41. These were mostly functionally-specific committees such as the 
Lisensing Board, the Advisory Boards on Transportation, the Muslim 
and Hindu Endowments Board, the Rubber Lisensing Board, etc.
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In the first (1948), second (1951) and third (1954)
Penang Settlement Council there was roughly a ratio of two 
westernized leaders to every community influential^. Similarly in 
the post-war Municipal Commission the westernized and professional 
elements continued to predominate. This was so even after the 
Municipal election of 1951. But their predominance was not destined 
to last for very long. In the early 1950’s they were still the 
favoured group in the eyes of the colonial administration. Indeed 
when thoughts were given to a future independent Malaya the authority 
hopefully saw in them not a group divided by race or other primordial 
loyalties but one united by a common commitment to western, more
43. The first group included such people as Dr. Lee Tiang Keng,
Dr. K.M. Ariff, Mr. Donald A. Mackay, Mr. Chee Swee Ee,
Mr. Matthew P. Matthew, Mrs. Cheah Inn Kiong (wife cf a 
lawyer and the first woman to serve on the Council). Mr. N. 
Ponnudurai, Mr. S.P. Ramanathan Chettiar (resigned in 1949 and 
succeeded by Dr. M.K. Menon) and Mr. Gilbert Shelley.
Community influentials were Mr. Kee Hup Hor, Mr. Ng Sui Cam,
Mr. Lee Woon Mun, Mr. A.M. Abu Bakar, Mr. S.M. Aidid and 
Mr. Hashim Awang, all of them successful businessmen.
In the second Council there were sixteen unofficial members.
Dr. Lee Tiang Keng served briefly before being succeeded by 
Mr. Lim Huck Aik, a lawyer. Mr. Mackay and Mr. Ng Sui Cam were 
not re-appointed and the three new members were Dr. Lim Chong Eu, 
Mr. H.B. van Praagh and Mr. Mohd. Noor Hamzah. The unofficial 
membership of the third Council was the same as that of the 
second, with the exception that Mr. Gilbert Shelley was re­
placed by Mr. E.P. Balhetchet, then Editor of the Straits Echo.
42. The Council consisted of three ex-officio members (The 
Resident Commissioner, the Crown Counsel and the State 
Treasurer), eight official and fifteen unofficial members.
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44specifically pro-British, values r. As a group they had considered
themselves and had been considered by others as primus inter pares.
On most counts they were seen as eminently qualified to become the
future leaders of the state. However, colonial patronage and their
own western orientation had lulled them into a complacency which
largely ignored the rapidly changing political circumstances of the 
45early 1950’s . When they did react to these by way of forming a
political party, the Radical Party, in June 1951 their effort was 
preceded by the formation of the Labour Party and the United Malays 
National Organization.
After a lapse of nearly half a century^ the first post­
war election in Penang was the Municipal Election held on December 
471st, 1951 . Out of an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 eligible voters
44. It is therefore not surprising that when final negotiations for 
independence were taking place the Straits Chinese British 
Association (Penang and Malacca) sent a delegation to London to 
seek the continuance of ties between the British Government and the 
two Settlements. The Association even took the position that
’if necessary, consideration should be given to the secession of 
the Settlements from the Federation.' Frank H.H. King, The New 
Malayan Nation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951/),
p. 13.
45. Cf. K.J. Ratnam, op. cit.
46. For some references to earlier elections held in Penang see 
Penang Past and Present, 1786-1963, pp. 25-40.
47. This was the first Malayan election, followed by the Kuala Lumpur 
Municipal election in the following year in which an electoral 
understanding between the local M.C.A. and U.M.N.O. resulted in a 
more permanent coalition which is the ruling Alliance Party (cont.)
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only about a quarter of them registered to vote in this election.
For the first time political parties came to life in Penang; the
election itself being the catalyst for the formation of the Labour
Party and the Radical Party. At this embryonic stage of party
formation it is perhaps justified to assume that party leaders were
those who stood for election. On this premise the Labour Party was
led by a group of English-educated teachers, clerks and unionists^.
As for the Radical Party it was quite obviously the party of the local 
49professionals . The third party which contested the election was 
U.M.N.O. which was formed several years earlier in the agitation 
against the Malayan Union.
The campaign was officially described as ’a good, well 
argued, one, with appeals to good sense and reasons and little attempt
48. They included such people as N. Ponnudurai (an administrative 
assistant in a commercial firm and a unionist, he was an appointed 
member of the first, second and third Settlement Council),
P.U. David, Yeoh Oon Chuan, Osman Siru, D.S. Ramanathan (all of 
them teachers), A. Raja Gopal (an insurance representative) and 
Ooi Thiam Siew (a unionist).
49. Its early leaders were Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Dr. N.K. Menon, (both 
medical practitioners), Lee Thean Chu, M.E. Meera Hussian,
C.O. Lim, Nancy Yeap, Oliver L. Phipps, Sonni Pillai (all of them 
lawyers).
47. today. A full report of this election is contained in Report on 
the Introduction of Elections in the Municipality of George Town, 
Penang 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1953).
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to inflame class or communal passions.'^ The result was a victory 
for the Radical Party which captured six of the nine seats with 
U.M.N.O. and the Labour Party gaining one seat each; the remaining 
seat was filled by an Independent. Of the six Radical Party 
Councillors four were lawyers, one was a doctor and the other a 
teacher. The Independent Councillor was also a doctor; while 
U.M.N.O. was represented by a government pensioner, and the Labour 
Party by a unionist who had earlier been appointed to the Settlement 
Counci1^ *.
In a sense, therefore, it can be said that the local 
professionals won seven of the nine seats. They had stood the test 
of electoral support and came out of it with excellent results. 
Paradoxically this electoral success was to cause the political 
demise of the Radical Party four years later. It had led the 
Party to believe that the experience, knowledgeability and unquestioned 
abilities of its members were enough to win and hold political support. 
This belief obscured the necessity of drawing the party closer to 
the electorate. This was to prove a fatal failure because the 
voters had increasingly lost their 'civic indifference’ and had been
50. Ibid., p. 11.
51. He was N. Ponnudurai. The only other Settlement Councillor 
who stood in the election as a U.M.N.O. candidate, but 
defeated, was A.M. Abu Bakar, a businessman.
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’awakened to  t h e i r  own in te r e s t s  to  th e  e x te n t o f e x e rc is in g  th e i r
52vo tes in  favou r o f  condidates and p a r t i e s  of th e i r  c h o ic e . ' A fte r
th e  f i r s t  M unicipal e le c t io n  th e se  v o te s  p r a c t ic a l ly  ceased to  go to  
53th e  R adical P a rty ; the  l a s t  R ad ica l member s a t  in  th e  Council in  
1955 and by the  end o f th a t  year th e  p a r ty  ceased to  e x is t  fo r  a l l  
p r a c t ic a l  p u rposes.
Thus th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e  government and 
e le c to r a l  com petition  had ch a llenged  th e  'custom ary ' form al le a d e r­
sh ip  o f th e  lo c a l p ro fe s s io n a ls .  As a group they  were confron ted
by an e le c to r a te  g re a t ly  s tim u la te d  by sen tim en ts  o f p a ro ch ia lism  
54and communalism, sen tim en ts w ith  which they  could h a rd ly  sym pathize. 
T he ir d i s t a s t e  fo r  'machine p o l i t i c s '  and the  compromises demanded by 
communal p o l i t i c s  p reven ted  them bo th  from b u ild in g  a s tro n g  
p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iz a tio n  and from a c q u ir in g  a more than  ephemeral 
p o l i t i c a l  b a se . T heir p a s t  p o s i t io n  o f le a d e rsh ip  under c o lo n ia l 
pa tronage and t h e i r  i n i t i a l  success in  1951 had n o t p repared  them 
fo r  th e  ad justm ent d e c ta te d  by an a c c e le ra te d  com m unalization o f
52. Penang P as t and P re se n t, 1786-1963, op. c i t . ,  p . 95,
53. The p a r ty  d id  n o t c o n te s t th e  f i r s t  L e g is la tiv e  Council e le c t io n  
in  1955.
54. The s tim u la tio n  o f p a ro ch ia lism  appears to  be a u n iv e rs a l  fu n c tio n  
of th e  achievem ent o f  independence and th e  consequent in tro d u c tio n  
o f an e le c to r a l  p ro c e ss . Cf. C lif fo rd  G eertz , "The In te g ra t iv e  
R e v o l u t i o n i n  Old S o c ie tie s  and New S ta te s  (New York: The Free 
P re s s , 1963), esp . pp. 120-21. A study  o f A frican  e le c t io n s  
su g g ests  th a t  they  have encouraged lo ca lism  to  be more a r t i c u l a t e .
(Cont.)
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political life. The result was a withdrawal from active political 
interest5  ^on the part of a majority of them. Of the ten or so 
local professionals or westernized leaders on each of the three pre­
independent Settlement Council, only two of them stood for state­
wide election when it was introduced. They were Dr. Lim Chong Eu 
and Dr. N.K. Menon. Besides the Municipal election in which the 
latter stood as a Radical Party condidate, both won seats in the 
Settlement Council election of 1955. But what is interesting is 
that they both stood under the Alliance banner.
The demise of the Radical Party highlighted the withdrawal 
of the professionals and westernized leaders from active politics.
Some like Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Dr. N.K. Menon, Lim Eow Thoon, opted to 
join the rising communal parties; others like Sir H.H. Abdoolcader,
Dr. Ong Huck Chye, Dr. K. Mohd. Ariff, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, Khoo Sian 
Ewe and most of the successful Radical Party candidates in the first 
Municipal election declined to be involved with party politics by 
1955. Therefore the professionals and the westernized leaders as a group
55. Cf. Edward Shils, ’'Influence and Withdrawal: The Intellectuals in
Indian Political Development,” in Dwaine Marvick, ed., Political 
Decision-Makers (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 29-56;
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Road to Independence (Paris: Moreton,
1964), pp. 146-49.
54. See W.J.M. Mackenzie and K. Robinson, eds., Five Elections in
Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). For references to the
Malayan situation, see K.J. Ratnam, op. cit.
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surrendered their claim to a central role in the affairs in the 
state. This claim was now made by a new emergent stratum of 
community influentials and 'grass-root* politicians. Some of these, 
like S.M. Zainul Abidin, S.M. Aidid, Chee Swee Ee, Ng Sui Cam and 
Hashim Awang were already recognized by the colonial administration 
after the war through their appointment to the Settlement Council,
Others who did not receive such a formal recognition were most of the 
contemporary Alliance party leaders, people like Saw Seng Kew, Wong 
Pow Nee, Loh Boon Siew, Cheah Seng Khim, Tan Cheng Bee, Chor Sin 
Kheng, Syed Hassan Aidid, C.C. Ismail, Ahmad Saaid, Ahmad Abdullah, 
Sulaiman Palestine and N.T. Arumugum Pillai.
Besides these community influentials a new generation of 
politicians had also emerged. They were mostly English-educated and 
they generally belonged to the lower-middle to middle salaried class. 
They included such people like D.S. Ramanathan, Ooi Thiam Siew,
N. Patkunam, C.Y. Choy, Tan Phock Kin, Tan Chong Bee, V. Veerappen, 
all of whom were leading members of the Labour Party/Socialist Front 
in Penang at one time or another'^. Others who rose to prominence in the 
party were Lim Kean Siew and Lee Kok Liang, both lawyers, and a few 
Chinese-educated teachers or unionists like Wong Chong Woh, Kang Eng 
Wah, Yuen Fook Cheong, Low Ban Hin and Tan Chong Boo.
56. Except C.Y. Choy, all of them subsequently left the party.
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Similarly within the Alliance partners electoral politics 
had given prominence to a group of English-educated party activists. 
They included such people as Aziz Ibrahim, Phee Joo Teik, Tan Kim 
Hoe, Kee Ycng Chin (all of whom were elected in the 1959 State 
election and were membeis of the StateExecutive Council), Geh 
Chong Keat, Ismail Idris, Ibrahim Bin Abdul Rahman (all successful 
Alliance condidates in the 1959 Parliamentary election), Choong 
Ewe Leong, P.A. Das, and William David.
It is not suggested, of course, that all community 
influentials and the English-educated lower-middle to middle class 
were active in the political affairs of the state. It is also 
obvious that besides those of them who were there was another group 
of activists. This consisted of the communally-educated who 
figured in the internal affairs of the Alliance partners. Aside 
from a similar group who joined the Labour Party/Socialist Front 
mentioned above, they were largely the lower party functioneries. As 
such their impact on state or community-wide leadership was largely 
insignificant.
Thus by the mid-1950's a new configuration of power had 
emerged. The previously predominant position of the local 
professionals and the well-to-do English-educated 'British subjects' 
had waned through the crystallization of political interests in 
communal terms. Another consequence of this latter development was
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the decreasing political relevance of the division between the local- 
born and the foreign-born, or within the Muslim community between 
Arab-Malays (Jawi Peranakan) and ’real* Malays. Election, mass 
politics and independence had raised a new set of factors which could 
not but influence the leadership structure. Communalism became 
politically significant; communities and their organizations became 
rallying points for leadership competition. Intra-communal conflicts
or divisions decreased as the potential for inter-communal conflicts 
increased. So the various community influentials and a small stratum 
of the English-educated reacted to the new realities through the 
instrumentality of political parties. Out of this a new pattern of 
leadership emerged, one that reflected the plural character of the 
society.
The first significant party to emerge in Penang, as within 
the country generally, was the Alliance. By 1955, following the 
successful electoral coalition between U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. in the 
1952 Municipal election in Kuala Lumpur, the Alliance had become the 
major political force representing the three main racial communities. 
The other important parties to emerge in the state were the Labour 
Party which had joined with the Party Ra’ayat to form the Socialist 
Front in 1957, the United Democratic Party formed in 1962 by Dr. Lim 
Chong Eu three years after he had resigned from the federal presidency 
of the M.C.A.
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In the f i r s t  s t a t e  e le c t io n  in  1955 th e  A llian ce  P arty  won
a l l  th e  te n  se a ts  and l a t e r  in  th e  y ear a l l  the  fo u r s t a t e  s e a ts  in
th e  Federal e le c t io n .  Among i t s  ten  su c c e ss fu l s t a t e  can d id a tes  were
fo u r C hinese, fo u r Malays and two In d ian s ; in  the  Federal e le c t io n
57th e re  were two Chinese and two Malays . The p a r ty  went on to  win 
conv incing ly  both the  1959 and 1964 s t a t e  and fe d e ra l  e le c t io n s .  But 
by th i s  time the  o p p o sitio n  p a r t i e s ,  f i r s t  th e  S o c ia l i s t  Front and l a t e r  
th e  U .D .P ., began to  make them selves f e l t  e le c to r a l ly  in  th e  s t a t e .
In the 1959 s t a t e  e le c t io n  the  A llian ce  cap tu red  17 o f the  
24 s e a ts  and the  S o c ia l i s t  Front the  o th e r  seven. In  the  
p a rliam en ta ry  e le c t io n  of th e  same y ear the  margin between the  two 
p a r t ie s  was sm alle r: th e  A llian ce  w inning f iv e  s e a ts  and S .F . th e
rem aining th re e . In the  same e le c t io n s  in  1964, dubbed th e  ’k h ak i' 
e le c tio n s  on account o f the  Indonesian  C o n fro n ta tio n , the  A lliance  
in c reased  both  i t s  s ta t e  and fe d e ra l  s e a ts  by one. But the  S .F . 
was rep laced  by th e  IJ.D.P. as the  main o p p o s itio n  p a r ty  in  the  s t a t e .
57. They were Chee Swee Ee, Tay Hooi Soc, Haskim Awang and 
S.M. Zainal A bidin. None o f them were 're co g n iz e d ' by 
th e  C olonial a u th o r i ty  b e fo re  th e  war; a f t e r  th e  war, Chee 
Swee Ee and Kashim Awang were appo in ted  to  th e  
S ettlem en t C ouncil.
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58It lost four state seats to the U.D.P. and one to the Alliance ,
59and one federal seat each to the Alliance and the U.D.P. In the 
shift of electoral fortune several patterns can be observed.
Nationally as well as within the state the Alliance 
retained its electoral predominance. It captured all but one seat 
in the 1955 federal election, 74 of the 104 seats in 1959 and 89 
seats in 1964. In the Penang state elections it won 17 seats out 
of 24 in 1959 and 18 seats in 1964. Nationally the S.F. rose to 
political prominence in 1959 but lost considerable ground in 1964.
In 1959 it won eight parliamentary seats, three of them in Penang; 
but, in 1964 it retained only two seats, one of them in Penang. In 
the state the S.F. was the only successful opposition party in 1959. 
But by 1964 the main opposition party was the U.D.P. which won four 
seats to the S.F.'s two. Moreover, the U.D.P. victories were all at 
the expense of the S.F.
Another pattern that emerged was the character of regional 
support of the parties. The S.F. and the U.D.P. gained its support
58. The Alliance gain of this seat was brought about through the 
defection of D.S. Ramanathan from the S.F. to the Alliance. A 
former stalwart of the Labour Party and the S.F. he was the 
S.F. mayor of George Town from 1958 to 1959. He left the party 
in 1961 and joined the Alliance just prior to the 1964 election. 
He stood in his old constituency of Sungei Pinang and was re­
elected.
59. The successful U.D.P. candidate was Dr. Lim Chong Eu.
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la rg e ly , i f  no t e x c lu s iv e ly , from the  urban o r sub-urban a re a s , 
w hile the  A lliance  perform ed very  w ell in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s . The 
A llian ce  has never won in  the  e x c lu s iv e ly  urban p a rliam en ta ry  
c o n stitu en cy  of Tanjong and Dato K ram at^ , w hile  i t  cap tu red  a l l  
b u t one of th e  o th e r s ix  p a rliam en ta ry  s e a ts  in  1959 and 1964. The 
lone excep tion  was Sebarang S e la tan  in  1959 which was won by the  S .F .
In the  1959 s ta te  e le c t io n  th e  A llian ce  won a l l  the  r u r a l  s e a ts ,  
a l l  bu t one of th e  sem i-urban s e a ts ,  and fo u r of th e  te n  urban se a ts^ * . 
The S .F . won s ix  urban and one sem i-urban s e a ts .  In  the  1964 the  
S .F . re ta in e d  only two o f i t s  seven s e a ts ,  bo th  o f them urban ; w hile 
th e  new U.D.P. cap tured  fo u r  urban s e a ts  from the  S .F . Once again  
th e  A llian ce  won a l l  the  ru r a l  and sem i-urban s e a ts  and re ta in e d  i t s  
fo u r urban s e a ts .  This general p a t te rn  o f A llian ce  s tre n g th  in  the  
r u r a l  and sem i-urban areas and o p p o s itio n  s tre n g th  in  th e  urban a reas  in  
Penang roughly  d u p lic a ted  th e  n a tio n a l p a t te r n .  I t  was a lso  
d u p lic a te d  in  the  general lo c a l e le c t io n s  h e ld  in  1961 and 1963.
60. Both th e se  s e a ts  a re  in  George Town. The S .F . cap tu red  both  
o f them in  1959 bu t lo s t  Tanjong to  Dr. Lim Chong Eu (U .D.P.) 
in  1964.
61. The c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f s t a t e  s e a ts  a re  as fo llo w s:
URBAN - Kota, Tanjong U tara , Tanjong Tengah, Tanjong B ara t, 
Tanjong S e la ta n , Kelawei, J e lu to n g , B u tte rw orth , Bukit Mertajam 
and Dhoby Ghaut (10); SEMI-URBAN - Tanjong Bungah, Ayer Itam , 
Sungei Pinang, G lugor, Bagan Ajam (5 ); and RURAL - Bayan 
Lepas, B alik  Pu lau , Muda, Kapala B atas, Tasek G lugor,
Permatang Pauh, Alma, Sungei Bakap, Nibong Tebal (9 ) . (See 
co n stitu en cy  map on the  fo llow ing  p a g e ) .
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(12) jelutong
(16) Kota
(17) Tanjong Tengah
(18) Tanjong Utara
(19) Tanjong Barat
(20) Sungei Pinang
(21) Tanjong Selatan
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At the local level the Alliance won control of all the
councils in 1961 and 1963 except the City Council of George Town
where the S.F. was successful on both occasions. In 1961 the S.F.
scored its greatest electoral victory in the City Council election
of George Town. It won 14 seats to the Alliance's one. In 1963 it
lost five of these seats, four to the Alliance and one to the U.D.P.,
but, it retained control of the Council. This control was finally
lost at the end of 1965 after the split of the S.F. and the defection
62of one of its leading members
What are the main reasons behind the rise and fall of party 
fortunes in Penang? The first significant factor was the rise of 
the Alliance Party during the 1955 Federal election. A coalition of 
three communal parties its initial overwhelming electoral success in 
1955 made it the 'government-elect' of the impending independent 
Malaya. It made it possible for the party to set itself up as the 
model for the nation both in terms of its inter-communal relationships 
and its structure of decision-making. In essence it meant that no 
racial group would be excluded from the governing process. When 
independence was finally negotiated and brought about under the Alliance
62. Mr. Ooi Thiam Siew, a founding member of the Labour Party and 
a former S.F. mayor of George Town, stood as an independent 
candidate in the mayoral election. He defeated the Labour Party 
candidate, the incumbent, with the support of the Alliance and 
Party Ra’ayat councillors. The U.D.P. councillor abstained.
142
aeg is  i t  pu t the  p a r ty  sq u are ly  in  th e  middle o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ta g e .
I t  boosted  the  p a r ty ’s e le c to r a l  fo r tu n e  in  Penang as e lsew here.
However, i t  d id  n o t, ip so  f a c to , re so lv ed  th e  p o l i t i c a l  problems of 
the  p lu r a l  s o c ie ty . Moreover, by 1959 the  A llian ce  was being  challenged  
more e f f e c t iv e ly  by both  more communal and non-communal p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  the  Pan Malayan Is lam ic  P a rty  and th e  S .F . In 
Penang, as mentioned above, th e  ch a llen g e  came f i r s t l y  from th e  S .F . 
and l a t e r  th e  U.D.P.
The success s to ry  o f th e  A llian ce  P a rty  has been w ell to ld .
The p a r ty  i t s e l f  as w ell as i t s  p o l ic ie s  r e f le c te d  Malay predominance 
over the  Chinese and th e  In d ian s . This in  no sm all measure con­
t r ib u te d  to  the  w illin g n e ss  o f Malay v o te rs  to  c ro ss  th e  communal
63l in e  and vo ted  fo r  Chinese A llia n c e  can d id a tes  . But has the  
A llian ce  so lu tio n  to  th e  paradox o f  Malayan p o l i t i c s  been as 
a p p lic a b le  to  Penang as i t  has fo r  th e  country  g en era lly ?  As 
mentioned b efo re  Penang i s  more Chinese and more urban than  th e  
country  as a whole. Chinese m a jo rity  became more and more s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  a f t e r  1957. There was g re a t d r iv e  fo r  c i t iz e n s h ip  among 
th e  C hinese, aided by p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  M.C.A. In  
Penang one r e s u l t  o f  th i s  was an in c re a se  in  the  e le c to ra te  o f about 
65,000, or n e a r ly  a t h i r d ,  between the  1959 and 1964 e le c t io n s .
63. See K .J. Ratnam, op. c i t . ,  Appendix I I .
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While it is impossible to determine the proportion of Chinese and 
Indian voters in this increase, it is generally true to say that before 
1959, and particularly before 1964, a large number of them were 
ineligible to vote. They were either under age or were not 
registered as citizens. But, with this increase the success of the 
Alliance in Penang would depend to some extent on the ability of the 
M.C.A. to win the Chinese vote. As indicated by the Alliance 
failure in the overwhelmingly Chinese area of George Town this has 
been problematic for the Alliance.
While nationally the Alliance had increased its proportion
64of the vote between 1959 and 1964 , its proportion had actually
decreased in Penang, (see Table 3.1).
As a consequence Penang has become the second weakest 
state for the Alliance in Malaya, next only to Kelantan.
Part of the problem of the Alliance in Penang is the fact 
that nationally-defined pro-Malay policies have alienated a substantial 
proportion of the Chinese. Secondly the Alliance government of Penang, 
for reasons mentioned in the previous chapter, has been unable to 
resolve the pressing urban problems, particularly that of the free-port
64. From 55.5% to 57.6% in the state election; and 51.8% to 58.5% 
in the parliamentary election.
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Table 3.1
Sta.te and P arliam en ta ry  E le c t io n s , 1959 and 1964*
PARTY STATE PARLIAMENT
1959 1964 1959 1964
S eats % o f Seats % o f S eats % o f Seats % o f
Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote
A llian ce 17 51.1 18 47.2 5 44.0 6 47.3
S.F . 7 29.4 2 32.1 3 38.2 1 31.6
U.D.P. - - 4 17.5 - - 1 18.1
P .M .I.P . - 3.1 - 2.1 - 10.8 - 2 .7
O th e rs1
i_____ _ _______ _______
11.4 - 0 .9
'
7 .0 - 0 .4
* There a re  e ig h t s t a t e  and 24 p a rliam en ta ry  s e a ts .  
1. P .P .P . ,  P .A .P ., P a rty  Negara and Independents.
s ta tu s  and unemployment. Another fa c to r  i s  the  n a tu re  of the  
A llian ce  le a d e rsh ip  and th a t  o f th e  o p p o sitio n  p a r t i e s .
The emergence and success of th e  A llian ce  was b rought 
about by th e  le a d e rsh ip  o f th e  community in f lu e n t i a l s  and a ided  by 
th e  com m unalization o f p o l i t i c s .  The l a t t e r  p ro cess  caused a group 
of E n g lish -ed u ca ted  people to  jo in  the  v a rio u s  communal p a r tn e rs  o f 
th e  A llia n c e . In  due course  th i s  group emerged as th e  A llian ce  
e le c te d  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  w hile  th e  community in f l u e n t i a l s  r e ta in e d
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control of the communal parties. By 1959 this pattern had become 
clear. Alliance party leaders like Saw Seng Kew, Loh Boon Siew,
Ng Sui Cam (all M.C.A.), Syed Hassan Aidid, C.M. Hashim, S.M. Aidid 
(all U.M.N.O.), N.T.S. Arumugum Pillai and P.A. Das (both M.I.C.) 
were firmly in control. But not a single one of them stood for 
the state or parliamentary elections of 1959 or 1964. Despite this 
their leadership of the parties w»re totally unchallenged. But this 
did not mean that other community influentials were also uninvolved in 
elections. Particularly in the case of U.M.N.O. several of them, 
such as C.C. Ismail, Ahmad Saaid, Ahmad Abdullah, and Sulaiman 
Palestine stood and won handsomely in predominantly Malay rural 
constituencies, but by and large the Alliance elected representatives 
were drawn from its English-educated members, most of whom belonged to 
the lower-middle to middle, salaried class.^ To be sure some of 
them have in recent years devoted full time to a political career , 
but very few of them are very rich or have independent means. ^  For 
them politics has been the main instrument of social mobility and 
electoral success has conferred upon them prestige and social standing 
in their respective communities. Although leadership is largely
65. The main exceptions were Cheah Seng Khim, a Federal Senator and a 
very rich English-educated businessman, Choong Ewe Leong and S. 
Natha Singh, both of them lawyers.
66. Although there are widespread rumours that the politicians have 
accumulated great wealth in recent years through their engagement 
in commercial undertakings such as housing development and land 
speculation. Not unexpectedly there have been charges of 
corruption, and of unethical use of secret information.
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community-oriented (in the sense that one is first of all a leader in
67one's community before one can be a leader generally ) electoral 
success has also bestowed upon them communal leadership . This has 
the effect of blurring the distinction between communal leaders and 
governmental leaders, between those who control the parties and those 
who control the state government.
Partly because of different backgrounds and partly because 
of control over different institutions there have been strains within 
the Alliance leadership between the communal leaders and the elected 
politicians. It is difficult to determine what the actual differences 
between these two groups are. Privately several government leaders 
remarked that they have had to resist the demands of the communal
67. It is in this sense that the westernized professional class as a 
class has failed to capture the top leadership of the state. But 
as an elite of skills and education it still commands the respect 
of those in the government and a substantial portion of the 
English-educated.
68. It may be argued, of course, that electoral success can only be 
gained by those whom the communal political parties choose to 
stand for election; and to be selected one must have influence 
in the community. But not all those who have such an influence 
can or are willing to stand for election - language deficiency 
is a barrier to some while others are unprepared to risk their 
reputation at elections. Conversely not all those who are 
eager for political office have influence in their own community.
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leaders '. Some said that they have more to do with commercial 
rather than communal interests while others maintain that the demands 
were strictly political. One speculation was that the M.C.A. was 
worried about its position in George Town where a majority of the 
Chinese live and would like the government to take steps to win back 
the votes which in recent years have consistently gone to the 
opposition. In any case it is clear that beside the expected 
tensions in the Alliance arising from three partners with different 
communal perspectives there is also periodic lack of agreement between 
those who control the government and those who control the parties.
But to the extent that control of the government does not mean 
absolute descretion in policy-making, in the sense that both the 
State Alliance and the state government are subjected to its 
Federal counterparts, this kind of disagreement has not proved 
disintegrative.
As a result the top Alliance leaders are able to play two 
all-important roles of linkage in the society: between the various
69
62. On an official trip I undertook with the Chief Minister of the 
State he confirmed this, but like everyone else he refused 
to elaborate on what some of these demands are.
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communities and the government , and between one community and
another. It is this dual linkage function which permits them to
resist the more communalistic demands without alienating the communal
71support which they need. It also lends unity to the leadership 
structure of what is, after all, a very pluralistic society. And 
by the very existence of such a leadership structure each community 
feels that its voice is made and heard at the highest level.
For the most part, however, the new leaders were men who 
were both unprepared and unwilling (and some say unqualified) to do
70. That such a function comes close to being a prescription for
stability is recognized elsewhere. This point has been 
developed by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lemer in the 
following way: 'There are "two worlds' ... in every new nation - 
the modem Western and the traditional native. The successful 
politician __ is likely to be the man who bridges the gulf.
The tenacious unilateralist of the modern Western faction is 
likely to be destroyed by the liberated traditional natives.
The unscrupulous exploiter of the traditional native is likely 
to bring his new nation to ruin.
Effective representative policy is most likely to be promoted 
in new nations by the politician who understands the context in 
which the "two worlds" of modernity and tradition may be bridged. 
It is he who - when facing two conflicting sets of values and 
institutions with high potential for mutual destruction - will 
create those eclective optimizing procedures of negotiation, 
bargaining, and compromise that build mutual respect.' This 
point is made in their introduction to Marshall R. Singer, The 
Emerging Elite, op. cit., p. xii.
71. According to a leader in the government: 'Politics is communal
but government is not. We can "politick" on the basis of race
but it is very difficult to run the government on such a basis.' 
[Quotation translated from Hokkien].
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72more than preserve the status quo when they took over the reins of
power. In a climate of considerable political apprehension about
the future - the Malays were logically concerned about their position
73in a predominantly Chinese state , and the Chinese about the place of 
such a state in a 'Malay-dominated7 country - the best claim of 
leadership proved to be an ability to promise that the communal 
interests would be served. In theory this could mean the advocacy 
and advancement of one community's interest to the real or perceived 
detriment of another, the Chinese relying on their local position and 
the Malays relying on their national position. In practice, however, 
it took the form of preserving, or seeking to preserve, as much of 
the existing interests as possible, and of making sure that any 
changes should have the least detrimental effect on any particular 
community. This merely reflected the seemingly paradoxical situation 
where the communalization of politics placed a premium on inter­
community co-operation on the basis of intra-community solidatitv.
72. In an analogy used by Lucian Pye: ’No one should rock the boat,
which means that everyone must sit down, and no one can even 
stand up to find out where the boat is heading.' Lucian W.
Pye, "A New Class in Malaya," op. cit., p. 14.
73. After the secession of Singapore from Malaysia there were 
rumours that a Chinese opposition member of the State Legislative 
Assembly wanted to introduce a motion calling for the re­
consideration of Penang's position in Malaysia. Confirmation
of this came in a speech made by the Speaker of the Assembly,
Tuan Haji Sulaiman bin Haji Ahmad, at an Alliance function to 
celebrate the second anniversary of the formation of Malaysia.
In his loudly applauded speech the Speaker said that 'the 
Malays would never allow the secession of Penang.'
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In such a situation the central role of leadership has been that of 
mediation between communal group interests, a role that can best be 
performed by those who have the support and confidence of their 
respective communities. It is precisely the realization of this 
requirement that had led some of the middle-class, English-educated 
political aspirants to ally themselves with the communal leaders in 
the first place.
It is therefore a system of leadership which depends on 
striking a balance between the various community interests and 
between them and the demands of a rational, efficient administration. 
As such it works through the traditional sources of influence as 
much as the formal authority of the s t a t e ' T h i s  is perhaps the 
single most important factor in legitimating the new, post­
independence leadership.
74. It seems that somewhat the same sort of situation also developed 
in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century when Japanese society was 
undergoing very rapid change. As one writer puts it:
[Japanese leaders depend] very often on their status in 
the traditional society and the authority stemming from 
this status. Concomitantly, the demands of specialization 
and differentiation accompanying development require the 
leaders at the national level to adhere, however minimally, 
to the principles of legal authority and its accompanying 
leadership characteristics. The result of this situation 
is the emergence of leadership which depends on both law 
and tradition to accomplish its goals. It is this seeming 
ambivalence which gives leadership in developing societies, 
as in the case of Japan after the mid-nineteenth century, 
the appearance of looking upon law as merely a formal mask 
behind which things get done on the basis of informal
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But preserving the status quo can hardly be a prescription 
for progress. For Penang with its acute unemployment problem, which 
incidentally affects mostly the urban Chinese population, the Alliance 
system of leadership is vulnerable to opposition attacks. Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the Alliance, of course, goes beyond the question 
of employment. In more subtle and difficult to define ways it 
extends to the general issue of the pro-Malay Alliance compromise.
This expressed itself most effectively in the Chinese concentrated 
area of George Town where the voters have consistently voted first 
for the S.F. and later for the U.D.P. and between the Alliance 
partners, U.M.N.O. has consistently polled better than the M.C.A. 
within the state generally.
In the 1959 and 1964 state elections U.M.N.O. captured 
all the ten seats it contested for the Alliance; so did the M.I.C.
74. traditional patterns of influence .... Legal authority
legitimizes the new forms and ways of doing things while 
traditional authority makes innovation operational among 
the great masses of society. The almost equal balance 
of these two types of authority and their orientations 
among Japanese leaders after 1868 made the leaders 
frequently very successful despite the fact that none of 
them could be called truly charismatic.
Bernard S. Silverman and H.D. Harootunian, eds., Modem 
Japanese Leadership (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press,
1966), pp. 424-25.
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On the other hand all the seats the Alliance lost were seats where 
M.C.A. candidates stood. A similar pattern was obtained in the 
parliamentary elections.
Where the M.C.A. has performed badly the S.F. and later 
the U.D.P. have done well. It is difficult to be sure that the 
support for the opposition parties was indicative of the anti-M.C.A. 
feeling among the urban Chinese. On the other hand it is tempting 
to suggest that support of the S.F. was an expression of proletarian 
sympathies for a professedly socialist party. Without breakdown 
of racial voting and a detailed analysis of the numerous compaigns 
both suggestions can only be speculative.
It is interesting to remember that the S.F. first began to 
gain control of the City Council towards the end of 1957. At this
time the Council was composed of eight Labour Councillors (five 
Chinese and three Indians), five Alliance Councillors (three Malays, 
one Chinese and one Indian) and two Independents (one Chinese and 
one Indian). Such a composition may be taken to imply an absence of 
strict communal voting as most, if not all, city electorate may be 
presumed to have Chinese majority. But, if composition were to be 
taken as an indicator of communal voting or an expression of anti- 
M.C.A. feeling among the urban Chinese the result of the 1961 Council 
election would be revealing. For after this election the Council 
was composed of 14 S.F. Councillors (11 Chinese, two Indians and one
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Malay) and one M.C.A. Councillor. Also for the first time the S.F. 
was represented by five Chinese-educated Councillors. It is, 
therefore, plausible to suggest that the urban, mostly Chinese, 
voters had by this time become disenchanted with the Alliance and, 
in particular the M.C.A. This was confirmed by the state and 
parliamentary results of the 1964 elections.
To what extent was the support of the S.F. a positive rather 
than a negative one? In other words, were people voting for the 
S.F. or against the Alliance? While it is not possible to supply 
a definite answer, several factors may be mentioned. In the first 
instance, by 1961 the S.F. has gained a stature of national importance. 
In parliament it has emerged as the second strongest opposition 
party, next to the P.M.I.P. In the state election of 1959, it was 
the only successful opposition party. In percentage of votes polled 
in 1959, it has captured 38 per cent of the parliamentary votes to 
the Alliance’s 44 per cent, and 29 per cent of the state votes to 
the Alliance’s 51 per cent. An this performance was with fewer 
candidates than the Alliance. Besides this, electoral success has 
also promoted the political stature of some of its leaders. In 
Penang individuals like Lim Kean Siew, Tan Phock Kin, V. Veerappan,
D.S. Ramanathan, Ooi Thiam Siew, C.Y. Choy, Tan Chong Bee, Lee 
Kok Liang and Loh Ban Hin were members of multiple elective bodies.
In fact the first two named were simultaneously City Councillors,
State Assemblymen and Federal parliamentarians.
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A consequence of these developments was the growth of party
membership. For various reasons the party was more attractive to 
75youth . By 1960 the Labour Party in Penang had 31 active branches.
Observation and interviews revealed, however, that a significant
proportion (perhaps even a majority) of its members were Chinese-
educated youth. This could not but have an impact on the party
which until then was being led by small group of English-educated
and socialist-minded politicians. The first of this was the
nomination, for the first time, of six Chinese-educated candidates
in the 1961 City Council election. The fact that five of them
were successful meant that the ’Chinese faction' of the party had
come to stay. That this tended to divide the party was revealed
indirectly by appeals to co-operation and understanding among party
76members and leaders . Indeed the following statement made by the
Chairman of the Penang Division is revealing:
Because of ... disagreements a few unscrupulous 
members have deliberately split party leadership 
and in that way allow persons of less ability, 
but who have closer contact with the branches 
and are therefore more popular, to take over 
leadership by ousting men of more ability.77
75. In 1960 it was stated that 3/4 of the Labour Party members were 
youth. For this reason the party considered it redundant to 
have a separate Youth Section. Proceedings of the Extra- 
Ordinary Conference of the [Labour] Party, held in Kuala 
Lumpur on 24th, April, 1960.
76. See Labour Party of Malaya, Penang Division, Annual Report 1963.
77. Ibid., p. 9.
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He was, in this instance, referring to the party split of 1962 in 
which four stalwarts of the party resigned and in the process accused 
their former party of malpractice in the City Council. This split 
was symptomatic of the changing character of the party's rank and 
file members. It was said that the party was being dictated by 
its young Chinese-educated members. Being unable to be absorbed 
into the economy or the educational system they had brought into 
party politics an enthusiasm and radicalism which were absent in 
the English-educated party leaders. According to one former party 
leader: 'they are unemployed, unmarried and bitter and they
despised those of us who are English-speaking and with comfortable 
positions . It is absurd that these young inexperienced members 
should dictate to those of us who founded the party in the first 
place and who have been associated with its success in Penang.'
In the light of subsequent events it seems that the 
explanation of the changing character of the party membership and the 
pressure on its leadership is quite valid. In the period 1965-66 
several public demonstrations undertaken, by young party members, in 
the name of the party were found to be unauthorized by the party's 
executives. That these activities compromised the public stature 
of party, only just recently gained, can be gauged from the reaction 
of the leaders: they claimed responsibility for them, even as they
disagreed, for fear of revealing that they were not in control.
The party's electoral fortune began to decline from 1963. As
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mentioned above, its position as the main opposition party to the 
Alliance in Penang was overtaken by the U.D.P. These developments, 
therefore, tend to support the proposition that a substantial 
proportion of the S.F.'s support was negative or an expression of 
anti-M.C.A. sentiments. If it were proletarian sympathies for a 
socialist party it would have held steadfast as the S.F. had 
become more radical socialist instead of less. Perhaps it should 
also be mentioned that the party, in the eyes of some people, has 
also become more blatantly a ’’Chinese'’ party.
What were the reasons behind the electoral impact of 
the U.D.P. aside from the division within the S.F. and its con­
sequence? From all accounts the party was formed almost single-
handedly by Dr. Lim Chong Eu in 1962, three years after he had
78resigned from the federal presidency of the M.C.A. It is 
perhaps useful here to recall very briefly his political career.
Dr. Lim was first appointed to the Penang Settlement 
Council in 1951, the year he helped found the Radical Party and 
acted as its Secretary-General. In 1954 he served as Penang’s 
representative on the Federal Legislative Council and was appointed
78. This was a consequence of the disagreement between M.C.A. 
and U.M.N.O. over the allocation of seats for the 1959 
Federal election.
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to the Federal Executive Council. He joined the M.C.A. in Penang 
in 1955 and became a member of the State Executive Council. In 
1957 he became the Alliance chief party whip in parliament and in 
the following year was elected M.C.A. president. As a result of 
the Alliance internal crisis of 1959 he resigned from the presidency 
and the party and did not contest the 1959 election. But despite 
this his political stature in Penang remained intact, particularly 
since it was popularly recognized that he had tried to protect 
Chinese interests within the Alliance. Thus when he formed the 
U.D.P. it was not surprising that he would gain some support. This 
was first reflected in the 1963 City Council election when one of 
Dr. Lim’s chief lieutenants, Teh Ewe Lim, was able to defeat the 
S.F. leader Lim Kean Siew. In contesting the 1963 local elections 
for the first time the U.D.P. was able to gain 16 per cent of the 
vote, compared to the Alliance’s 44 per cent and the S.F.’s 34 per cent.
The increasing popularity of the U.D.P. was confirmed in 
the 1964 elections, as mentioned earlier. While its percentage of 
the vote did not increase substantially it had emerged as the main 
opposition to the Alliance in Penang in terms of seats. It is also 
clear that the strength of the U.D.P. was in the urban and over­
whelmingly Chinese area of George Town. Here in the two 
parliamentary contests in 19643 that of Tanjong and Dato Dramat, the 
party actually polled the highest number of votes among the three
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main p a r t i e s .  Was th i s  a s ig n  th a t  Chinese v o te rs  were d r i f t in g  
towards th e  U .D .P.? And i f  so , what d id  th i s  imply? Any answer 
would be sp e c u la tiv e . But, th e re  i s  no doubt th a t  Dr. Lim was 
making a su c c e ss fu l p o l i t i c a l  comeback. The e le c to r a l  f ig u re s  
show th a t  bo th  the  A llian ce  (M.C.A.) and th e  S .F . in c reased  
th e i r  v o te s  between th e  1959 and the  1964 c o n te s t s . But 
th e re  was a g re a te r  percen tage  of v o tin g  tu rn o u t in  1964, 
r i s in g  from about 72 p e r cen t to  85 p e r c e n t. Of th e  th re e  
p a r t i e s  th e  M.C.A. managed th e  low est p ro p o r tio n  o f in c re a se  
in  i t s  v o te s .
Although th e  A llian ce  d id  somewhat b e t t e r  in  
th e  1964 e le c t io n  than  in  th e  1959 e le c t io n  i t  i s  c le a r  
th a t  i t s  Chinese p a r tn e r ,  the  M.C.A., has f a i l e d  to  
cap tu re  a m a jo rity  o f th e  Chinese vo te  in  Penang. I t s  
perform ance compares bad ly  w ith  th a t  o f U.M.N.O., which 
has c o n s is te n t ly  won a l l  th e  s e a ts  i t  c o n te s te d  fo r  the  
A llia n c e . Indeed in  the  s ta t e  e le c t io n  o f 1964 only two o f
79
79. The U.D.P. p o lle d  some 21,000 v o tes  to  th e  S . F . Ts 18,600 
and th e  A ll ia n c e 's  14,000.
159
the six M.C.A. candidates returned won with a comfortable margin.
In one other seat the M.C.A. candidate won with a bare majority of 
the vote; and in the remaining three seats the party squeezed 
through with a mere plurality. Perhaps, the plight of the party 
can be seen in the performance of the state Chief Minister, the 
party’s leading politician. In 1959 he captured 70 per cent of the 
vote in the state constituency of Bukit Mertajam compared to the 
S.F.'s 30 per cent. In 1964 he was returned with only 43 per cent, 
with the S.F. obtaining 31 per cent and the U.D.P. 26 per cent.
An even more dramatic example of the decline of the M.C.A. in 
Penang was the 1965 by-election in the state constituency of Ayer 
Itam.
The Ayer Itam By-Election, 1965:
The State constituency of Ayer Itam is situated almost in 
the middle of the top half of Penang island. Although it lies 
outside the city limits of George Town it has the same demographic 
profile as the city. Ayer Itam is predominantly a Chinese area, 
owing in large measure to the overflow of the city population. It
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is only about 10 to 15 minutes by car from the centre of the city.
So for all practical purposes, except administrative ones, it is 
part of George Town. Being a suburb, Ayer itam has a large 
number of people who work 'downtown.' The rest of the population 
are farmers, vegetable gardeners and small traders. There are two 
special features of Ayer Itam. It is a tourist area on account of 
several famous Buddhist temples and pagodas and the Penang Hill 
holiday resort. Secondly Ayer Itam is an area of 'Chinese 
education.' It has two well-known Chinese high schools, the Chung 
Ling High School and the Han Chiang High School. In their heydays 
these two schools attracted students from the other parts of the 
country as well as Thailand and Indonesia.
Until the 1965 by-election Ayer itam was represented in 
the State Assembly by only one man. He was Mr Chor Sin Kheng, a 
member of a very prominent family in Ayer Itam with large land- 
holdings and other properties. So when he first contested the 
Ayer Itam seat on the Alliance ticket in 1959 his victory came as 
no surprise. As a result he became a member of the state Executive 
Council. In 1964 he again won the seat, but only just. His 
death the following year brought about the by-election.
The by-election took place in November, almost 20 months 
after the 1964 election. In that period the seriousness of the
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Indonesian Confrontation had subsided and Singapore had seceded 
from Malaysia. The free-port status of the island remained 
ambiguous and talk of joining it to the mainland by a bridge or a 
causeway was rife. The pre-1964 election idea of building a road 
up Penang Hill had not materialized. Penang was still suffering 
economically from the severance of barter trade with Sumatra. 
Unemployment remained high, though how high was a matter of dispute, 
and the state government industrialization programme was concentrated 
on the Mak Mandin industrial estate in Province Wellesley. The 
Federal Government had proposed additional tax measures, a payroll 
and a turnover tax, which were generally believed to affect mainly 
the Chinese community. So there was no dearth of issues for the 
by-election.
Since the 1964 election the two main issues in Penang were 
the concept of ’Malaysian Malaysia' and the new taxes. These in­
dicated the ’Chineseness' of the state. The first issue was sus­
tained through a Malaysian Solidarity Convention rally in Penang 
which was scheduled before Singapore's separation and held right after 
it, with the U.D.P. naturally playing the leading role. The second 
issue was kept alive by the Chinese business community in Penang 
with the M.C.A. being a concerned party. Besides these, of course, 
there were also the 'perennial' issues of Chinese language and 
education, these being particularly germane to an area like Ayer Itam.
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With all these matters in the air the by-election was no ordinary 
affair and this was confirmed in the month before polling day.
If for no other reason the racial composition of the 
Ayer Itam constituency made it an important by-election. Roughly 
85 per cent of the electorate were Chinese, 10 per cent were Malay 
and the rest were mainly Indian. Without the fear of the Indonesian 
Confrontation to confuse the issue as it did the year before, the 
outcome of the contest was viewed as an indication of Alliance pop­
ularity, more specifically the popularity of the M.C.A. In Penang 
as a whole it generated a great amount of interest several weeks 
before nomination day and for a good while after polling day.
Before nomination day the local press, especially the two 
Chinese papers, was ardently speculating on who would contest the 
seat. It was generally expected that the three parties which 
contested in 1964 - the M.C.A. for the Alliance, S.F. and the U.D.P. - 
would do so again. There was a brief speculation about the two 
opposition parties coming to an agreement and filing only one
candidate. But this was soon revealed to be false: both the S.F.
1
and the U.D.P. were confident of victory and neither was willing to 
step down. A few days before nomination took place the local press 
revealed the following line-up of candidates: On the Alliance ticket 
was a scion of one of the oldest and richest Chinese families in
163
Penang, David Choong Ewe Leong, lawyer (and former international 
badminton star), national chairman of M.C.A. Youth and chairman of 
Penang M.C.A. Youth. Mr Choong, 36 years old, had joined M.C.A. 
only a few years earlier after he returned from England, and was 
the only M.C.A. candidate to be successful in the City Council 
election of 1961 and 1963, There was apparently no dispute about 
his selection. The S.F., after some press reports about the 
reluctance of some of its leading members to contest the seat, 
nominated one of its leading national figures, Mr Lim Kean Siew.
Mr Lim, who was 43, was also a scion of one of the leading 
professional families in Penang.^ Son of a very prominent lawyer 
and himself an equally prominent lawyer, he was elected to the 
federal parliament in both 1959 and 1964 and became a leading 
opposition spokesman in that body. He had held several high 
national offices in the S.F. and was the national secretary-general 
as well as the chairman of the Penang division of the party. Mr Lim 
also contested the seat in 1964 and lost to the M.C.A. candidate 
by just over 100 votes.
The U.D.P. was represented by Mr Tan Gim Hwa, a young 
graduate of Melbourne University in accountancy. At 27 Mr Tan
80. So, incidentally, was Dr Lim Chong Eu, except in his case the 
profession was medicine.
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was truly a newcomer to politics. If he was not as prominent as the 
other two candidates he had an important background. Unlike the 
other two, who were locally educated in the Penang Free School, he 
was an alumnus of the Chung Ling High School and could therefore 
speak Mandarin. Mr Tan's selection apparently provoked some dis­
satisfaction on the part of the previous U.D.P. candidate in the 
1964 election.
So the line-up of candidates was a very prestigious one. 
If the U.D.P. candidate was comparatively unknown this was offset 
by the fact that Dr Lim Chong Eu himself lived and maintained a 
practice in the constituency. A battle royal was promised and 
that was what the by-election turned out to be. But before we 
briefly examine the campaign and the outcome, it is useful to point 
out some of the similarities between the candidates. Of course, 
all three of them were Chinese; but they were also professionally 
qualified. Like a large majority of the Chinese in Penang they 
were Hokkien. They were comparatively young and, naturally, 
politically ambitious. Except for the S.F. candidate, they had
81. Indeed Dr Lim was so prominent in the campaign that it provoked 
the S.F. to make the following statements: 'He talks as if he
is the ... candidate when in fact he is not'; 'Dr Lim is not 
fighting the election. He is already in the State Assembly.' 
Also in a statement released during the campaign by the S.F. Dr 
Lim's name was mentioned 17 times and the U.D.P. candidate, Mr 
Tan, was not even mentioned once!
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accepted the relevance of communalism and joined communal-oriented 
82parties. Again, except for Mr Lim who was already well-established, 
they were regarded as being among their parties' up-and-coming 
leaders. But apart from their personal reputations, greater issues 
were at stake.
For the M.C.A. the by-election was an important barometer 
of its continuing influence among the Chinese and for the Alliance, 
of a continuing acceptance of the original racial bargain, now more 
and more being translated into policies. Particularly in the area 
of Chinese education, the contest was a test of the national policy 
to emphasize Malay as the national language and hence as the primary 
medium of instruction in all schools. For in Ayer Itam the two 
prominent Chinese high schools adopted different positions with 
regard to the national education policy. The Chung Ling High School 
had opted to go along with the policy and to receive federal grants. 
But the Han Chiang High School had decided to remain independent, and 
hence retained the content of Chinese in its curriculum. Which 
position did the Chinese prefer and could the election tell anything? 
That the Alliance federal government thought it important can be
82. The U.D.P. considered itself non-communal, but it was generally 
regarded as a pro-Chinese party, at least in Penang, which was 
its headquarters.
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seen in the discussion of the campaign below.
For the S.F. the contest was an opportunity to regain 
its lost prestige. The 1964 election had delivered a severe blow 
to the party because it was unable to take a categorical position 
against Indonesia; and also the leadership split which began in 
1962 had weakened its local image.
For the U.D.P. the contest was a chance to further con­
solidate its initial gains in 1964. More specifically the party, 
through its leader Dr Lim Chong Eu, had picked up the call of a 
'Malaysian Malaysia' originally articulated by the Singapore Prime 
Minister.
Therefore, much was thought to be at stake. But could 
the outcome of the by-election be considered a verdict on any of 
these issues? If these issues were not the controlling factors, 
then what were? The campaign itself was most illuminating in 
this respect.
For three weeks up to the polling day Ayer Itarn was caught 
up in a political carnival. Posters, party symbols, flags and 
sign boards were put up in all the vantage points in the con­
stituency. Nightly political rallies were held in different parts
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of it, in good and inclement weather, with loudspeakers carrying the 
messages to the surrounding areas. The electorate was not spared 
in the daytime either. Vans with amplifiers toured the area 
chanting a liturgy of political recommendations. As if the voters 
were not disturbed and interrupted enough, teams of canvassers 
went round from household to household trying to persuade and cajole
u 83them.
Because of the racial composition of the constituency the 
campaign was carried out in Hokkien. English was also spoken but 
not frequently. When it was used Hokkien translation was provided 
Malay was used in the district where most of the 1,000 odd Malays 
lived, and this only by the Alliance. Despite their professional 
background and foreign education, all the candidates spoke mainly 
in Hokkien, although the U.D.P. man also used Mandarin occasionally 
to emphasize the fact that he was Chinese-educated locally.
The three main local campaigners were the M.C.A. and the 
S.F. candidates and the leader of the U.D.P., Dr Lim. The U.D.P.
83. It was confirmed by a person heavily involved in the campaign
that secret society elements were involved with all the parties. 
Mostly they were retained to ensure that other 'bad-hats' did 
not disrupt the party's campaign. In the course of the 
campaign no disruption was evident and order was maintained 
by the police throughout.
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candidate himself was not very much in the picture in the public 
rallies, although unlike the others he took part in the house to 
house canvassing. As for outside of state speakers, all three 
parties recruited their prominent national figures.
Those who took part for the Alliance included the 
federal Deputy Prime Minister, two federal Chinese and one Indian 
Ministers, and officials from the M.C.A. and Alliance national 
headquarters. Besides these political luminaries, there were the 
Alliance leaders from the state.
Speaking for the S.F. at various stages were the party's 
other member of parliament, besides its candidate Mr Lim, the party's 
secretary-general and the national leader of its Women section.
Other activists from out of state also assisted the S.F.'s effort.
The U.D.P, was the only party supported by leaders from 
other parties in the country. The leaders of the S.U.P.P.
(Sarawak) and P.P.P. spoke on its behalf, as well as other U.D.P. 
leaders from Kedah and Perak.
84. The leader of the D.A.P. who was a member of parliament was 
refused permission by the police to speak at a U.D.P. rally 
on the ground that he was not a member of a properly registered 
political party. At the time the party was seeking re­
registration as a party autonomous of the Singapore P.A.P.
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The issues raised in the campaign were numerous. The 
Alliance naturally was on the defensive. Speaker after speaker 
stressed the party’s record and how it had made Malaysia one of 
the most advanced countries in Asia and Africa. It laid particular 
emphasis on its achievement of racial harmony in the country. It 
also tried to use the issue of Indonesian Confrontation, but it was 
evidently not as potent as in the 1964 election.
The two opposition parties were more specific. The S.F. 
returned to the issue of Malaysia on the basis that the separation 
of Singapore justified its original reservation. It called 
Malaysia a neo-imperialist plot underwritten by British and Malayan 
(capitalist) interest, How this was so, was not explained. It 
mentioned the questions of free-port, education and language, the 
lack of economic planning, and the Alliance treatment of the 
ordinary man such as hawkers, fishermen, etc.
For its part the U.D.P. emphasized the slogan of a 
'Malaysian Malaysia and not a Malay Malaysia,' the recently announced 
payroll and turnover taxes, Singapore's secession and Chinese 
language and education.
As expected all these issues were raised and challenged 
and different interpretations of them were made. The result was
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total confusion as far as the majority of the electorate were 
concerned. What was claimed by one party was immediately con­
tradicted by another. It was virtually impossible to imagine 
how the voters were able to determine who was right. No proof 
was given for a particular interpretation or claim; none was 
considered necessary. It seemed that the rhetoric was the 
important thing. For these reasons, all the parties realized that 
ultimately one particular issue was central.
For the Alliance it was the claim that the party already 
controlled the state and federal government, and its candidate could 
therefore more effectively represent the interests of the people of 
Ayer Itarn. For the S.F. the issue was who among the three 
candidates had the most proven personal ability. In other words, 
who had the best leadership claim. For the U.D.P. the issue was 
the party, not so much what the man could do but which party he was 
representing. The S.F„ was discredited, so it claimed, and the 
M.C.Ao could not be trusted to protect Chinese interests. These 
three separate themes were repeated so often that one got the 
impression that other issues did not really matter. From observation, 
they did not.
In the end the S.F. carried the day - Mr Lim Kean Slew won 
the by-election narrowly. He defeated the U.D.,P. candidate by 153
171
votes, with the Alliance candidate another 220 votes behind. The 
statistics of the by-election compared to the previous two contests 
are presented below.
Table 3.2
Results of the Ayer Itam Election, 1959, 1964 and 1965.
Party (In per cent 
1959
of valid 
1964
vote cast) 
1965
Alliance1 51.5 43,3 30.9
S.F. 48.5 41.7 35.5
U.D.P. - 14.9 33.6
Electorate 5693 9608 10,237
Per cent voted 71,6 85.3 78.0
1. Represented by the M.C.A, in each instance.
The trend against the Alliance and the S.F. is clear; 
while the U.D.P. did not win its performance was quite spectacular. 
In three years it had come within a breath of defeating the two 
older and more established parties with, on top of that, a young 
and inexperienced candidate, practically unknown before, during or 
after the campaign.
What issues decided the election? This question is really 
impossible to answer except for an estimate of the likely outcome of
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the election done by one of the parties in the last days of the 
campaign. This estimate is presented in Table 3.3 below and its 
remarkable accuracy is astonishing,
Table 3.3
Estimated Breakdown of Support by Issues 
(in number of probably votes)
Votes 'determined' by 
issues or factors
Alliance S.F. U.D.P,
Basic party supporters 1800* 1600 1000
Candidate's reputation 150 1000 -
Other personalities support­
ing candidate 200 100 1000
Chinese education and 
language - - 400
Payroll and turnover taxes - 100 300
'Malaysian Malaysia' - - 100
Free-port status - 100 100
Racial harmony 100 - -
Total estimated votes 2250 2900 2900
Actual votes obtained 2463 2836 2683
It was thought that this would be 300 or 400 higher if all the 
Malays voters turned out to vote. But it was anticipated 
they would not. There was a rumour that the defeat of the 
M.C„A, candidate would mean the possibility of an U.M.N.O. 
sitting member being elevated to the Executive Council vacancy 
created by the death of the original member. If this were 
true it illustrated the division between the Alliance partners 
at the local level.
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What is valuable about the above table is the hint it 
provides of the relative significance of the factors which influenced 
the voters. Aside from the basic party support the Alliance was 
considered unable to count on other factors very much. In the case 
of the S.F. it is revealing that the candidate's personal reputation 
was estimated to be worth a third of its potential vote. A similar 
situation was thought to be operative for the U.D.P. except in this 
case it was the personal reputation of its leader, Dr Lim Chong Eu. 
The party was also believed to benefit quite substantially by its 
'pro-Chinese' stand on such issues as Chinese education and language, 
taxes, and the concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia.' In the end, as 
it were, it was severely handicapped by its candidate whereas the 
S.F. won with substantial assistance from this factor.
By and large the projection hinted at the significance of 
two general factors, neither of which helped the governing party at 
all. One was personalities and the other 'pro-Chineseness,' both 
being important for the U.D.P. and the former for the S.F. The by- 
election, by its nature and timing, permitted these two factors to 
be operative.
The by-election also illustrated the split of the Chinese 
leadership in Penang. Had the Alliance candidate been challenged 
by candidates without elite status he probably would have retained
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the seat for the party. The two opposition parties did as well
largely because they were led by people who enjoyed very high
reputations of leadership among the Chinese in Penang. But then
so was the M.C.A. What explains its defeat in a seat which had
85been described as an Alliance stronghold? Even though its
86candidate had a growing reputation it could not live down the
growing dissatisfaction among the urban Chinese. For some
the national policies favouring the Malays are inefficient and
positively damaging to the national interests in terms of
modernization. For others these same policies are sometimes
87considered to be specifically unfair to the Chinese
85. The Straits Times, 6 November, 1965.
86. Indeed he was mentioned as a possible future chief minister 
of Penang.
87. An M.C.A. branch leader complained that the party ’talks 
about law but I talk about li_ [a Chinese concept which 
can loosely be translated to mean the correctness of 
things or reasonableness circumstantially defined].’
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Conclusion:
As in the national situation, people of Penang see the 
Alliance party as the vehicle of integration, at least at the 
leadership levels of the various communities. Owing to this the 
party has been able to form the state government. Opposition 
parties which appeal largely to single communities have so far 
been unable to capture power. This does not mean that there is a 
substantial number of noncommunally-oriented voters. The electoral 
success of the Alliance in Penang to date, as elsewhere, has been 
based upon the abilities of each of its communal partners to gain 
support. Hence, the failure of any one of them under some 
circumstances can spell defeat for the Alliance. In Penang this is 
a problem for the Alliance. As we have seen the Chinese partner, 
the M.C.A., has not been able to win the solid support of the 
Chinese as the U.M.N.O. has been able to do among the Malays. But 
the performance of the M.C.A. has not been so poor as to deny the 
Alliance party the state government. What were the factors behind 
this failure of the M.C.A.?
Generally they fall into two categories. In the first 
place the Chinese leadership in Penang is split along party lines. 
The opposition parties, though claimed to be non-communal, are led 
by people who enjoy great prestige in the Chinese community in 
Penang. Regardless of the parties' strength elsewhere and their 
programmes or platforms, these leaders have been personally
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responsible for the electoral successes scored locally. The fact 
that their electoral strength lies in the urban centres hides the 
significance of this factor. This is because the electoral support 
of the opposition parties is often explained by their attractiveness 
to the urban working class. If this is so it is difficult to 
explain the decline of the S.F. in the last few years and the rise 
of the U.D.P. Our examination of the electoral record in Penang, 
particularly the local leadership split in the S.F. (actually the 
Labour Party) and the by-election of Ayer Itam, reveals the 
importance of the individual party leaders. The S.F. declined 
after the desertion of some of its prominent leaders; in fact, 
one of them was subsequently elected to the State Assembly on the 
Alliance ticket. The U.D.P. has emerged electorally because of its 
prominent leader, Dr. Lim Chong Eu. How then can we explain the 
decline of the M.C.A. which is also led by prominent members of the 
Chinese community? Here the second factor comes in.
In recent years the racial compromise personified by the 
Alliance has been translated into policies more and more. Penang 
being a ’Chinese' state has felt the weight of the concessions 
demanded from the non-Malays more than any other. Actually there 
are two elements who are dissatisfied with the M.C.A. On the one 
hand there are the Chinese-oriented who resent the concessions they 
have to make when in fact they are also the under-privileged
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members of the society. Then there are those who are progress- 
or modernity-oriented who feel that some of these concessions are 
seriously compromising the modernization of the society. These 
two elements then coalesce to form the main opposition to the 
M.C.A. So long as they are divided the M.C.A. and the Alliance 
are not threatened. But if they were united in electoral 
competition against the M.C.A. they could seriously challenge the 
supremacy of the Alliance in Penang. This appears to be a 
distinct possibility because the opposition leaders are men who 
enjoy leadership status in the community, apart from their party 
affiliations, as well as professional qualifications, presumably 
attractive to the noncommunally-oriented. Thus the degree of 
urbanization and the demographic majority of the Chinese in Penang 
have made it possible for the state to be less pro-Alliance than 
many others . There is also, of course, the important fact that 
hitherto the opposition leaders do not derive their status from the 
party, so much as confer status on it.
88. Here it may be useful to compare the case with Kelantan. In 
Kelantan the Malay leadership is split along party lines too. 
Its general backwardness in terms of social progress enables 
the tradition-oriented P.M.I.P. to defeat the U.M.N.O. and the 
Alliance. Thus if the Alliance were too modern to a ’Malay* 
Kelantan, it might be too backward for an urban, ’Chinese’ 
Penang. Hence, the Alliance compromise may be suitable for 
the country as a whole; it may not be for a very ’Malay’ or 
a very ’Chinese’ state.
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The brief look at elections in Penang, particularly 
the case of the by-election, hints that this can in turn be 
the basis of promoting the aspirants to leadership rank. Whether 
this can in fact come about remains to be seen and only when the 
party of the majority of the community leaders, the Alliance, is 
defeated electorally by the opposition led by a few of similar 
status. If this were to happen one might find out whether 
elective office can confer leadership generally.
It would also raise the question of how the hitherto
effective tripartite structure of power can be maintained when
one of the partners can no longer claim to exercise leadership
over its community. (It is useful to note that such a problem
has not yet confronted the Alliance Party anywhere else in 
89Malaya.) For if the Alliance were tc fail in Penang this 
failure could not just simply be characterized as the triumph 
of non-communalism. It might be the thin end of the wedge 
for the de-communalization of political life, but it certainly 
would be a case of the Chinese community in Penang becoming
89. In the case of Kelantan it is true that the failure of the 
Alliance was the failure of U.M.N.O., but here the M.C.A. 
and the M.I.C. never amount to much, the Chinese and Indian 
communities being very small.
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disenchanted with the M.C.A. leadership. Would this mean that 
the Chinese community was no longer satisfied with the original 
»racial bargain1 personified in the Alliance? Or would it 
represent the case of an urban community becoming more persuaded 
by non-communal but economic considerations such as employment, 
new industries, the free port status of the island, and urban 
facilities?
In either case an important consequence would follow: the
presence of a government which was not part of the inter-community 
arrangement and hence could not maintain the link between government 
and people as previously. It might also follow that the other 
linkage function hitherto performed by the leadership structure - 
between the various communities - would be strained. This would 
not mean, however, an inevitable separation between formal authority 
and informal influence. On the basis on which we have hypo­
thesized a change in governmental leadership, it would mean that
90
90. I was told by a former supporter of the M.C.A. that he was 
switching his support to the U.D.P. because the former ’is 
doing nothing for me, my business or my children. But like 
business we must have some insurance, so I still give them 
[the M.C.A.] a bit.'
91. Cf. Nancy L. Snider, "What Happened in Penang?," Asian Survey, 
vol. VIII, No. 2 (December, 1968), pp. 960-75
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the linkage could be maintained, or rather re-structured, only in 
the case of the Chinese community. If this happened, that is, 
if the Malay community were to feel that it was not an intrinsic 
part of the power structure, there would very likely be adverse con-
92sequences for the stability and effectiveness of the new government. 
Formal authority and informal influence would then be at daggers 
drawn instead of being mutually re-inforcing. The power structure 
would no longer subsume the social tensions which naturally arise 
from ethnic pluralism, but would necessarily have to manage these 
tensions with new and more deliberate means. Instead of inter­
community co-operation at the top there could be inter-community 
confrontation, one between the urban Chinese and the rural Malays.
It would be naive to predict the outcome in terms of the pattern 
of leadership and its effectiveness and social legitimacy. But 
one thing is certain: the leadership structure which has under­
pinned stability since the mid-1950's could not remain the same.
In the meantime it cannot be assumed that leadership 
is solely a function of elective office. Hence the following 
chapters seek to examine leadership in Penang from a broader, 
more analytical basis.
92. This is assuming that the federal structure of power likely to 
remain dominated by the Alliance Party with U.M.N.O. as the un­
challenged senior partner would not provide any psychological 
compensation for the Penang Malays.
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F ie ld  o b serv a tio n s  re v e a l th a t  the  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  of 
th e  le a d e rsh ip  s t ru c tu re  is  p a r t ly  a fu n c tio n  of the  way i t  i s  
p e rce iv ed  by the  p u b lic  and the  way le a d e rsh ip  is  ex e rc ised  
in  term s o f th i s  p e rc e p tio n . A ccordingly a f t e r  the  a n a ly s is  
o f th e  s o c ia l  backgrounds o f th e  contem porary le ad e rs  th i s  
p e rc e p tio n  and i t s  e f f e c t s  w i l l  be analysed .
CHAPTER IV
A METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP
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Early in the field work, discussions with a few top 
elected politicians and senior administrators in Penang revealed 
that leadership in the society is not coterminous with formal 
position. Several individuals who occupied no position in 
government were considered by them to be leaders, while others 
who were members in the State Assembly were dismissed as unin- 
fluentialo This view was further corroborated by others outside 
the government. There seemed to be a consensus between the two 
groups of discussants that a better criterion of leadership is 
involvement in public affairs. The view was expressed that an 
elected official cannot necessarily be considered a leader just 
because he has been elected -- membership of elective bodies is 
not a hallmark of public involvement and by itself does not confer 
leadership status. Other individuals who were mentioned as 
'powerful leaders' in these unstructured discussions included those 
who occupy positions of responsibility in non-governmental 
organizations. Knowledge of these leaders also indicates that in 
most cases they are very active in public activities. These 
observations, therefore, pose a problem in leadership identification. 
If formal positions in government are not an appropriate criterion 
of leadership in Penang, then what is? The methodology devised is 
mainly to get around this problem. Briefly this involves drawing 
up a list of names of possible leaders and asking a panel of 
informants to nominate individuals whom they consider as leaders in
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Penang, When such a strategy was devised it was discovered that, 
aside from the basic purpose of identifying leaders so that their 
characteristics may be studied, the result also permits an 
examination of the main outlines of the structure of power in Penang,
The first task was to draw up a list of names of potential 
leaders. This operation was handicapped by the absence of any 
published list of names of prominent individuals in Penang, 
Organizations and associations are generally unreliable in supplying 
names of their office-bearers because of their poor record keeping 
practices. Almost invariably they can supply the names of the 
current office-holders but not those of the past, 1 Societies are 
registered with the Registrar of Societies in Penang, Inspection 
of the card files in the latter’s office shows that there are 887 
registered societies, classified under 11 subject-matter and one 
residual categories. But information on office-bearers of these 
societies is not available except for a few cases. The Who’s Who 
in Malaya was next examined and found wanting for two related reasons 
firstly as a national compendium its coverage of Penang is not 
comprehensive; secondly, according to one informant, inclusion in
1 , This student was informed by one secretary that lists of past 
office-holders were available but he did not know where they 
were placed by his predecessor. This plus the fact that there 
were so many registered societies in Penang prevented the 
collection of all the lists of office-bearers.
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the Who's Who is dependent upon one's prior agreement to purchase 
a copy of it„ Having exhausted nearly all the normal channels of 
obtaining names of prominent people it was decided that the daily 
local newspapers should be scrutinized for names mentioned in them0 
This turned out to be a slow but most fruitful basis of drawing up 
the list for several reasons»
Interviews with several reporters and editors revealed 
that the local press has the practice of covering most of the 
important activities of local societies, such as the annual general 
meetings where office-bearers were elected» Where direct coverage 
did not take place, the press usually published names of newly 
elected officials sent in by the societies» In these ways the 
local press can be said to have a comprehensive coverage of local 
activities even though it means mere mention in a large number of 
cases»
2Accordingly the local press was systematically scrutinized 
for names which were mentioned as leaders of organizations or ad hoc 
bodies» This was done daily for almost nine months, from September 
1965 to May 1966» Each individual mentioned was assigned an index 
card and his or her function or position was recorded» If the same 
individual was mentioned on different occasions and in different
2, English and Chinese language press only»
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contexts this information was also taken down„ Thus, for example, 
an individual who was the chairman of a trade association, a member 
of a school's Board of Governors and of the State Assembly would have 
all these positions recorded on his card» This implies that his 
activities in all these three contexts were mentioned in the press.
To be mentioned in the press did not, of course, mean that one had 
to be active only in organizational or governmental affairs. The 
press assiduously mentioned all individuals who received honours or 
awards from any source, The names of these individuals were, there­
fore, also recorded.
In the initial stage of drawing up the list no discrim­
ination was made between organizational positions, in other words 
between positions such as patron, chairman, secretary and committee 
member. Neither was any distinction made between political, trade, 
social, welfare or recreational organizations. Thus the secretary- 
general of a political party and the patron of a swimming club were 
both recorded if they were mentioned in the press. Similarly senior 
administrators who made official announcements which were reported 
by the press were also included in the list. Thus politicians, 
administrators and private individuals were all likely to be 
included if they were active in public affairs either as office­
bearers of associations, spokesmen of groups and governmental 
institutions or recipients of honours.
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The adopted procedure resulted in an initial listing 
of 281 names towards the end of May 1966. It included, as polar 
types, the Chief Minister of the State whose leadership position 
was practically undeniable and the secretary of a Dramatic Society 
who was unheard of by people outside this organization. It is 
interesting to note that there are many individuals in formal 
positions who were not included on this first list.
Of the 24 members of the State Assembly, 10 were not on 
the list, including six members of the governing Alliance Party.
As for the City councillors five out of 15 were not listed. All 
the four chairmen of the Rural District Councils were included but 
no other member of these Councils was included unless they were 
also members of higher elective bodies. The list excluded only 
one of the eight members of the Federal Parliament and an appointed 
member of the Federal Senate. One district officer and two senior 
City administrators were also left out. All these were subsequently 
put on the list. This then brought the number of names up to 301.
In March 1966 a discussion with a senior State official 
revealed that leaders of the various ethnic communities were 
traditionally appointed Justices of Peace. Since J.P. appointments 
are for life and a majority of them were made during the colonial 
period, there are many living J.P.'s who have ceased to be active 
in community leadership. In 1965 the State Government listed 82
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living J.P.’s. Of these 26 had been included in the first list. 
The remaining 56 were added to the list which then came up to a 
total of 357 names. This completed the first stage of listing 
with the following composition:
1. Mentioned in the press = 281
2. Elected politicians at 
City Council level and
above = 17
3. Senior administrators = 3
4, Justices of Peace = 56
Total = 357
It can be readily appreciated that the list thus obtained 
was based mainly on the public positions of those listed, whether in 
government or in non-governmental organizations. It therefore 
differs from the traditional practice of the positional approach 
which considers only positions in the government. The end result 
is different in this respect: while only 20 occupants of formal
political offices were left out at the very first listing many 
other without formal political roles were included.
Inasmuch as the list was intended to form the basis of 
leadership nominations by a selected panel of 'judges’ it was 
considered too long for practical reasons. So the list was
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presented to three knowledgeable individuals, a Chinese 
businessman, a Malay journalist and a senior government official 
who is an Indian, for consideration. They all agreed that it 
was too long and undertook to cancel out those familiar to them 
but whom they did not consider as likely to be nominated as 
leaders. It must be admitted that this pruning process is quite 
arbitrary. The general criterion for adopting the suggestions of 
the three referees is this: all names were excluded when at least
two of them so recommended; when a suggestion was not corroborated 
it was accepted only in cases where the race of the referee and the 
person involved was the same. This was to ensure that no name was 
excluded purely on account of the referee's lack of familiarity with 
it. This pruning process left out 212 names, leaving a manageable 
list of 145 names.
The next task was to determine what the panel of 'judges' 
might be requested to do besides nominating individuals on the list 
as leaders. Observations and discussions have revealed that power 
in Penang could be exercised in two different contexts or a combin­
ation of both. The first is at the ethnic community level, and
the second is at the level of the society at large. There are 
leaders in Penang who are influential only in their own ethnic
3. These three individuals subsequently acted as 'judges' in 
the final nomination process.
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communities. Not only are they uninfluential in other communities 
they may also be completely unknown in them» On the other hand 
there are people who are influential in the affairs of non-communal 
organizations and institutions ranging from the Red Cross, Civil 
Defence, Rotary to the governmental administration. The impact of 
these individuals lies outside the ethnic community context. It is, 
of course, conceivable that there are leaders who wield influence in 
both the communal and the non-communal contexts, or at the level of 
the community as well as the society at large. For obvious reasons 
these leaders have the greatest impact on the society. By convention, 
we label them as ’General' leaders; those who are influential only 
at the non-communal level are labelled as 'Westernized' leaders, and 
those at the communal level as 'Communal' leaders.
The typology devised was discussed with many political 
activists in Penang. There was general agreement that the three­
fold categorization was a meaningful one. It was then decided 
that 'judges', in nominating individuals as leaders, should also 
categorize them accordingly.
If, as implied in our basic approach, power is not 
coterminous with official positions, it is necessary to determine 
what are the bases of power in Penang. The literature on power 
assumes that an influential person generally possesses those
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values in the society which are desired. But since different 
cultures regard different values as important,^ it is only 
possible to select the most common values for attribution by the 
panel of 'judges'. In the case of Penang five values are singled 
out, namely wealth, participation in decision-making, skill or 
proficiency in any practice, respect and a high degree of 
involvement in public affairs.
The procedure by which these five factors were selected 
is similar to that mentioned earlier. The same people were 
consulted to determine which are the most common bases of influence 
among Penang leaders. Wealth is generally agreed to be an 
important base of power, but this does not mean that the mere 
possession of wealth makes a man a leader. To be a leader a 
wealthy man must be willing to spend his money for all types
4., Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, op.cit., pp. 55-6, 
mentions nine possible values. These are well-being, 
enlightment, skill, power, respect, rectitude, affection 
and religious values.
5. See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1934).
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of causes. This is particularly true among the Chinese. 
A Chinese member of the State Assembly once said to this 
student:
Without money one can do nothing.
If you are rich and if you belong 
to a political party, you are asked 
to contribute to the party fund. If 
you are elected, you are expected to 
contribute to charities and even to 
make numerous small donations to 
members of your constituency for 
school-fees and books for their children.
Another important factor is participation in making 
decisions or otherwise influencing the process. Positions of 
authority in organizations are highly prized and individuals 
elected to these positions are congratulated in newspaper 
advertisements and at dinner parties organized for the purpose. 
These positions are, however, not popularly differentiated as 
between governmental and non-governmental bodies. Membership 
of the State Executive Council, for example, is not considered 
more important than the presidency of a chamber of commerce.
6. It has been said that leadership and authority are tightly 
integrated with economic power in the Chinese community.
M. Freedman and Michael Swift, "Rural Sociology in Malaya,"
Current Sociology, vol, 8 (1959), p. 5. This is also 
mentioned in G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the 
Chinese Community of Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1958), p . 80 and passim. Cf. Donald E. Willmott, The Chinese 
of Semarang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 116-19.
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In a society where there is still a continuing concern 
with 'face' respect is another important factor of leadership. 
Individuals who are respected by others are generally considered 
as leaders. Respect may accrue to a person because of his 
occupation or education or the fact that he has received honours 
and awards. This is why in Penang the annual Governor’s awards 
are looked upon as an important event and receive great publicity 
in the press. As with election to offices, award-winners are 
publicly congratulated by the organizations or groups to which they 
belong.
Skill too is another important factor for leadership.
In the context of Penang society an individual who is skilful in 
any practice is likely to be considered as generally skilful.
Thus an outstanding lawyer or the most popular doctor is credited 
with abilities transcending his profession. Particularly, it was 
discovered that there is a tendency to attribute great abilities 
to individuals who have amassed large fortunes in spite of their 
humble beginnings and lack of education. The cases of several 
local millionaires who began as labourers are deeply ingrained in 
the public imagination as one hears endless reminders of these in 
public speeches and private discourses. Advanced education 
apparently also confers the reputation of skill besides being 
prestigious in itself.
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Finally an individual may attain a leadership position 
if he is involved in public activities extensively. This is 
especially so in communal affairs. Anyone who aspires to a 
position of influence is most likely to be an activist first if 
he does not possess any special skill or great wealth. Prima 
facie evidence seems to suggest that involvement in public 
(communal, non-communal or both) affairs is the first rung of the 
ladder for most leaders. And it is the most accessible of all 
the five factors for any aspirants to power. Yet extensive 
involvement alone is not likely to confer great influence. To 
be among the most influential leaders in Penang one has to call 
upon other resources such as those mentioned before.
Having obtained a list of 145 names of potential leaders 
and isolated the five most common factors which contribute to leader­
ship position the next task was to select a representative panel of 
'judges'. They were required to do three things: nominate
individuals as leaders, categorize them into three groups and 
attribute to them those factors responsible for their leadership 
position. Because this is not an easy operation the task of 
selecting 'judges' presented some difficulties. There were 
several requisites which the panel must fulfil in order to prevent
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7the most obvious biases inherent in this sort of technique.
Firstly this panel must be sufficiently representative of the 
racial composition in Penang. Secondly the roles of the ’judges' 
must be such as to permit them to perceive the power relationships 
in the society. A corollary of this requisite is that the panel 
should include people who are obvious members of the power structure 
as well as those who are outside it. Thirdly the 'judges' must 
have given indications that their general view of the society is 
not evidently coloured by personal bias.
With these requisites in mind a tentative list of twenty 
'judges' was drawn up largely on the basis of this student's 
acquaintanceship with them. Conversations and discussions with 
all except one were held more than twice and in a myriad of contexts, 
but particularly in the office or at dinner parties. On the basis 
of these were selected the twenty potential 'judges' who were deemed 
to fulfil the requisites best. When approached individually four 
of these refused to act as 'judges' for various reasons. The other 
16 agreed but they all unanimously demanded absolute confidence.
7. For a summary of the criticisms against this technique and the 
reasons why it is still in use, see Charles M. Bonjean and 
David M. Olson, op.cit.; see also Howard J. Ehrlish, "The 
Reputational Approach to the Study of Community Power," 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 26 (1961), pp. 926-27.
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The method by which the 'judges' performed their tasks varied.
Ten of them did so in their offices and in the presence of this 
student; the other six requested time to examine the nomination 
sheet and to return their nominations by mail. Two of the latter 
were found to be incomplete. Eliminating the nominations of these 
two 'judges' we have 14 completed nomination sheets.
The nomination sheet was drawn up in the following manner:
Category 
of Leader­
ship
Name Wealth Parti­
cipation in 
decision­
making
Skill = 
proficien­
cy in any 
practice
Respect Community 
or society 
involve­
ment
(145 names 
listed in 
alphabet­
ical 
order)
The basic instructions given to the 'judges' were as follows:
1. Please read through this list of names and 
underline those whom you consider to be the 
most influential leaders in Penang.
8. In some cases the 'judges' sought some further amplifications 
but these were mainly in the nature of confirming their 
understanding of the instructions.
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2. In your opinion which are the factors most 
responsible for the leadership position of 
those you have underlined« Please mark "X" 
in the appropriate column on the right«
3« In the column on the left of the names you 
have underlined, please mark "1" for those 
leaders who are influential in Penang society 
at large, and M2" for those who are influential 
only in their particular community. Conceivably 
some names will be marked with both "1" and "2", 
signifying that these leaders are influential
9in both spheres.
4„ If any come to mind would you please write down the 
names of those leaders not included in this list, 
and apply Instruction 1, 2 and 3 above. ^
9. Discussions with all the ’judges' established the norm that 
they all considered leaders marked with "1" and "2" as the 
most influential, followed by those marked with "1” only and 
”2" only but not necessarily in that order of influence.
10. Only one ’judge’ added a new name and categorized the person 
as a communal leader.
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Before analysing the data obtained through this
methodology it is necessary to outline the characteristics of the
panel of 'judges’. Of the 14, four are Malay, five Chinese,
11three Indians and two Eurasians. Six of them are active in 
politics -- a member of Parliament, three members of the State 
Assembly and two members of the City Council of George Town.
Between them they represent four of the five major political parties 
in Penang. In terms of occupations the breakdown is as follows: 
three senior civil servants (one Chinese, one Indian and one 
Eurasian), four journalists (one in each racial group), one lawyer 
(a Chinese), one school-teacher (an Indian), one insurance executive 
(a Chinese), three businessmen (two Malays and one Chinese) and a 
retired government official (a Malay) who is a full-time elected 
official.
As for language abilities, all of them know English.
The four Malay 'judges' also know Malay but no other languages.
Of the five Chinese 'judges' all know how to speak Hokkien (the 
lingua franca of the Chinese community in Penang), three can read, 
speak and write Mandarin and two speak Cantonese. All the three 
Indian 'judges' speak Tamil but only one can read it. Of the two
11. The two 'judges' who returned incomplete nomination sheets were 
a Malay and a Chinese.
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Eurasian 'judges' one knows some French, Only one of the non- 
Malay 'judges' can read Bahasa Kebangsaan (the National language) 
while all of them can speak bazaar Malay,
All the 'judges' received their formal education, wholly 
or in part, in English-medium schools. Only one of the four 
Malays did not receive some form of Malay education, whereas three 
of the five Chinese had attended Chinese schools for some years.
The others were wholly educated in English, One Chinese, one Indian 
and an Eurasian completed tertiary education; the rest were educated 
up to the secondary level.
Largely on account of their educational background all
the 'judges' daily read the English-language press -- The Straits
Times and/or The Straits Echo. Only one of the four Malays reads
the Malay-language Utusan Melayu daily while another reads it less
frequently. The three Chinese who received part of their education
in Chinese read various Chinese newspapers (namely Nanyang Siang Pau,
Kwong Wah Jih Pao and Sing Pin Jih Pao) but not on a daily basis.
12None of the Indians read a Tamil-language newspaper.
12. Seven of the 'judges' read the American weekly news magazine 
Time and three of these also read The Economist and The New
Statesman.
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With the exception of one, all the 'judges’ have lived in 
Penang for at least twenty years (i.e. since the end of World War II). 
Eight of them were born in Penang and have lived there since.
Only one Eurasian and one Indian were born outside of Malaya. All 
but one of them now live in George Town, although two of them have 
previously lived in Province Wellesley.
In conclusion it can be said that even though the 
selection of the 'judges' was somewhat arbitrary and necessarily 
dependent upon their willingness to co-operate, they represent a 
good sample of the knowledgeable people in Penang. In particular 
their roles, as reflected by their occupations, are sufficiently 
close to the power structure to permit them to make a reasonably 
good estimation of who are the leaders in Penang. Collectively 
their nominations of individuals to certain leadership categories 
as well as the factors they attribute as responsible for these 
individuals' leadership positions indicate the outlines of the power 
structure in Penang. To be sure these outlines are perceptions 
of the 'judges' but their 'representativeness' permits one to accept 
them with reasonable confidence. In any case the perception of 
the power structure of a society always affects the way one behaves 
towards it and since the 'judges' are more or less representative 
of the participant, as opposed to the subject, section of Penang 
society their perceptions are important and meaningful reflections
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of the Penang power structure. Therefore the analysis of these 
is done in Chapter VI , on the basis of nominations rather than 
nominees, On this basis we seek to draw inferences about the 
operation of the power structure and its relationship to 
political stability.
Since nominees are by implication leaders information 
on them has been obtained by other sources as well and this is 
analysed in Chapter V .
CHAPTER V
THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY LEADERS
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Introduction:
Generally there are several reasons for investigating 
the social backgrounds of the elites. First of all, there is 
the need to discover the extent to which they are different 
from the non-elites. Secondly, analysis of their social 
backgrounds affords an understanding of the socio-political 
dynamics of a society, such as the rate and nature of social change, 
the political socialization and recruitment process, and the 
requirements of leadership and its performance.'*' Thirdly, because 
elites are crucial actors knowledge of their social backgrounds can 
explain the progress or retrogression, stability or instability 
within the society. It is for these reasons that the advocates 
of the power-elite approach in the study of politics maintain 
that it affords a comprehensive perspective. That this is so has
1. Cf. S.F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," International 
Social Science Bulletin, vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn, 1956), pp. 
413-24; Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling 
Class," British Journal of Sociology, vol. 1, No. 1 (March, 
1950), pp. 1-16 and vol. 1, No. 2 (June, 1950), pp. 126-43; 
Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political 
Decision-Makers (New York: Doubleday, 1954); Lester G.
Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development," 
Journal of Politics, vol, 26, No. 3 (August, 1964), pp. 612- 
26; Suzanne Keller, op. cit.; and Dankwart A. Rustow,
"The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How," World
Politics, vol. 18, No. 4 (July, 1966), pp. 690-717.
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2been proven, though rarely, before,
There are, however, several issues arising from and about 
elite studies which need to be mentioned. To repeat a point made 
earlier, there is no agreement on the definition of the term 'elite.' 
It is important that elite studies in different political systems 
should be comparable in terms of definitions and analytical methods 
used. Comparisons make it possible to test assertions about the 
apparent relations between the political aims and methods of elites 
and their recruitment and social background. But such comparisons 
are not valid unless the concept of 'elite' is defined in a con­
sistent way.
While elites are for the most part crucial actors they are 
by no means free agents in the political process. They are subjected 
to a host of factors, including formal-legal rules, and in ways which 
cannot be taken for granted. It is certainly useful to investigate 
the predispositions or orientations of the elites, but we cannot 
assume that social backgrounds unidimensionally 'predict' political
2 . Frederick W, Frey, op. cit„, is the most recent example. There 
is no question that Frey has succeeded brilliantly in analysing 
Turkish politics by using the power-elite approach.
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behaviours and attitudes across time and space,
A third problem about elite studies is the difficulty
4of obtaining all the relevant data. In the case of elites in 
new nations this is because of their very newness. But if 
biographical data are hard to come by, so are those concerning the 
attitudes or orientations of the leaders.^ This encourages 
explanations of elite behaviours based on their background 
characteristics because attitudinal factors are largely unknown.
3. Cf. Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D„ Searing, "Social Background
in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," The American
Political Science Review, vol, LXI, No. 2 (June, 1967), pp. 
428-45. See also Leo A. Despres, op. cit., on the 
organizational strategies of the Guyanese elites which are 
not solely preconditioned by their backgrounds.
4. This is particularly so in the case of elites in the new nations. 
Frey admits that 'A study of this scope would prove practically 
impossible in many "emerging" nations.' Frederick W. Frey,
op, cit., p. 17. In his study of the Ceylonese elites Singer 
has to rely upon one single informant who was considered to be 
very knowledgeable on the backgrounds of the elites. See 
Marshall R. Singer, op. cit This was hailed by Harold D. 
Lasswell and Daniel Lerner as a methodological breakthrough in 
their introduction to Singer's book.
5. These refer to the total elite and not to individual 
'charismatic' leaders, Cf. Paul E» Sigmund, Jr., ed., The 
Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger, 1963). 
However, extrapolating attitudes from 'major' pronouncements 
does not permit distinguishing between real and expressed 
attitudes and ignores the rhetorical qualities of these 
pronouncements.
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Obtaining attitudinal data from the elites of new nations
is really a two-fold problem. On the one hand members of these
elites are reluctant to be interviewed and to disclose their
political attitudes openly. Political survival often demands
that they play their cards close to their chests. On the other
hand, quite a large number of them do not have any specific or
manifest attitudes on politics.^* This is particularly the case
for those elites who are not committed to changing their society in
fundamental ways. The absence of such a commitment, of course, is
a manifest attitude in itself, but it is also typically associated
with uncertain, and hence elusive, political attitudes. Such a
predisposition is also partly the result of the ambiguity in leader-
7ship roles and the lack of a strong sense of personal efficacy.
In the case of Penang, and, one suspects this is also true 
of Malaysia generally, there is the factor of race or communalism. 
This factor is so central that it must surely govern most of the
6. Cf, Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, 
op. cit.
7. In what must be considered an unusually frank discussion a 
leading politician and communal leader in Penang told me that 
he was not sure of 'things' and wondered whether people like 
him were not 'hypocrites' (his word). How extensive was such 
a feeling, unfortunately, could not be found out.
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political attitudes and behaviours of the leaders. But precisely
g
because of this they are unwilling to disclose these attitudes.
But since we cannot infer political attitudes and behaviours solely
from social background characteristics, we have sought other types
of data to supplement our analysis of the attitudes and behaviours
9of the leaders in Penang.
This chapter will concern itself with the following 
questions: What sorts of persons are leaders in Penang? How many
of them are occupants of formal political office? What are the 
implications for the overlap or lack of it between formal authority 
and informal influence? What are the differences in the social 
backgrounds of the leaders in•terms of race (and 'levels’ of leader­
ship)? The contemporary leaders, for the most part, are those who 
have emerged since the 1950s. The period before this is so 
different in terms of leadership that any detailed comparison 
between the contemporary leaders and their counterparts of the pre­
independent period is impossible.
8. This was discovered when they were asked their feelings about 
the major problem of Penang and Malaysian politics. Only a 
few Chinese leaders said that it was ’the place of
the Chinese in the country.' Most of them and the non-Chinese 
leaders simply refused to answer the questions or gave such in­
nocuous answers like 'economic development,' 'good political 
leadership,' and 'a good life.'
9. See the following Chapter.
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The Identification of Contemporary Leaders:
In order to avoid an a priori definition of the contemporary 
leaders in Penang, a list of 145 names of all the 'formal leaders' as 
well as those in the public eye was submitted to a panel of 'judges' 
for their nominations. On this basis 41 names received no nomination 
and two were nominated by all the 14 'judges.' The full distribution 
of the nominations is as follows:
Table 5.1
Distribution of Nominations
No. of 
nominations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
No. of 
names 41 26 8 10 15 10 5 8 3 5 4 4 2 2 2
Before dismissing the 41 names which do not receive a 
single nomination it is useful to mention briefly who some of them 
are. They include, among others, one of the four (Federal)
Senators from the state, two State Assemblymen, all the five District 
Officers, two chairmen of District Councils, five City Councillors, 
the Chief Kathi and Mufti of the State of Penang (both appointive 
positions), three leaders of Malay opposition parties,^ and the
10. The P.M.I.P. Commissioner, Penang State Division, the leader of 
the P.M.I.P. Women's Section (both religious teachers), and the 
Chairman of the Penang Division of Party Ra'ayat.
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Deputy Public Prosecutor. That formal positions are not assurances 
of leadership status is clear. This is further supported by the 
fact that 65 of the 104 individuals who receive one or more 
nominations occupy no formal position.
One of the problems of identifying leaders by the 
reputational techniques relates to the ’cut-off* point. Not all 
individuals who receive one or more nominations can ipso facto be 
considered leaders; for example, one 'judge* may nominate a leader 
who is known personally to him but who is not considered influential 
by other ’judges.' In our case there are 26 individuals who 
receive one nomination each, or close to a quarter of all those 
nominated. We assume that the 'cut-off*point should be higher than 
this.
One of the less arbitrary 'cut-off' measures is the 
average test, i.e. to include all those whose nominations are above 
the mean number of nominations of all nominees. In our case this 
would mean counting only those who have five or more nominations, 
since the mean number is 4„8 nominations. This is presently 
considered too severe as it would exclude 59 of the 104 nominees.^
11. A tentative check reveals that this would leave out some 
individuals who are quite influential.
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On account of this, a compromise measure is adopted whereby those
who receive less than three nominations are excluded. While this
12cut-off point has no statistical rationale, it satisfies the
intuition and knowledge gained of the leaders. Intuitively it
13includes all those who are considered influential. Applying this 
criterion of the 'cut-off 70 individuals are identified as leaders in 
Penang, or slightly less than half of the original list of 145 names. 
It is hardly necessary to add that others outside this group of 70 
exercise some amount of influence here and there. But they are not 
as important and, by implication, neither is their influence extensive 
or permanent. In the course of time some individuals will promote 
themselves into the top leadership rank while others will vacate their 
positions in it. In the meantime these 70 individuals are held to 
constitute the top current leaders in Penang for purposes of the 
subsequent analysis.
Sources of Background Information:
There are seven types of sources which provide the 
biographical information on the leaders, namely questionnaires,
12, In a case like this it is a curious logic to argue that a non- 
arbitrary statistical measure is better than one based on per­
sonal judgement and knowledge. Here there can be no magic in 
the arithmetic mean.
13. The lower figure of two nominations is judged to be unsatis­
factory in this respect. In any case the difference involved 
only eight persons, not all of whom can be judged as 
influential with confidence.
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interviews, newspapers, Who’s Who, public documents, the State 
Secretariat, and informants.
An elaborate questionnaire was first prepared in the field 
and was sent to all those individuals whose names appeared on the 
list. This was meant to be a self-administered questionnaire, with 
a Malay version of it sent to those suspected of having difficulty 
in answering the English version. This initial attempt at eliciting 
information was mostly unsuccessful. Only about 15 per cent of the 
questionnaires were returned and they were from those with English 
education. Strangely those who answered the questionnaire were 
mostly educated at the tertiary or the primary level. One surmises 
that this was because the former understood the purpose of the 
questionnaire and the latter responded to its novelty - it is likely 
that this was the first time they had received 'attention* of this 
sort. At all events, the response rate was so poor that other ways 
of gathering information were tried.
The questionnaire was next used as the basis of interview 
with those who consented and were available in their offices or 
homes. In all 48 interviews were done. Few of these interviews 
were completed in the sense that not all the answers were obtained 
through them. Some types of data were known before the interviews, 
such as the racial background, political party affiliations, political
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offices held, election records, and Honours obtained. The contexts
of the interviews varied and quite a number of them were cut short for 
14lack of time. Hence there were gaps of information even for those 
who had been interviewed.^ This is also due partly to the 
reluctance of many to answer some types of questions such as those 
concerning annual income, parents' education, past voting and even 
size of family.
Where gaps of information existed they were filled by 
recourse to newspaper reports. These reports were useful mostly 
in revealing the public activities of the leaders, the Honours they 
received, and their general economic status. In the same way was 
the Who's Who (Malaya and later Malaysia) used. This source was 
found to be particularly useful in checking the ages of the leaders 
and their education.
14, Perhaps it is worth mentioning that one such interview was 
scheduled to take place in a home but was adjourned to the 
Penang Turf Club where a race meeting was being held. The 
'interview' took three hours without much headway being made 
after the second race! It was subsequently resumed under 
calmer circumstances.
15. However the interviews were useful in another respect. They 
enabled me to meet those whom I had not previously met and 
with some of whom I subsequently had discussions unconnected 
with soliciting background information.
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Another source of information was the Penang State
Gazette and the yearly reports of local government authorities.
In the latter case the Annual Report of the City Council of George
Town was more useful than those of the other District Councils.^
These public documents provided a reliable check on formal positions
occupied by the leaders as well as the time these positions were
taken up. They also revealed all those who received official
honours from the British sovereign (pre-1957), the Agong and the
State Governor. Besides these documents, reference was also made
17to all the election reports to date and the information they gave 
was obvious. Particularly they provided information on those who 
stood for elections but were never elected and those who were re­
elected .
The State Secretariat was another source for confirming 
and obtaining information, besides being the venue of about half a 
dozen interviews. Data obtained included the personal details of 
those who received State honours and the names of those individuals
16. Only since 1965 did these Councils produce a coherent annual 
report of their activities. Previously local government 
activities outside of the City Council were reported to the 
State government by the individual departments and even these 
were not gathered together in a single volume.
17. Reports on local elections were consulted at the office of 
the Election Commission in Kuala Lumpur.
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appointed to ad hoc committees, These were particularly useful 
in the case of those leaders who were not interviewed,
A final source of information in the field was a small 
group of referees or informants. This group included two 
officials in the City Council, three in the State government, two 
politicians who themselves were considered by others to be 
influential and a reporter. This group supplied information as
19well as checking the accuracy of information otherwise obtained.
Thus most information that was public knowledge was 
obtained. To obtain personal details which only the leaders
themselves could supply, a final questionnaire was mailed to
20the leaders from Canberra, relying on the efflux of time and the 
academic address of this questionnaire to secure a better response
18. Involving such activities as the promotion of Malay partitipation 
in business, National Language Week and official celebrations.
19. These informants were particularly useful when it came to such 
issues as the language abilities and economic status of the 
leaders. In one instance a Malay leader claimed that he could 
speak Chinese but one informant confirmed that this extended 
only to exchanges of daily greetings. This claim was 
therefore discounted,
20. This was done through the Australian National University.
It was also suspected that this would dispel any doubt about 
the status of this research student.
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21rate which, this time, was almost 50 per cent.
Despite all these varied sources not all the relevant 
data were obtained. This is evident in the analysis below.
Data Preparation and Analytic Technique:
The biographical data obtained include the following: 
race, age, place of birth, occupation, education (level and medium), 
language abilities, length of residence in Penang, community 
activities, (rough) economic class, honours obtained, government 
service, colonial appointments (to advisory bodies), present and 
past formal political positions, political party activities (when 
involved, how, at what level, election experiences), and involvement 
in voluntary organizations. The data on fathers’ backgrounds 
include their occupation, education (level and medium), economic 
class, place of birth, interest in public affairs and leadership 
status, if any.
All these data, including the number of nominations each 
of the leaders obtained from the 'judges’ and the frequency of the
21„ Still it needs to be said that experiences elsewhere in the 
developing world confirm the difficulty of depending on 
questionnaires to obtain information. See Marshall R, Singer, 
op. cit„, Frederick W, Frey, op. cit,, and Wendell Bell,
Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); also see
Gabriele Wuelker, "Questionnaires in Asia," International Social 
Science Journal, vol. 15, No, 1 (1963), pp, 35-47 and volT XXII, 
No, 3 (1958) issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly.
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leadership factors attributed to them, were then coded„ With the
exception of a few factors such as race and education, new
classificatory schemes were devised to organize the data and these
will be evident subsequently, The coding was done by the present
writer which minimized unreliability but could possibly lead to a
22consistent bias in coding. The coded data were then transferred
to computer cards by the staff of the computer centre at the
23Australian National University, Altogether each leader's back­
ground was coded in terms of 42 variables, though some of these
variables were not used. The data cards were then processed for
24two-way tables by the computer. Row and column percentages were 
also calculated by the computer and these were used where appropriate, 
(See Appendix I.}
22, The only referee who could check this was my wife. However her 
agreement could be a commentary on any one of three things - my 
accuracy, her agreement tendency evident in other instances, or 
our relationship,
23, Similar procedures were adopted to handle the data on nominations 
and attributions of leadership factors by judges used in Chapter 
VI and the data in Chapter VII.
24, This was done through the "IPT Program for IBM 1620" under the 
programme name of DEMOG GENERAL SURVEY PROGRAM developed by 
Miss Mary Rose, computer programmer of the Research School of 
Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra«
217
By and large the data will be presented in a cross-
tabulate form so as to avoid as much as possible the presentation
of single items of the backgrounds of the leaders. In this way
pairs of variables are examined in turn, with the most frequent
25'anchor' variable being race. Other pairs of variables are 
selected for examination whenever it is suspected that there may 
be some degree of correlation between them.
No statistical test of significant correlation will be
used as a rule partly because the cells in the tables frequently
26have very small values, and partly because there was no intention
to correlate background indicators with attitudinal and behavioural
indicators. No attempt is made to generalize to a larger sample of
leaders. Through our identification process we consider the 70
leaders as top leaders in the state and as such they are not a sample
27of a larger population.
25o Given the nature of our data and the limitedness of our 'sample' 
it was not possible, nor was it considered advisable, to use 
more sophisticated analytic techniques such as multivariate or 
factor analysis.
26o Even though chi-squared values with Yates correction were
originally calculated by the computer as part of the programme.
27. By the nature of the case it is not possible to assume that this 
group of 70 leaders in Penang constitutes a sample of the sub­
national leaders in Malaysia.
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In a sense what follows can be considered, broadly, as 
a cohort analysis of the leaders' backgrounds in terms of the central 
factor of race. On account of the limited time coverage no trend 
analysis of the backgrounds can be undertaken,, Finally, for 
purposes of comparability the data are presented in percentages, 
with the total 'N' being specified to caution against over­
interpretation „
Formal Position and Leadership Status:
The analysis of the historical development of leadership
suggests that contemporary leadership is not a function of formal
position,, In fact, more than half of the leaders, 40 (or 57 per
cent) have no formal political status* This generalization also
applies to all racial sub-groups except the Indian, The proportion
28of leaders who had no past formal political status is even higher, 
being 66 per cent. Does this imply that 'informal' leaders are 
exercising formal authority surreptiously?
If the decision-making factor selected for attribution to 
the leaders by the judges is considered an indicator of the exercise 
of formal authority then leaders do not appear to be prejudiced
28 * This includes such other positions in the colonial period as
city commissioners, Settlement councillors and Federal Legislative 
councillors *
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by the lack of it. On the average those leaders without formal 
political positions are credited with 2 „5 attributions of decision­
making compared to 6,5 for those who have. Therefore,
reputationally, 'formal* leaders exercise formal authority and
29'informal* leaders do so less. The conclusion can be drawn 
that neither the occupancy of formal political positions nor the 
exercise of formal authority is crucial for leadership status in 
general. To what extent is this a function of communal leader­
ship?
Using a simple criterion of majority, individual leaders
30are classified either as General, Westernized or Communal leaders, 
depending on the types of nominations they received, This 
classificatory scheme is therefore purely a reputational one, The 
relationship between such a classification and the presence or 
absence of formal position is indicated in Table 5.2.
29, Indeed five of the leaders without formal political position were 
not once credited with depending on participation in decision­
making „
30. This classification was fairly straightforward since there were 
only a few instances where the individual leaders were nominated 
in all three categories evenly. In such cases the classifi­
cation of the leaders is either based on the personal knowledge
of the present writer or on extra weight given to the nomination(s) 
of the judge(s) deemed to have more knowledge on the leaders 
concerned. While still somewhat arbitrary this system is the 
least objectionable.
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Table 5.2
Levels of Reputational Leadership and Formal Position
LEVEL NUMBER
LEADERS
WITHOUT
FORMAL
POSITIONS
LEADERS
WITH
FORMAL
POSITIONS
General 18 6 12
Westernized 16 13 3
Communal 36 21 15
It can be seen that both Westernized and Communal leaders
are responsible for the absence of a strong correlation between
leadership status and formal position. Indeed there are two
interesting conclusions in the light of our historical analysis of
the changing pattern of leadership. First of all, it seems that
the local professionals, here assumed to equate with the Westernized
leaders, have not really lost all influence in the society. Despite
the fact that few of them occupy formal positions there are some who
still retain influence. No doubt they are not predominant in the
leadership structure, But instead of their wielding formal authority
and the non-westernized, traditional elements wielding informal influence
31it is the other way around. Thus the Westernized leaders may have
31, Perhaps no developing society can do without some Westernized
leaders. The question is whether they monopolize power, or pre­
dominate, or are just a part of a leadership structure.
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been the victims of the communalization of politics but they have 
not all been banished politically. What they lack in terms of 
formal-legal authority is partly compensated by some of them 
retaining a reputation for influence and, no doubt, some real 
influence.
Secondly, even though some leaders occupy formal 
positions they are still reputed to be Communal leaders, in 
other words wielding influence only within their own racial 
communities. In fact half of all the leaders with formal positions 
are characterised in this way. This is one of the most direct 
impacts, on the leadership structure, of the communalization of 
politics. Thus regardless of the legal authority that accrues 
to a leader in respect of his formal position he is still looked 
upon as a representative of his community. In practical terms 
this means that such a leader does not represent his constituency 
as much as he represents his community and is generally considered 
to speak on its behalf. On account of this he is not legitimised 
by his formal position,
These two deductions, therefore, suggest that leaders do 
not derive their status from the formal authority they are legally 
entitled to exercise. Hence it is unlikely that they would 
exercise their influence through formal-legal ways - it is less a
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question of what formal positions they occupy than who they are. 
Age and Place of Birth:
While it is legally possible for a person to get elected 
and claim a position of leadership at the age of 21 it is very 
unlikely that there are many youthful leaders.
Table 5,5
Age and Place of Birth by Community (in percentages).
N Age Place of Birth
31-40 41-50 51-60 61 $ 
Over
Penang Outside
Penang
Malay 24 12.5 37,5 25,0 25.0 83,3 16,7
Chinese 33 9,1 24,2 45.4 21,2 87,9 12.1
Indian 9 - 33.3 44,4 22,2 22,2 77.8
Others 4 - 50,0 - 50,0 25,0 75.0
All leaders 70 8,6 31,4 35.7 24,3 74,3 25.7
32, Although in the reputational category of General leadership
two-thirds of the Leaders have formal positions. This seems 
to suggest that these positions strengthen the influence of 
some leaders.
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There are six leaders (three Malay and three Chinese) who are 40
or below, but no leader below 36, As shown in Table 5.3 a majority
of them are above 51, with almost a quarter of them in their
sixties. The highest proportion of the Malay leaders are in the
41-50 age group, whereas two-thirds of the Chinese and Indian leaders 
33are over 50. Apparently Malays can become leaders at a
younger age than Chinese, Indians or Otheis.
The fact that leaders are in their fifties and sixties 
means that they have reached their adulthood before the Second 
World War and the Japanese occupation. They tend, therefore, to 
deplore the violence and ravages typical of the period and to 
adopt a political perspective which stresses peace and harmony.
This then probably contributes to the status quo attitudes of some 
of them referred to earlier.
Three out of every four leaders were born in Penang 
and a third of the others were born in other parts of Malaysia 
(and Singapore). Here there is a substantial difference between 
the racial groups. While only one Malay leader was born outside 
of the country and three Chinese leaders in China, there are
33, Henry R. Glick, op. cit„, discovers a similar difference 
between ’indigenous’ and Chinese government officials in 
Sarawak.
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six Indian leaders (or two-thirds of them) who were born in the 
Indian subcontinent. If it is assumed that the characteristics 
of a community somehow influence the selection of its leaders it 
is meaningful that most of the Indian leaders are not native-born. 
Among the three main racial communities the Indian is the least 
’settled,' whereas there is hardly any difference between the 
Chinese and Malay communities in this respect.
Once again, the birthplace of the leaders hints at the 
necessity of establishing a long claim to leadership before achieving 
it, Although there is no direct evidence here to confirm this, 
it must be true that general physical mobility in the society has 
increased substantially in the last two decades. And yet this 
has not resulted in more leaders born outside the state, Presumably 
it would not be unreasonable to expect that given the general 
expansion of government activities and the need for expertise 
there would be many leaders who are not native to Penang. But 
this is not so= There is one leader who has lived in Penang for 
less than 10 years and three others for less than 20 years. The 
vast majority of them, 66 out of 70, stated that they have lived 
in the state for more than 20 years. In effect this means that 
only four of them have come to live in Penang since the Japanese 
occupation. The achievement of leadership status, then, appears 
to be strongly related to length of residence in Penang.
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Education and Language Abilities:
Education has generally been considered the hallmark of 
the elite in most developing societies, It has been said that:
The gestation, birth, and continuing 
life of the new states of Asia and 
Africa, through all their vicissi­
tudes, are in large measure the work 
of intellectuals. In no state- 
formation in ail of human history 
have intellectuals played such a 
role as they have in these events of 
the present century c.., The 
intellectuals have created the 
political life of the underdeveloped 
countries; they have been its 
instigators, its leaders, and its 
executants„*4
To what extent is this also true of leaders at the sub-national
level? There have been some suggestions that more and more
leaders of the new states at both the national and sub-national
levels are non-intellectuals and are parochially educated rather
35than western educated What this implies is that as the 'new'
politics becomes more and more related to the 'old* social 
realities of the society the westernized intellectuals begin to
34» Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals m  the Political 
Development of the New States," in John H. Kautsky, 
op. cit o, ppo 195-7 o
35- Cf. Marshall R. Singer, op, cit,, and Myron Weiner, 
"Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in West 
Bengal," op, cit.
226
lose their predominant positions in the political system. 
Others begin to assert their claims to leadership at the same 
time.
The data on the leaders in Penang show that a
majority of them are educated up to the secondary school 
37level. Table 5.4 shows the educational background of 
the leaders by race.
Table 5.4
Race and Education of Leaders (in percentages).
N No Formal 
education
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Malay 24 - 8,3 83.3 8.3
Chinese 33 3.0 6.1 66.7 24.2
Indian 9 - 11.1 55.6 33.3
Others 4 - - 25.0 75.0
All leaders 70 1.4 7,1 68.6 22,9
36. If the political elite is defined by education it then 
becomes tautological to say that the intellectuals play the 
leading role in the politics of the new states.
37. Level of education is not exactly equivalent to standard of 
education. Hence, for example/the secondary school level* 
implies attendance not completion at this level.
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So,seemingly consistent with the fact that politics is communalized 
and that the leadership structure is not coterminous with formal- 
legal positions of authority the leaders, on the whole, are not 
men of high education= Less than a quarter of them can be said 
to be men of education. However, given their ages it is reasonable 
to say that they constitute the better educated people of their 
age groups, Presumably most of them have finished their formal 
education in the pre-war period and, as such, they belong to the 
generation not known for high educational attainment.
Is it reasonable to say that those leaders with tertiary 
education are westernized leaders since they typically depend on 
their educational attainment for their status? Of the 16 
leaders who were nominated by the 'judges' as Westernized 
leaders, nine have tertiary education; four are reputed Communal 
leaders and three are considered to be very influential generally, 
Therefore, tertiary education does not ipso facto determine the 
'level' of one's leadership or the sphere of one's influence.
If the leaders are fairly well educated in comparison 
with the generation which reached its adulthood before the war, 
do they come from well educated families? Educationally they
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compare favourably with their fathers, less than half of whom were
38educated at the secondary level and above.
It has been said that leaders in certain sections of
39the Malaysian society are mostly English-educated. Here it
is useful to quote a recent statement on the role of English in
Malaysian politics:
The English language is used 
fluently by only a small proportion 
of the Malaysian population. But 
it is used by those people who 
carry the greatest degree of inter- 
ethnically recognized prestige and 
influence. Furthermore, English 
is ... important „.. because it is 
the language used to express ideas 
on those subjects generally con­
sidered most crucial to the future 
of the nation as a whole.^0
Moreover it is also stated that ’The Elites of every [ethnic] 
group have a personal stake in the perpetuation of the English
38, The educational background of their fathers has the following
breakdown: no formal education - 10%, primary - 25.7%,
secondary - 32.9%, tertiary - 11,4% and 'no answer' - 20%.
39, On this point Tilman says that 'It is easy to recognize that 
the English-educated elite groups are dominating the [national] 
political process . Robert 0. Tilman, "Policy Formation, 
Policy Execution and the Political Elite Structure of 
Contemporary Malaya," op. cit„, p. 354. Cf, K.J. Ratnam and 
R.S. Milne, op cit,, pp. 418-24,
40, Cynthia H. Enloe, "Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia,"
(Ph.Do Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1967), p. 159.
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language»* To what extent then is it true that the leaders 
in Penang are also English-educated? And perhaps more importantly, 
what is the role of English at this sub-national level of leader­
ship? If politics is communalized and if leadership status is 
generally unrelated to formal political positions, then it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that the leaders are likely to be 
communally or parochially educated» Such a hypothesis runs
42counter to the notion that the English-educated are still on top»
Our data prove that the latter notion is true» Of the 70 leaders 
42 were solely educated in English. Table 5.5 gives the educational 
background of the leaders by race»
41
41 . Ibid., p. 147.
42 » There is an interesting implication here which presently
cannot be supported except with indirect evidence. If 
the top leaders are English-educated and if the masses are 
not, does this mean that considerations of ethnicity or 
communalism override language barriers within each community? 
If so it is unreasonable to maintain that within each 
community there is a politically meaningful division between 
the English-educated and the parochially-educated. Cf. S.T. 
Alisjahbana, X.S. Thani Nayagam and Wang Gungwu, eds., The 
Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia 
(Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Society of Orientalists, n.d.),
pp. 177-8»
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Table 5.5
Medium of Education by Race (in percentages),
N English
only
Malay
only
Chinese
only
Tamil
only
English
plus
Malay 24 25,0 25,0 - - 50.0 *
Chinese 33 72,7 - 9,1 - 15.1 **
Indian 9 88,9 - - 11,1 -
Others 4 o o o - - - -
All leaders 70 60,0 8,6 4,3 1,4 24,2
Note: The totals for the Chinese and all leaders do not add up to
100 per cent because one Chinese leader has no formal 
education.
* English plus Malay,
** English plus Chinese,
It is clear that four out of five Penang leaders have 
some formal education in English, while less than a quarter are 
educated in English plus another communal medium, Only nine 
(six Malays and three Chinese) are solely educated in their 
respective communal mediums. Between the races, the less 
'powerful’ community tends to have more leaders who are English 
educated, with the Chinese being an exception. The Malay leaders 
are the only group of which a majority are educated in the 
communal medium. It is interesting to note that the relative
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proportions of the leaders educated in English correspond with the 
respective communities' degrees of literacy in English. Thus the
more literate a community in English the more of its leaders who
43are educated in that medium
The data shows that a majority of the leaders, regardless
of race, share a common educational background. This surely
is a bridge between the leaders even if they are primarily
identified as leaders of their communities. Thus it would be
wrong to say that the leaders are in this way linguistically
separated from their communities just because a majority of the
latter are not educated in English. There is no simple one-to-
one relationship between medium of education and language
abilities. Medium of education is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for language ability in that medium. Most
leaders speak English because they learned it in school but it is
possible to pick up at least a speaking ability in English from
44outside the school, Similarly some leaders can speak Malay,
43. According to the 1957 Census the most literate community in 
English is the residual category of 'Others,' followed by 
the Indian, Chinese, and Malay communities in that order.
44o All parochial school systems include the teaching of English 
in their curricula, but in some instances the command of 
English extends only to comprehension and not expression, 
verbal or written.
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albeit ungrammatical Malay, even if they have never attended a 
Malay school. Therefore language abilities are separate from 
medium of education. While inter-elite communication can be 
carried out in English, is this necessarily the only medium?
The data on the language abilities of the leaders in Table 5.6 
affords an inferential answer here.
In terms of the leaders* ability, minimally, to talk in 
a language the table shows that English and Malay are co-equals. 
Only about nine per cent of the leaders are unable to communicate 
orally in either language, whereas almost half of the leaders are 
handicapped when it comes to Chinese (or rather Hokkien which is 
the lingua franca of the Chinese community in Penang), The 
proportions are much higher when it comes to Tamil or any other 
languages. By and large, however, leaders are observed to speak 
in English most of the time and written communication is also 
most often carried out in English, Within the racial groups, 
Malays tend to use Malay more often than Chinese use their own 
language. But outside of the Malay community the most common 
medium of elite communication, verbal or written is English. This 
is because the nature or subject of the transactions is most
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T ab 1e 5.6
Language Abilities by Race (in percentages) .
LANGUAGE MALAY CHINESE INDIAN OTHERS ALL
ABILITY (N=24) (N=33) (N=9) (N=4) LEADERS
Code* (N=70)
(0) - 15.2 - 25.0 8.6
C D 4 o 2 45.5 44,4 50.0 31.4
MALAY
(2) - 18 o 2 11.1 25.0 11.4
(3) 95,8 21.2 44.4 - 48.6
(0) 91 o 7 - 88.9 100.0 48.6
(1) 8 o 3 63.6 11.1 _ 34.3
CHINESE
(2) - 12.1 - - 5.7
(3) - 24.2 - - 11.4
(0) 8 o 3 12.1 - - 8.6
(1) 8 o 3 6.1 11.1 _ 7.2
ENGLISH
(2) 4.2 - - - 1.4
(3) 79.2 00 *—* 00 <?>0000 100,0 82.9
*Code:
(O') = no abilityo
(1) = speak only (for Chinese language this implies Hokkien).
(2) = speak and read only (for Chinese language this includes
Mandarin),
(3) = speak, read and write (for Chinese language this
includes Mandarin) „
Note: The Tamil language is ignored because it is comparatively a 
very insignificant vehicle of inter-community communication.
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amenable to English expression, " But it is also observed that 
more and more Malay is being spoken by the leaders, especially 
in official contexts. This is an indication of the voluntary 
acceptance of the Malay language as the Bahasa Kebangsaan. The 
fact that such a high proportion of the leaders can at least 
speak Malay makes the acceptance easy. What is significant 
is that a fifth of the Chinese leaders and almost a half of the 
Indian leaders are capable of speaking, reading and writing Malay. 
And presumably those who have a speaking ability in Malay would 
not find it difficult to learn the language more thoroughly.
If language is a barrier between the various 
communities generally, this certainly does not apply to their 
leaders. The fact that no non-Malay leaders received their 
education in the Malay medium does not prevent them from being 
able to use Malay in their communication. Thus English education 
and Malay language ability is a common background among a large 
majority of the leaders in Penang. This has certainly helped 
inter-elite relationships, but to what extent it contributes to
45 Political party meetings, however, are carried out in the
communal languages and English is very seldom spoken. This 
was observed in four party meetings which I was privileged 
to attend, Even the 'non-communal' English-speaking leaders 
of the Labour Party addressed a branch meeting of the Party 
Ra'ayat in halting Malay.
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the chances of the leaders in achieving and maintaining their
, 46leadership status is another issue. All leaders at least
speak their community's language and this insures that intra­
community communication between the elites and the masses is 
not a problem.
Occupation and Economic Class:
The specialization of economic activities among the 
different communities has generally tended to convey the 
impression that leaders have distinct occupational characteristics. 
For example, Malay leaders are often believed to be former 
bureaucrats and Malay school teachers, secular or religious. 
Similarly Chinese leaders are thought to be mostly merchants or 
traders, and Indians mostly unionists. Along the same line it 
is also thought that Chinese leaders are wealthier than either 
Malay or Indian leaders who are mostly from lower-middle to middle 
economic class. These are decidedly superficial stereotypes, 
not unlike the notion that the political power in the country is 
in the hands of the Malays and the economic power in the hands 
of the Chinese. Just as the latter notion ignores the 
convertibility between political and economic resources the former
46- Unfortunately this can only be investigated through a trend 
analysis of the leaders' backgrounds.
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characterizations forget a typical quality of leadership. Leaders 
cannot be indistinguishable from their followers in abilities and 
resources. They must stand out from them; they must not just 
simply be different but different in the sense of being better.
In other words, they must be endowed with those values which are 
generally in demand but not commonly possessed. One should 
therefore expect leaders to be more like one another than like 
their followers. In the case of Penang this means that the 
leaders are likely to pursue occupations which are not typical 
of their communities. Furthermore there is no a priori reason 
to believe that their economic status is somehow determined by 
the economic status of their communities.
The data on the occupational background of the leaders 
show that there is no clear-cut pattern. But they do challenge 
at least one stereotype - that Malay leaders are not businessmen. 
Among the Malay leaders in Penang, commerce is the occupation 
most frequently reported; and there is no Malay leader who is 
either a religious teacher or a religious official. In fact the 
secularism of the leaders extends to the other communities as 
well. The occupations represented and the extent of the 
representation are shjown in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7
Occupation and Race (in percentages) .
MALAY
(N=24)
CHINESE
(N=33)
INDIAN
(N=9)
OTHERS
(N=4)
ALL
LEADERS
Commerce 29.2 45,5 33.3 - 35.7
Profession^ 8.3 42.4 55.6 50.0 32.9
2Government Service 25.0 - - 25.0 10.0
Clerical/Technical - 3.0 - - 1.4
Property-owning - 3.0 - - 1.4
Retail Trade 8.3 3.0 - - 4.3
Retirement 16.7 3.0 11.1 o lnCM 10.0
No Answer 12.5 - - - 4.3
1« Including teachers, managers and executives.
2. Including elected office-holders without other remunerative 
occupation.
Clearly most of the leaders pursue highly prestigious 
occupations. While only a small proportion of the Malay leaders 
are in a 'profession* quite a number are in the government service. 
Not only does this reflect the relative scarcity of Malay 
professionals it also implies that the few there are, are most 
likely to be in the government service. This is not true of 
either the Chinese or Indian leaders, none of whom is so employed.
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This indicates a difference between the communal perspectives on 
working for the government. Among the Malays such employment is 
looked upon as prestigious and carries with it the attribution of 
power and influence. Similar dispositions do not seem to exist 
among the Chinese and the Indian communities; at least individuals 
in government service are not automatically regarded as leaders 
by them. In the colonial days such employment might have been 
perceived as an entre to the corridors of influence besides being 
secure and prestigious in itself. Nowadays administration is 
subordinate to politics as far as leadership is concerned. All 
these do not mean that there are no Chinese or Indians in senior 
positions in the government; they are simply not regarded as 
leaders either generally or in their respective communities.
Another interesting revelation is that almost as many 
Chinese leaders are professionals as are businessmen, This 
challenges the popular notion that the Chinese community being 
commerce-oriented is led by the merchant class. Our data shows 
that this is not even true of Penang which is, after all, a state 
depending heavily on trade. There is a possible implication 
here. Should future developments threaten the commercial 
interests of the Chinese it is not automatic that these 
developments will be opposed by a solid rank of Chinese leaders. 
This is assuming, of course, that any threat in this direction
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is not perceived in communal terms so that the preservation of a 
communal identity overrides occupational as well as other 
differences existing between its leaders„ It is perhaps on 
account of this, for example, that the imminent loss of free- 
port status by Penang Island is perceived as a threat by only 
a section of the Chinese community and its leaders. Similarly 
the imposition of a turn-over tax in 1965 by the Federal 
government was not opposed by some Chinese leaders in Penang.
The main economic activity of the state, commerce, is 
reflected in the occupational background of its leaders. This 
applies as much to the Malay leaders as to their Chinese counter­
parts. Does this mean that leaders belong mostly to the upper
47economic class? There are few leaders who are not, generally 
speaking, well-to-do. This can be seen in Table 5.8
47o The economic class status, however, is not determined with
too much confidence. This is because the leaders generally 
refused to disclose their wealth or income. Their 
classification according to this index is based primarily 
on their own self-estimation, and secondarily on my own 
knowledge of about 80% of them.
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Table 5.8
Economic Class by Race (in percentages).
N UPPER UPPER-
MIDDLE
MIDDLE LOWER-
MIDDLE
Malay 24 12.5 41.7 33.3 12.5
Chinese 33 42.4 27.3 24.2 6.1
Indian 9 22.2 55.6 22.2 -
Others 4 75.0 - 25.0 -
All leaders 70 31.4 34.3 27.1 7.1
By and large Chinese and 'Others' leaders are wealthier than their 
Malay and Indian counterparts„ Malay leaders, in particular, have 
not reached the top of the economic ladder although one suspects, 
there being no adequate evidence to support this, that as a group 
they are the most economically mobile. While 30 per cent of them 
are engaged in commerce only 13 per cent belong to the upper 
economic class; this compares with almost the same proportions 
of Chinese leaders in these two categories. In any case, less 
than a third of the leaders can be said to belong to the top 
economic stratum of the Penang society. In spite of the fact 
that the (Malaysian) economic system is essentially capital- 
oriented wealth alone does not determine leadership. But it 
appears that unless one belongs at least to the middle class one's
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leadership chances are quite limited. Finally, the economic 
status of the leaders is much higher than that of the vast 
majority of the members of their respective communities.
Political Socialization:
Earlier we have seen that leadership and formal 
political positions are not coterminous. But it does not 
follow that leaders are generally unconnected with specifically 
political experiences or activities. It is possible that 
individuals who have plenty of political experience and are 
deeply engaged in party activities do not find it necessary to 
obtain formal political offices to promote or maintain their 
leadership status. If this is so it is an interesting 
commentary on the political process itself.
In terms of governmental experience in the colonial 
period, 34 per cent of the leaders received appointments to 
councils or advisory boards; and the rest of them had no 
connection with the colonial government whatsoever. A higher 
proportion of the Malay and Indian leaders were involved 
officially with the colonial government than Chinese leaders.
When it comes to government service the proportion with any past 
experience is smaller: 23 per cent of them were previously employed
by the government. This record of past political and administrative
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experiences testifies to some continuity at the leadership 
level between the colonial and the independent era. Thus 
involvement with the colonial government is not a hindrance 
to leadership status. But since less than half of the leaders 
were so involved it cannot be said that it is an advantage 
either. This aspect of the leaders' political socialization 
contrasts with that of other contexts where there has been a 
revolutionary struggle for independence which thoroughly 
discredited those involved with the colonial power. The absence 
of such a struggle in Malaysia explains the basic continuity 
of government and leadership. But if a majority of the leaders 
in Penang cannot claim a high degree of political experience and 
seniority, what have they been able to depend upon?
If we equate official honours received with status
and influence in the communities then a majority of the leaders
enjoy such standing. Almost three out of every four have
48received official honours of one kind or another. The 
proportion does not vary significantly between the racial 
sub-groups. Of course, honours are awarded very frequently to
48. A check with those nominees who received insufficient
nominations to be included in the leadership rank revealed 
that more than half of them are without official honours.
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those whose leadership status is already firmly established.
They then serve not to promote leadership status but to confirm it,
Another aspect of political socialization is the 
leaders' involvement with voluntary activities. These comprise 
activities within one's own community and those within a non- 
communal context. Examples of the former are a Malay leader's 
continuous engagement in a rural credit and/or co-operative 
society and a Chinese leader's involvement with a surname or 
dialect association. On the other hand voluntary activities in 
such organizations as the Civil Defence, the Red Cross, Rotary 
Club, etc,, are strictly non-communal. A leader may, of course,
be active in both contexts. The data on this topic are 
presented in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9
Voluntary Activities by Race ( m  percentages).
N
NOT
ENGAGED
COMMUNAL
ONLY
NON-
COMMUNAL
ONLY
COMMUNAL 
AND NON- 
COMMUNAL
NO
ANSWER
Malay 24 - 50,0 4.2 45,8 -
Chinese 33 9,1 27.3 21.2 36.4 6.1
Indian 9 - 11.1 22.2 44,4 22,2
Others 4 50,0 - 25.0 25,0 -
All leaders 70 7.1 31,4 15.7 40,0 5,7
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The table shows that there are very few leaders who
are completely unmvolved in voluntary activities; they are
three Chinese leaders and two 'Others,1 Most of the leaders
are heavily engaged in such activities, and this in an
interesting pattern. Fewer than a third are involved only-
in their own community's affairs; the highest proportion of
these is among the Malays, Almost all the Malay leaders are
involved in their community voluntary organizations, half of them
being involved also in non-communal activities. This contrasts
quite sharply with the Chinese and the Indian leaders. Contrary
to the popular notion that Chinese and Indian leaders are heavily
engaged mtra-communally because there are many more voluntary
organizations in these two immigrant communities, our data shows
that it is the Malay leaders who are more involved in this respect.
Just over a fifth of the Chinese and the Indian leaders are not
involved at all in communal activities; this compares with only
49four per cent of the Malay leaders
More than half of the leaders of every race are involved 
in both communal and non-communal affairs. If the leaders
49 This may be a function of the fact that most Malay voluntary 
organizations such as the rural credit and co-operative 
societies, mosque committees, the Women Institute, and kampong 
development committees, are of recent origin and are in most 
cases involved with the U,M,N.O„ or the government, Chinese 
and Indian voluntary organizations have no such characteristics,
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participate in the same types of non-communal voluntary 
organizations, there is another arena of inter-elite contact 
and inter-action besides the political one.^ This does not 
mean that leadership is achieved by this means. What is more 
likely is that leadership itself demands such involvement. 
Inter-elite contact in this way probably broadens the narrow 
communal perspectives of the leaders and softens the rigidities 
of communal politics If the political arena demands a
communal stance it need not necessarily pervade all the behaviour 
of the leaders in other contexts.
Perhaps the most crucial forms of elite behaviour
52and attitudes anywhere are political party activities.
50. Field observations confirm that this is the case.
51» This extends even to informal contacts. I was privileged 
to attend a dinner which was the outcome of an election bet 
between two leaders of different parties. (This was the Ayer 
Itam by-election mentioned in Chapter III above.)
The dinner was attended by a wide cross-section of the various 
parties* leaders except the P.M.I.P, The friendly 
atmosphere contrasted very sharply with the passionate 
rethoric and mutual accusations traded by these very leaders 
during the election campaign, There were also many other 
occasions where the private and public behaviours of the 
leaders were different,
52r With the exception, of course, of colonial societies. But 
even this is getting to be less and less the case as the in­
digenous leaders seek to overthrow the colonial regimes. The 
most modern manifestation of the structures of political 
competition is the party system.
I
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Among the 70 leaders only 14 (or a fifth) are not
affiliated with a political party, These comprise three
Malay leaders, five Chinese, two Indians and all the four
'Others.* Of those affiliated there is an interesting
distribution between the racial sub-groups: all the Malay
leaders are members of U oM.N,0. and all the Indian leaders are
53members of the M.I.C, Among the Chinese leaders, 22 are members 
of the M.C.A., four belong to the Labour Party and two others 
were affiliated with the dissolved United Democratic Party (now 
the Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia). Although there are other parties 
in Penang - the Party Ra'ayat, P.P.P,, D.A.P., and P.M.I.P. - 
they are totally unrepresented in the leadership group. This 
cannot be attributed to the fact that none of them is represented 
in the State Assembly since we have seen that formal positions 
do not determine leadership status.
The opposition parties are very under-represented among 
the leaders. The Alliance Party not only controls the State 
government but it also contains 50 of the 70 leaders in Penang,
53, One of the Indian leaders was formerly a leading member of 
the Labour Party.
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This explains the success of the Alliance Party to date. There 
are also, of course, other implications in this pattern of 
affiliation» Because the constituent partners of the Alliance 
include practically all the leaders of the three main racial 
communities the Alliance Party becomes the forum of inter­
community relations. And because the Party also controls the 
government the leaders can be said to link the communities with 
the government. No other party can claim similar functions.
Another implication is that despite the stance and 
platforms of the opposition parties, all parties in Penang are 
communal parties. This is in the sense that individually they 
incorporate only leaders of the same ethnic backgrounds. At the 
present stage of party development in Malaysia, all parties are 
popularly associated with their leaders. They do not have an 
identity of their own which is not bound up with the identities 
of their leaders. This being the case the absence of multi­
ethnic leadership in the parties leads to their characterization 
as communal parties. No doubt there are party leaders within 
some parties with different ethnic backgrounds; but these have no 
leadership status within the society at large. Until they do the
54, It could also mean that those with leadership status have 
allied with the partners of the Alliance,
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self-professed non-communal parties are likely to remain communal
55in their impact on the public,
If a fairly large majority of the leaders are members of 
political parties, does this mean that they are automatically the 
top leaders of their parties? In other words, what are the levels 
of their party affiliation? Aside from the 14 leaders who are not 
affiliated with a political party and two from whom no information 
was obtained, only two leaders hold no political party office.
The breakdown of those who do is as follows:
Local level = 10 or 14.3 per cent of all the leaders.
State level = 27 or 38„6 per cent.
National level = 15 or 21.4 per cent.
Thus a majority of the leaders hold party office at the State level 
and above. It is difficult to say, given the nature of the above 
data, whether the leaders endow their parties with legitimacy56 or 
in respect of them the parties have been performing the typical 
role of elite recruitment. In all probability both processes
55„ A case in point is the now dissolved United Democratic Party 
led by Dr Lim Chong Eu, a former national President of the 
McC.A, Although the U.D.P. was constitutionally a non-communal 
party with members of various ethnic backgrounds, Dr Lim's name 
was practically a synonym for the party and it drew its financial 
and electoral support mainly from the Chinese community.
56, Certainly it has been an important factor for both the Labour 
Party and the U .D .P .-turned-Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia that some 
of their leading members have leadership status in the society. 
See Chapter III above.
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have been at work« The data on the time these leaders joined 
their respective parties are quite revealing.
Of the 56 leaders who have party ties, 41 established 
them before the country became independent in 1957 and 12 after­
wards (the appropriate information on the remaining three was 
unavailable). More of the leaders who are U.M.N.O. members 
joined their party in the earlier period, as can be seen in 
Table 5.10. The data here plus the fact that a majority of
Table 5.10
Leaders’ Parties and Their Time of Affiliation.
BEFORE
1957
AFTER
1957
NO
ANSWER
TOTAL
U.M.N.O. 23 - 1 24
M.C.Ao 12 7 2 21
M.I.C. 3 2 - 5
Labour 3 1 - 4
U.D.P. - 2 - 2
TOTAL 41 12 3 56
the leaders are without formal authoritative positions seem to 
suggest that leaders have helped their parties with their status 
rather than the other way around. It is, of course, possible to 
argue that the electoral successes of the Alliance Party have
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enabled the party to perform the function of elite recruitment.
But if this were so it is certainly not strictly in the sense
of obtaining for them formal-legal positions of power. This
is particularly true in the cases of those leaders who are
U.M.N.O. or M.C.A. members. Of the 24 U.M.N.O. members,
exactly half are without formal positions. This proportion
is even higher for the M„C»A, group - 13 out of 21. So if
their parties have recruited them it is in an unconventional 
57sense. It is more likely, however, that they have lent
social legitimacy to their parties and in the process brought 
about their electoral successes, One feels that it is only 
in the case of the smallest of the three communities, the Indian, 
that the political party (the M.I.C.) through its membership of 
the Alliance has recruited leaders in the conventional sense.
Of the five M.I.C, leaders, only one is without formal office.
It is therefore conceivable that the status of these Indian
57, Intuitively it is possible for an electorally successful 
party to confer leadership status on its elected members 
as well as on its leading party members. This is particularly 
likely in situations where there is practically no distinction 
between the ruling party and the government as in one-party 
states and communist countries. Non-communist revolutionary 
parties which capture power are also likely to do this. The 
one case I have in mind is Mexico where ’the real governmental 
process takes place through the interactions of persons and 
interests working through the revolutionary party [the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional],’ Robert E. Scott, 
Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, 111.: University 
of Illinois Press, 1959), p, 9.
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leaders is promoted by their official positions. This points 
to one plausible generalization: the smaller the community the
more its leaders have to rely on formal-legal positions for 
leadership. For the larger communities, such as the Chinese 
and the Malay, leadership is less dependent on formal office 
than on involvement with political parties. This is meaningful 
in the light of the communalization of politics and the retention 
of the legal-formal structures of government and administration 
handed down from the colonial period.
In a situation where the canons and operative norms of 
administration -cannot fully incorporate communal (particularistic) 
considerations yet where the latter are crucial, the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the leadership structure are problematic. If the 
leadership structure is closely articulated with or solely sanctioned 
by administrative and formal-legal authority it may imply the 
alienation or exclusion of leaders of particularistic groups. If it 
is not there is the danger of excluding those with administrative 
and professional expertise from the leadership rank. The former 
appears to be operative among those new nations where there is a 
division between the western-oriented, new nationalist (political 
and administrative) elite and the parochially-educated traditional 
leaders. Is the latter operative in the case of Penang?
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The westernized professionals cannot be expected to be able 
to internalize the operative communal considerations; al­
though their expertise is necessary» Ideally they can be
recruited into a Weberian neutral bureaucracy, but they seldom 
58are, and they are not in Penang» If so and if the communal 
situation cannot permit them the unrestrained exercise of formal 
authority, where then are they located with respect to the leader­
ship structure? The Penang case supplies an intriguing answer.
The lack of a close articulation between leadership and 
the formal authority, in fact, enables the westernized professionals 
to be part of the leadership structure without having either to 
join the bureaucracy or to occupy formal positions» They are 
looked upon as leaders even though they largely remain unaffiliated 
with the political parties or have no formal-legal position. Of 
the 16 leaders with western tertiary education, nine have no party 
affiliation and 12 are without formal positions. Therefore in a 
sense they are the victims as well as the beneficiaries of the 
communalization of politics - the former because it robs them of 
their claim to monopolize power and the latter because it enables 
some of them to achieve leadership status without being politically
58, Cf c, Edward Shils, "Influence and Withdrawal: The Intellectuals
in Indian Political Development," op. cit.
253
contaminated by communal politics.
The analysis of some of the main background characteristics 
of the leaders reveals a leadership structure which incorporates 
all the relevant sections in the society. Not only are all the 
communal groups represented in it but also that section of the 
society which is the repository of modern knowledge and skills.
But if the groups they represent are disparate it does not follow 
that they themselves are of disparate backgrounds. Indeed they 
share numerous characteristics. To summarize, they are mostly 
born in the state fifty or more years ago, educated mostly at the 
secondary school level and in the English medium; while a vast 
majority of them can therefore speak English the same proportion 
can also speak Malay; they generally pursue prestigious occupations 
and their median economic status is the upper-middle class; their 
specifically political experiences are limited except for their 
heavy involvement with political parties beginning in the last 
years of the colonial era; while being members of communal 
parties they participate as often as not in non-communal voluntary 
activities without ignoring the communal ones. With these types 
of shared characteristics they interact with each other quite 
comfortably, all the time seeking to soften the rigidities imposed 
by the different communities they represent.
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However, while Malay and Indian leaders belong only to 
U.M.N.O» and M.I,C. respectively, the Chinese leaders are 
’politically split’ but a majority of them belong to the M.C.A.
This emphasizes the extent to which the Alliance Party is a party 
of the leaders. But this does not mean that the position of the 
party within the state is impregnable. The challenge to the 
Alliance is likely to come from those Chinese leaders who are 
not members of the M.C.A,
Finally it is appropriate to end this chapter by 
highlighting three aspects of the leaders' social characteristics 
which challenge conventional stereotypes. In the first place, if 
most leaders are educated in English this does not mean that there 
is no alternative medium of inter-communal elite communication. 
There are just as many English-speaking as Malay-speaking leaders, 
regardless of their educational and racial backgrounds. Secondly, 
if there are few Chinese who occupy formal-legal positions this 
does not mean that other Chinese are not otherwise influential and 
powerful in the political system. Hence it is not completely 
correct to say that Malay leaders monopolize political power. 
Thirdly, if a plurality of the Chinese leaders are in commerce so 
are a plurality of Malay leaders. The last two points suggest a 
convertibility between economic and political resources.
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CHAPTER VI
LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNAL POLITICS: THE NEXUS OF PERCEPTION
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In several exploratory interviews with top leaders in 
Penang during the early part of the field work this student was 
struck by the fact that all non-Chinese voluntarily confessed 
that they were uninfluential, and that they owed their positions 
solely to their willingness to 'serve other people.' On the 
other hand the Chinese leaders were only too willing to reveal 
that they were really the most important people in the state.
In fact they were saying that Malay and Indian leaders were merely 
symbolic figures and they could be dismissed when it came down to 
the actual determination of policies. If this were true it is 
undoubtedly an extraordinary situation since in Malaysia 
it is generally believed that Malay leaders are more influential 
than Chinese leaders. The superficial logic of such a situation, 
however, is not too difficult to come by. Penang is, in a manner 
of speaking, the most 'Chinese' state in Malaysia as previously 
indicated.^ But if the non-Chinese communities are quite as un- 
influential as the Chinese leaders claim then there must be some 
other explanations aside from the greater numbers of the Chinese. 
It is in seeking these explanations that this student came upon 
the importance of the leadership perception in the relationship 
between the leadership structure and communal politics in Penang.
1. See supra, Ch. II.
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On the surface of it the contention of the Chinese leaders
and the confession of the non-Chinese leaders are consistent.
However a chance discussion with a Malay university student
revealed that the Malay leaders generally propagated the notion
in the Malay community that they commanded the most influence
and had the ultimate say in most matters. This observation was
2later confirmed by a Malay clerk and a Malay journalist. So 
according to these Malay informants the Malay leaders actively 
work to create the impression in their community that Malay 
leadership is crucially important in the state. But they are 
generally reticent in doing so outside the Malay community. In 
fact, to an enquiring observer from the outside they would readily
2. After these discussions this student had to assume that the 
Malay leaders whom he interviewed earlier obviously considered 
his racial background as a more important point of reference 
than his role as a researcher. At least this is so in the 
context in which he was generally enquiring about leadership 
and influence in the society. Subsequent experiences in 
similar interview situations confirm this, much to the 
detriment of obtaining straight-forward answers from his 
respondents. The number of occasions when he had to assure 
their anonymity or come across remarks prefaced with 'Don’t 
say I say, but ...' is literally countless. Having said 
this, however, it is useful to point out that conducting 
research in one's own society always presents problems like 
those encountered here. Even though one wants only to be a 
neutral observer, one always runs the risk of being 
considered by others as a partisan participant. For discussions 
of other encounters of this type see M.N. Srinivas, Social 
Change in Modern India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1966), Ch. 5 on 'Some Thoughts on the 
Study of One's Own Society'; and W.F. Whyte, Street Corner 
Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn., 
1955), pp. 279-358, esp. pp. 320-325.
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deny it. As a result it should not be surprising that non-Malays 
as a whole would perceive the influence of the Malay leaders as 
very much less than the Malays would . At this stage a picture 
of the system of differential perceptions of the societal leader­
ship structure began to emerge.
The next interview along this line was made with an
Indian who was a senior civil servant. He unequivocally stated
that whatever the claims of the other leaders might be the
most important politician in the state was an Indian. According
to this informant this politician and three of his Indian
colleagues in the bureaucracy played very decisive roles in the
state government. Again he denied that he was personally
influential. Perhaps even more revealing were the remarks from
3an Indian school teacher. With unconcealed cynicism he said 
that the Indian leaders 'think they are powerful when in fact 
everybody but the Indians know that this is nonsense. They keep 
repeating the fact that the state president of the Malayan Indian 
Congress is the chairman of the Alliance State Committee, but
3. This individual is a personal friend of mine from secondary 
school days. This relationship permitted our discussion to 
reach a degree of openness which was absent in the interviews 
mentioned above.
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this is only an honorary job. '
These interviews, therefore, reveal that there is a 
general tendency for leaders of each community to propagate the 
notion of their predominance in the state among the members of 
their respective communities. Assuming that these propaganda 
are effective - the reasons for this fact are spelled out below - 
is it surprising that each community in this plural society 
accepts the leadership structure as legitimate and worthy of 
support? In this sense this is one of the most crucial activities 
undertaken by the leaders of each community. Since at least a 
section of the influential members are included in the leader­
ship structure this activity serves the dual purpose of enhancing 
the positions of the leaders and preventing the alienation of any 
one community from the leadership structure. The point can 
perhaps be made more strongly by stating the opposite case. If any 
one community does not have its share of the leadership positions 
in the society or feels this to be the case its leaders are likely
4. In 1966 when this interview took place the president of the 
Penang M.I.C. was the chairman of the Penang State Alliance 
Committee. My respondent was essentially correct in calling 
it an 'honorary job.' To a very large extent the Committee 
has served mainly as a liaison body between the constituent 
parties. In 1967 the system of electing the chairman of the 
State Alliance was changed. Under the new system the Chief 
Minister or Mentri Besar of each state is automatically 
elected the chairman.
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to deny the legitimacy of the leadership structure and to undertake 
to subvert it. As one anthropologist put it: '... cultural 
sections [communal groups] do not clash by chance or because their 
structure express incompatible values: They clash because certain
individuals and groups have decided that something can be achieved 
by way of making them c l a s h . I n  the case of Penang the activity 
of the community^ leaders in claiming predominance promotes the 
acceptance of rather than conflict about the leadership structure. 
But the different claims are logically contradictory. What then 
are the factors which prevent this contradiction from becoming 
obvious?
Perceptions of leadership by different groups in a plural
7society are inevitably far from being identical; nor are they 
always reasonably accurate reflections of who actually wield authority 
and influence. This is because communication, in the widest 
sense of the world, is never perfect. Problems of communication,
5. Leo A. Despres, op. cit., p. 29.
6. The term 'community' is preferred here to 'communal' because
it includes communal as well as non-communal leaders who belong 
to the same community.
7. This broad generalization clearly does not hold for a plural 
society under colonial rule. The concentration of power in 
the colonial administration prevents any doubt about the 
ultimate source of authority and influence.
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therefore, are at the root of the differential perceptions of 
leadership. These problems are frequently aggravated by the
g
very nature of the plural society. In the case of Penang the 
society consists of fairly distinct and easily identifiable racial 
communities which serve as the basic framework for social identity. 
The factors that are responsible for this are also easily recog-
9nizable. They extend from a host of socio-cultural differences 
to residential settlement patterns,1  ^medium of literacy and economic
8, Cf„ JoS, Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, loc,cit,; and 
his article "Co-operation, Competition and Isolation," op, cit. 
Edward Shils argues that 'Almost everywhere, the societies [of 
the new nations] consist of relatively discrete collectivities - 
ethnic, communal, caste, religious, or linguistic - that have 
little sense of identity with one another or with the national 
whole,' Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New 
Nations," in Clifford Geertz, ed,, op, cit,, p. 3, See also 
M,G, Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences, op, cit,, pp„ 763-85.
9, Cf, Maurice Freedman, "The Growth of the Plural Society in 
Malaya," Pacific Affairs vol,XXXIII, No, 2 (June, I960), pp, 
158-68, See also the two articles on Malayan nationalism by 
T,H, Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, op, cit,, and Wang Gungwu, 
"Malayan Nationalism," op, cit,
10, See supra, Ch, II, on demography. For a suggestive article 
on this point see W„ Donald McTaggart, "The Grading of Social 
Areas in George Town, Penang," The Journal of Tropical Geography, 
vol, 23 (December, 1966), pp, 40-46, Of the three areas 
surveyed in this study the Malays constitute only one per cent 
and the Indians three per cent of the population. This is in 
spite of the fact that the ethnic composition of George Town is
as follows: Chinese - 72,9%, Malays - 11,4%, and Indians - 13,6%,
The point is that if a different area of the city is selected 
the relative percentages of Chinese and non-Chinese could quite 
easily have been reversed. In George Town as well as 
throughout the state generally there are pockets of Chinese,
Malay and Indian concentration.
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and occupational specialization. All these differences rein­
force each other and are responsible for a low level of inter­
community contacts and ordinary social intercourse. These, in 
turn, cause certain uniformities in each communal group's 
perception of leadership and lead to a differential pattern of 
perception. If, for example, the Malay community were to 
consider participation in formal decision-making as a hallmark of 
influence it might view the leadership structure as including a 
large proportion of Malays, On the other hand if the Chinese 
community were to consider wealth as a strong determinant of power 
it might view the wealthy Chinese leaders as playing the pivotal 
role in the affairs of the state.
On the surface it is tempting to suggest that differential 
perceptions of leadership lead to crises of leadership. Such a 
suggestion would assume that accurate perceptions are inherently
11. The different media of literacy - Malay, Chinese, Tamil and 
English - have prevented easy communication between the 
communities. This problem is aggravated by a general pattern 
of economic and occupational specialization along racial lines. 
The promotion of the Bahasa Kebangsaan (the National language 
which is Malay) and attempts to create more opportunities for 
Malays in commerce are aimed directly at the social discon­
tinuities caused by such factors.
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better ('eufunctional') than less accurate ones. Insufficient
research has been done in this area to confirm that this is so. 
Indeed the case of Penang in particular and perhaps that of 
Malaysia generally would lead one to hypothesize that inconsistent 
perceptions of leadership and power play a functional role in 
generating support for the leadership structure. But regardless 
of the relative accuracy of leadership perceptions (between one 
society and another or, as in this case, between different groups 
in a particular society) they constitute a meaningful aspect of 
leadership and the exercise of it.
What then is the nature of such a differential pattern 
of leadership perceptions and in what ways does it contribute to 
the legitimacy and stability of the leadership structure? Ideally 
the best way to determine what are the factors or combination of 
factors which operate to condition people's attitudes and orientat­
ions to leadership in Penang is to survey a sample of the total 
population. But this is clearly beyond the resources of a
12. It has been stated that where formal leaders are also
reputational leaders the structure of power is legitimate 
in the sense that those who are thought to wield power are 
actually in the legal position to do so. See Charles M. 
Bonjean and David M. Olson, op. cit., p. 292.
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researcher working alone. Instead, as mentioned above, a
compromised strategy was adopted, aimed primarily to provide a 
basis for making inferences, and confirming field observations, 
about the relationship between the leadership structure and 
communal politics generally. Given the general distrust of an 
'outsider' intruding into the affairs of a community - a distrust 
which disqualifies this student in all but the Chinese community - 
a more direct investigation is not feasible.
At this juncture it is useful to review briefly the roles 
played by the panel of 'judges.' They were originally recruited 
to nominate individuals as leaders. In this way the contemporary 
leaders were identified for analysis of their social backgrounds. 
The 'judges,' however, also performed two other tasks: namely,
they placed their nominees in one of three categories of leader­
ship and selected factors responsible for their leadership 
positions. In this sense the 'judges' performed two separate 
roles - nominations on the one hand and categorization and 
attribution on the other - which can be viewed as unconnected
13. For a catalogue of the problems inherent in applying survey 
techniques in developing nations see Frank Bonilla, "Survey 
Techniques," in Robert E. Ward, ed., Studying Politics Abroad 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 134-52.
14. See supra. Ch. IV.
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analytically. This was the original intention.
Given the education, occupations and general background of 
the 'judges' their categorization and factor selection may, in fact, 
be very informative about perceptions of the leadership in Penang.^ 
Indeed the general uniformity of their backgrounds would enhance any 
perceptual differences on a group basis and hint at similar differences 
in the society at large. That there are differential perceptions of 
leadership in the society, particularly along racial lines, is the 
hypothesis which we seek to test, using the total categorizations and 
attributions of the 'judges' as a frame of reference. But the 
exercise of the 'judges' is also capable of supporting observations, 
and giving rise to inferences, about the leadership structure and 
communal politics. This is evident below.
Before proceeding to analyse the categorizations and 
attributions of the 'judges' it is useful to present the distribution 
of their various characteristics and choices. Altogether the 14 
'judges' make a total of 499 nominations. Individually there is a 
considerable range in the number of nominations made One 'judge* 
nominates only 14 names out of the list of 145, while at the other 
extreme two nominate 54 names each. Table 6.1 below gives the 
distribution of the nominations of the individual 'judges,'
15. There was, of course, no guarantee when the methodology was 
originally conceived that this was to be the case; although 
field observations would lead one to believe so.
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Table 6.1
Nominations by 'Judges.’
JUDGES NOMINATIONS
Identification Race General
Category
Westernized
Category
Communal
Category
Total
01 Chinese 11 5 27 43
02 Indian 11 2 24 37
03 Malay 5 2 21 28
04 Malay 11 9 34 54
05 Indian 14 16 11 41
06 Chinese 9 5 14 28
07 Malay 5 9 11 25
08 Chinese 5 3 6 14
09 Eurasian 18 9 14 41
10 Indian 13 6 30 49
11 Eurasian 43 3 8 54
12 Chinese 13 4 5 22
13 Malay 3 6 11 20
14 Chinese 21 6 16 43
TOTAL 182 85 232 499
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The above table also shows that more nominations are made
in the Communal leadership category, The percentage distribution
in the three categories is as follows: Communal leadership -
46,5 per cent, General leadership - 36,5 per cent and Westernized
(Non-communal) leadership - 17 per cent. Since the 'judges’ are
not drawn from the traditional sectors of the Penang society in
which the communal leaders exercise their influence this
emphasizes the saliency of communal leadership in Penang, In the
light of the previous discussion regarding the kind of impact of
the communalization of politics it is not surprising that communal
leadership is a recognized part of the total leadership structure.
The distribution also indicates the comparative insignificance of
westernized leadership in terms of the frequency of nominations.
Even though the 'judges' belong, in a manner of speaking, to the
modern, western-oriented sector of the society they think that the
leadership structure includes a smaller number of leaders of this 
16type, Individually, only one 'judge' nominates more Westernized
than either General or Communal leaders. There is therefore a 
widespread agreement among the judges that Westernized leaders
16, It is difficult to consider this as a matter of bias on the 
part of the 'judges' for, if this were the case, the exact 
opposite should have occurred. In other words, because of 
their western orientation the 'judges' should collectively 
have made the highest number of nominations in the 'Westernized' 
category,
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constitute a relatively small section of the leadership structure.
This contrasts sharply with the central positions said to be occupied
17by such leaders in other developing societies,
Thus the structure of the total nominations confirms the 
earlier observations that communal leadership is salient and that, 
by and large, the westernized, educated elites are not predominant, 
Futhermore it suggests that the communal aspect of leadership is 
widely perceived, extending as it were to those who are not 
normally within its frame of influence.
Turning to the five factors deemed responsible for 
leadership positions it is discovered that the ’judges' choose 
'Involvement in Community or Societal Affairs' most frequently;
381 of the 499 nominations are credited with this factor, This 
is followed by 318 choices of 'Decision-Making,' 310 of 'Respect,' 
172 of 'Wealth' and 146 of 'Skill', The relatively infrequent 
choice of 'Skill' once again lends support to the conclusion that 
the westernized professionals do not occupy the bulk of the
17, In an article on the non-western but western-educated
intelligentsias Harry J„ Benda concludes that 'Political 
changes [in developing countries] are likely to take place 
within these elites rather than to affect their predominance 
as ruling classes,' Harry J, Benda, "Non-western 
Intelligentsias as Political Elites," op, cit,, p, 251,
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positions of leadership. Among the five factors it may be safely
said that ’Skill' is the one most often associated with them»
But it is a factor deemed to be the least significant base for 
18leadership» Therefore it is clear that at this stage of its 
development the Penang society does not value skill as much as the 
other factors» But one suspects that it is still a crucial 
factor for those who have influence in the modern and non-communal 
contexts of the society.
The pattern of factor attribution also suggests an 
important aspect of leadership in Penang, It suggests that the 
leaders are very much involved with the general public, even if it 
means nothing more than elite/mass interaction within each 
community. This is still significant in the light of the 
pervasiveness of the elite/mass gap observed in other developing 
societies. The interaction between elite and mass in Penang is 
understandable in the light of the social backgrounds of the 
leaders and the fact that the inter-elite co-operation is based 
upon intra-community solidarity. Not to be involved with the 
mass would severely hinder the achievement of leadership status. 
This is exactly why the local westernized professionals did not
18. This conceivably could just be a function of the relatively 
small number of nominations in the Westernized category 
of leadership.
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consolidate their predominant positions in the early 1950s»
This also explains why some leaders who are in close contact with 
the masses are able to promote their status as general leaders in 
the society»
Perception of the racial composition of the leadership structure:
One working assumption of this survey is that the 
communalization of politics and the consequent compartmentalization 
of the leadership structure along racial lines affect the public 
perception of leadership» The implications of this assumption 
need to be mentioned» In the first place the involvement of 
communal leaders in politics has, in fact, meant their participation 
in extra-communal affairs» This, in turn, has led to a general 
awareness of leaders which cuts across community boundaries» The 
most prominent leaders of each community (as contrast to just 
prominent communal leaders) are, naturally, known to a larger number 
of people irrespective of racial backgrounds; particularly in the 
urban areas knowledge of the prominent leaders is quite widespread» 
The less prominent leaders are known to at least some people out­
side their own racial groups» But it is also true that leaders 
are better known in their own communities than outside them» For 
these reasons ’judges’ are not expected to nominate only leaders 
from their own race» But one might expect they would make more 
nominations from them» The data, however, do not show that this
is the case»
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In terms of the total number of nominations the Chinese 
constitute the largest group. They receive 49.7 per cent of the 
nominations compared to 31.3 per cent for the Malays, 15,6 per cent 
for the Indians and 3,4 per cent for the Others, The high 
proportion of Chinese nominees cannot be attributed to the larger 
number of Chinese 'judges’ since on the average they make a smaller
19number of Chinese nominations than all the other 'judges' combined.
This seems to suggest that all the 'judges' concede that the Chinese
constitute the larger part of the leadership structure. This is
what one would expect given the racial composition of the Penang
society and the relative prominence of the Chinese community. Yet
one is constantly reminded of the general hypothesis of Malaysian
politics that the Malays have the most political power. The data here
do not suggest that this hypothesis is false; it only cautions
against accepting it for all levels of the Malaysian political
system. Certainly in the case of Penang the Malays do not appear
to be predominant in the leadership structure. And it is doubtful
20that they have the most power, let alone monopolize it. Even the
21Malay 'judges' on the panel nominate more Chinese than Malay leaders.
19. The comparative figures are 15.4 and 19 respectively.
20. This statement is guarded because the index - proportion of 
nomination by race - cannot be the basis of measuring power 
as such,
21. In terms of the population distribution, however, the Malays are 
slightly over-represented in the nomination. They constitute 
28,9 per cent of the population (according to the 1957 Census) 
and 31,3 per cent of the nominations.
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However if one merely looks at the formal positions Malays 
do occupy more of them than Chinese. While the Chief Minister of 
the State is a Chinese the Governor is a Malay. The Mayor of 
George Town is a Chinese but the chairmen of the other local 
authorities are Malays. The percentage composition of the other 
formal bodies is shown in the table below:
Table 6.2
Racial Composition of Formal Authority Positions, 
(in percentages)
Malay Chinese Indian Others
State delegation to the 
Federal Senate, 1967 50.0 25.0 25.0
Senate delegation to the 
House of Representatives, 
1967 50.0 50.0
State Assembly, 1967 37.5 50.0 12,5 -
City Council, 1967 13.3 66.7 20.0 -
Four Rural District Councils 50.9 42.1 7,0 -
Senior bureaucracy* 46,2 7.7 19.2 26.9**
State Executive Council 37.5 37.5 25.0 -
District Officers 80,0 - 20.0 -
Heads of Departments, 1966. Information supplied by the 
State Secretariat.
This percentage represents seven expatriate officers.
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In numerical terms the above table represents 138 positions, 65 of 
which are occupied by Malays, 47 by Chinese, 18 by Indians and 8 
by Others, Therefore m  terms of formal positions Malays occupy 
more of them than Chinese, but in terms of nominations by the 
'judges* the opposite is the case. There are two possible
implications in this discrepancy.
In the first instance formal positions are not considered 
as the only basis of power and influence. Otherwise this would 
have been reflected in the nominations and there would be more 
Malay than Chinese nominations. The fact that the Malay * judges' 
do not even make more Malay than Chinese nominations underscores 
this point.
Secondly, and this arises from the first point, the 
discrepancy can conceivably underline the acceptance of the 
distribution of formal authority positions on the part of the 
Chinese, Even if Malays occupy more of these positions than 
Chinese there is compensation in the widespread knowledge that 
overall there are more Chinese than Malay leaders and that the 
former, by that token, are deemed to be more influential and
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significant. One is reminded of what was said of the Chinese
community in Penang in the 1890s: they often preferred
influence to office .... Their views were represented when their 
23race was not.’
There is, therefore, a certain complementarity in the 
leadership situation in Penang as far as the two major communities, 
Malay and Chinese, are concerned. There is, after all, no overt 
contest or conflict between the leaders of the Malay and the 
Chinese communities as yet, only one between a section of the urban 
Chinese community and the inter-communal coalition represented in 
the Alliance Party and government. This being the case and if it 
is assumed that there is a tendency to select self-vindicating 
facts in the perception of leadership, it is not surprising that 
both communities should feel happy about the leadership structure. 
The Malays would naturally emphasize the formal authority 
positions; the Chinese the informal ones. It is in this sense 
that no racial group clearly dominates the leadership structure.
The ambiguity inherent in this situation sustains the discrepancies
22. The equation of number of leaders and power of leaders is 
not convincing in terms of social science logic, but one 
feels that this is precisely the subjective frame of mind 
of a large section of the Chinese community.
23. Penang Past and Present, 1786-1963, op. cit., p. 40.
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between the actual and ideal (expected) structure of leadership 
as perceived by each community and between the different 
communitiesc This then is another support to the effectiveness 
of the leaders of each community in propagating their own 
predominance. For without this ambiguity the leadership 
perceptions of the different communities cannot be at once 
mutually contradictory and yet individually acceptable. Saying 
all this does not imply that there is a machiavellian conspiracy 
on the part of the leaders to deceive their own communities.
There are other observable facts arising from the nature of the 
plural society and communal politics which tend to precondition 
perception of leadership along this line.
To begin with, the Chinese community generally believes 
that while Malays may be very influential elsewhere they are not 
as influential as the Chinese in Penang. No doubt part of this 
view arises from the simple recognition that the Chief Minister, 
the Mayor of George Town and the leading Opposition spokesmen in 
the State Assembly, all locally prominent individuals, are 
Chinese. The more traditional elements of the community tend 
to view these leaders as free agents and to credit them with
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virtually unlimited authority. By and large the community tends 
towards a 'non-formal' view of power. But it does not lack ample 
evidence to suggest that its leaders are having the most say in the 
affairs of state. (This point is developed below.)
For the Malay community, a large proportion of which 
lives in the rural areas, such individuals as the Agong, the 
federal Prime Minister, his deputy, the Governor of the State, all 
being Malays and very visible, represent authoritative figures. 
Seldom is a political speech made in the Malay community without 
its numerous references to these leaders. At the lower level 
the District Officer, the Chairman of the Rural District Council 
and even the Penghulu are Malays. And since these are the 
officials with whom the rural Malay community has the most contact 
their significance looms large. Largely on account of these
24. On a tour I undertook with the Chief Minister he was beseiged 
with the following requests: an additional post-box, a new
public telephone, additional bus-stops, better shelters at 
bus-stops, increased frequency of bus services [the bus 
system is operated by a private company], and removal of 
people with bad reputations from the area. These requests 
were prefaced by a local spokesman with this remark: 'We
[literally, small brothers] have not taken independent 
actions because we know you are coming and that you will 
attend to our needs»' [Translated from Hokkien»] The Chief 
Minister replied that some of these things were outside of his 
jurisdiction but that he would try his best to see that they 
were attended to when he returned to his office.
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people the Malay community derives satisfaction when it perceives
power and influence in the society. If the Chinese community
tends towards a non-formal view of power the Malay community tends
to ignore the distinction between the federal and state levels of
power. Both tendencies are not without their validation in observable
facts, informal leadership being significant and federal power vis-
a-vis the state being overwhelming. But among the urban Malays
and the Malay leaders there is an appreciation that their Chinese
counterparts in the state are predominant, especially in terms of
25economic resources. This is reflected in the racial distribution 
of the nominations by the Malay 'judges.'
25. There is an increasing tendency for Malay community projects
usually undertaken by branches of the U.M.N.O., to be supported 
by private gifts from wealthy Chinese leaders and, to a very 
much lesser extent, from one or two Indian leaders. These 
gifts are never made known publicly although other forms of 
support are given openly. The most common of these is the 
placement of advertisements in 'souvenir programmes' with the 
fine recognition that these advertisements carry no ostensible 
publicity value. A typical advertisement runs like this:
' With the compliments of Hong Hong Ltd, 000 China Street, 
Penang. ' In the last few years there is a noticeable 
tendency for privately-owned firms whose proprietors are 
involved in politics to 'advertise' only in explicitly 
communal projects. This form of support and other private 
donations to such projects are deemed to result in maximum 
'political payoffs.' On account of this recognition most 
communal fund-raising projects are undertaken in the names 
of prominent political leaders to insure against financial 
failure.
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Another general factor which predisposes people to select
community-vindicating perspectives is the coverage of the communal
language presses. This factor can be clearly seen in the reports
of the debates and statements made in the State Assembly. As far
as the Chinese press is concerned its reportage of a State Assembly
session conveys an unmistakable impression that just about every
statement, every issue, every interest demand, is made by Chinese
members of the Assembly and that the non-Chinese members are merely
'seat-warmers.' The corresponding situation obtains in the Malay
press where the activities and views of the Malay members loom
large. Once again this discrepancy cannot be considered a
conspiracy. It is merely a function of the literacy medium of
the reporters, their acquaintanceship with Assembly members of their
own race, and the community relevance of the matters raised. It
makes little sense and is of little interest to report in the
Chinese press that a Malay member has advocated the extension of
electricity to a particular Malay village; besides the Chinese
reporter would find it difficult to obtain further information
26and clarification from the Malay member. Similarly the Malay
26. Only the English language press rely to some extent on
verbatim reporting and official information handed out by 
the Clerk of the Assembly. The Chinese reporters, in 
particular, resort to extensive interviews with Assembly 
members when it is in recess or adjournment. Such a style of 
reporting tends to exaggerate the significance, relevance 
and conviction of the members interviewed.
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press would not want to give cover to a Chinese member’s complaint 
about rising commodity prices in George Town or unemployment among 
Chinese-educated youth; also the Malay reporter very probably 
cannot obtain further elaboration from the Chinese member.
Such a pattern of community specialization in the coverage 
of the communal language presses reinforces the communal perspective 
on public affairs. This is partly due to the fact that those who 
read one communal language press are very unlikely to read another.
So the possibility of constantly encountering inconsistent reports 
is quite remote. Thus each community feels that the leadership 
structure includes more of its leaders, and they are more 
influential, than others would concede. Such a perspective is 
seldom challenged primarily because the leaders of all communities 
have a vested interest in it.
There is a minimum of elite competition, and much of it is
conducted within the community rather than between the communities
27and hence away from the public eye. As far as it can be determined
27. Elections constitute the most open competition and for this 
reason are deemed to be detrimental to communal harmony.
This is especially so when the candidates in one constituency 
are of different races.
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there has not been an attempt in Penang on the part of the leaders
28of one community to influence directly the members of another»
Any such attempt at cross-community influence without going through
the leaders of the target community, i.e, the sponsorship of the
latter group, is bound to be summarily rebuffed. This gives rise
to the absence of inter-community elite competition and the
29presence of elite interdependence.
It is this interdependence among the elites that 
engenders a spirit of co-operation and tolerance among them which 
accounts, to date, for a remarkable stability in the leadership 
structure. Moreover it also gives rise to a situation in which
28. In the Malaysian-wide context one may say that this was exactly 
what the People's Action Party of Singapore was trying to do 
when Singapore was part of Malaysia. The characterization of 
politics as a struggle between the 'naves' and the 'have-nots' 
by the P.A.P. leadership clearly blurred the distinction 
between the races and, not surprisingly, the harshest 
reaction and opposition came from the explicitly communal 
partners of the Alliance.
29. The inter-elite rapprochement between different communities as 
a basis of leadership has been observed by G. William Skinner 
in Thailand. In his book, Leadership and Power in the Chinese 
Community of Thailand, op. cit., Skinner mentions many examples 
of Chinese 'leaders with close connections in the Thai elite 
who rose in prestige as Chinese leaders. '
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the incumbent leaders possess a kind of veto power in the elite
recruitment process. Those who aspire to top leadership, here
defined as influence extending over the boundary of the community,
must first of all establish their credentials within their own
community. Secondly, they must be acceptable to and have good
30rapport with the leaders of the other communities. These
conditions entail both an ability and a desire to eschew open
31competition, to avoid raising 'delicate matters' in public and
to compromise in such a way as to suggest that no communal
victories are scored and all communal interests are served. Thus
there is a remarkable homogeneity in the Weltanschauung of the
contemporary leaders which is the basis of a symbiotic relation-
32ship that transcends community differences.
If community differences are transcended at the top of 
the social hierarchies they remain, however, quite rigid at the 
bottom. Because communities are distinct they become a barrier
30. The extent to which these conditions be circumvented depends 
on the inter-communal Alliance's ability to retain formal 
power in the state.
31. By and large these involve problems of inequalities between 
the various communities.
32. Apparently such a situation is also obtained among the elites in
certain Caribbean societies which are pluralistic. See M.G. 
Smith, Stratification in Grenada (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1965). Cf. M.G. Smith, The 
Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).
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to the formation of non-communal solidarities that are capable of 
overriding communal ones. On account of this leaders are mostly 
community-based and hence community-oriented. This then is 
another general factor which contributes an element of ambiguity 
in the community-based images of leadership in the state at large.
A general point can now be made which further explains why 
there is a differential pattern in leadership perceptions between the 
communities. By and large there is little appreciation of the 
distinction between formal authority and informal influence. In
the first place the formal authority structure of the state is new; 
secondly, the leaders themselves blur the distinction between 
formal authority and informal influence. This lack of a well- 
defined boundary between the two permits an easy and less rigid 
interpretation of the distribution of power.
So far we have relied on the racial distribution of the 
'judges’ nominations to make inferences about the leadership 
structure and its relationship to communal politics. We shall 
next examine more closely the relationship between categories or 
types of leadership and the factors most commonly associated with 
them, bearing in mind the racial backgrounds of both the 'judges'
and their nominees.
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Perception of Leadership Categories:
Earlier we have mentioned the fact that overall the
'judges' nominate more leaders in the Communal than either the
General or Westernized category. While this is broadly true
of the Chinese, Malay and Indian 'judges,' it is noteworthy that
the Eurasian 'judges' do not follow this pattern. They classify
a large majority of their nominations in the General leadership
category; the smallest proportion of their nominations is in the
Westernized category. This is in spite of the fact that Eurasians,
33as a whole, are the most westernized group in the society.
There are several plausible explanations.
Since the Eurasian community is western-oriented and hence 
non-traditional it is not deemed to have communal leaders. The 
community is by far the smallest and therefore Eurasian leaders, unlike 
their counterparts in the other communities, cannot base their influence 
on leadership of their community. Consequently there are no communal 
leaders among the Eurasians. This hinders the perception of relevance 
of communal leaders qua communal leaders. It is likely that the 
Eurasians consider most of the well known communal leaders as
33. Almost all Eurasians are Christians. Furthermore if we
consider western orientation as a matter of English education 
the 1957 Census shows that 83% of 'Others'(mostly Eurasians) 
aged 10 and over are literate in English. The corresponding 
figures for the other communities are: Indians - 22%;
Chinese - 20%; and Malay - 8%.
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General leaders. This is further supported by the low nominations 
of the Eurasian 'judges' in the Westernized category. Furthermore 
because they tend to view leadership in formalistic terms they 
are prone to classify all formal leaders and the professional elites 
in the General category. In short, among all the 'judges' the 
Eurasians are the least capable of perceiving the distinction 
between the leadership categories.
Among the other judges the pattern of nominations of the 
Malay 'judges' deviates slightly from those of the Chinese and the 
Indian 'judges.' As is evident in Table 6.3 below the Malay 
'judges' nominate more leaders in the Westernized than in the 
General category.
Table 6.3
Nominations by Race of 'Judges' .
Judges Nominations in Leadership Categories
Race General Westernized Communal Total
Category Category Category
Chinese No; 59 23 68 150
% : 39.3 15.3 45.3 99.9
Malay No: 24 26 77 127
% : 18.9 20,5 60.6 100
Indian No: 38 24 65 127
% : 29.9 18.9 51.2 100
Eurasian No: 61 12 22 95
% : 64.2 12.6 23.2 100
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The differences in the pattern of nominations to 
leadership categories by the different groups of judges hint 
at another ambiguity in the perception of leadership. In 
effect, they suggest that different communities may view one 
particular leader, for example, as influential at different 
levels of the society. Thus the Chinese may see one of their 
leaders as influential in the society at large; whereas the 
Malays may only see him as influential in the modern (western­
ized) sector of the society. It is also conceivable that the 
opposite can be the case. The extent to which this may be 
true can be gauged if the nominations are arranged according to 
three indices, viz. the racial backgrounds of the 'judges' and 
their nominees, and the categorization of leadership. This 
is done in Table 6.4 below.
At the level where a leader is considered influential 
in the individual community as well as the society at large, i.e. 
General leadership, all the 'judges' agree that Chinese leaders 
predominate. As Table 6.4 indicates they are followed by 
Malay and Indian leaders in that order.
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Table 6.4
Racial Background of fudges* and Their Nominees
by Categories of Leadership 
(in percentages)
'Judges'' Categories Nominees ' Race
Race of Leadership Malay Chinese Indian Others
General 25.0 62.5 12.5 0.0
Malay Westernized 26.9 46.1 15.4 11.5
Communal 45.4 44.2 10.4 0.0
General 28.8 52.5 18.6 0.0
Chinese Westernized 13.0 52.2 26.1 8.7
Communal 41.2 50.0 8.8 0.0
General 28.9 47.4 21.1 2.6
Indian Westernized 12.5 58.3 16.7 12.5
Communal 49.2 32.3 18.5 0.0
General 19.7 59.0 16.4 4.9
Eurasian Westernized 0.0 41.7 16.7 41.7
Communal
j--------------
9.1 72.7 18.2 0.0
This corresponds with the relative size of the three communities 
in the state. Predictably there are very few nominations of 
'Others' in this category of leadership. The Chinese and Malay 
'judges' consider that there is no General leader in Penang who 
does not come from one of the three main communities. However 
there seems to be a consensus among all the 'judges' that 
leaders from the residual community of 'Others' are overwhelmingly 
Westernized leaders; and that none of them can be considered
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Communal leaders« This consensus points to the possibility that 
General leadership is based largely on communal leadership«
Thus unless one can be influential in the communities one cannot 
achieve the highest status of General leaders« This suggests a 
close articulation between the communities and the leadership 
structure and confirms the significance of communal and informal 
leadership«
As far as Westernized leadership is concerned all the
'judges', once again, consider the Chinese as predominant. The
Chinese, Indian and Eurasian 'judges' nominate a larger proportion
of Indians in this category than Malays. But the Malay 'judges'
think that there are more Malay leaders who are influential at
this level than Indian leaders. This is understandable in the light
of the proportion of formal positions of authority occupied by 
34Malays. Even then it is quite revealing that the Malay 'judges' 
do not nominate more Malay than Chinese leaders in this category.
It all adds up to a suggestion that Westernized leadership is not
34« See Table 6.2 above.
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35simply equated with administrative leadership,,
One of the more interesting aspects of the data in 
Table 6.4 is the hint that Malay, Chinese and Indian communal 
leaders are familiar to the ’judges’ irrespective of race« It 
seems that the Malay and the Chinese ’judges' are mutually 
knowledgeable about communal leaders in their respective communities. 
The nominations of the Indian ’judges', however, indicate that 
they are more familiar with Malay than Chinese communal leaders. 
Similarly the Chinese 'judges' appear to be more familiar with Malay 
than Indian communal leaders. But it is noteworthy that 
nominations in the Communal leadership category do not go strictly 
according to race, in the sense that not more than half of the 
nominations from any community comes from the ’judges' of the same 
community. (This is in spite of the point made earlier that each 
community has tended to view its leaders as pre-eminent in the 
leadership structure,) Thus while the leadership structure may 
be racially compartmentalized, especially at the communal level,
35, A relevant experience in the field appears to confirm that 
this is so. On the occasion of the visit of the Vice 
Chancellor of the University of Sussex to Penang the Chief 
Minister invited a local group to meet with the former to 
discuss the proposed University of Penang. Roughly a third 
of the invited guests were government officials, and the 
rest have no official roles but with university experience 
such as doctors and lawyers.
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it does not prevent recognition of leaders which cuts across racial 
lines. It may be suggested that such a recognition further under­
lines the acceptance of a racially pluralistic leadership structure. 
This is in accord with the observation made in the field. No 
community denies the position or influence of the leaders of another 
community in the affairs of that community. It only challenges 
the claims of those who seek to influence the members of a 
different community.
So far we have organized the data around the racial 
backgrounds of the 'judges.' Among other things there is a 
suggestion that irrespective of these backgrounds it is perceived 
that Chinese leaders predominate and that communal leadership is 
significant. It is possible to see whether these general­
izations still hold when the data are organized in accordance 
to the public roles of the 'judges.'
'Judges'* Public Roles and Their Nominations:
Perception of leadership can conceivably be influenced 
by the distance of one's public roles from the centre of the 
political system. The public roles of the 'judges' as
politicians, administrators, journalists and professionals, are 
fairly central. If a distinction can be made between them it may be
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considered that the politicians and the administrators are 
participants and the others are observers of the central process 
of government. This distinction, however, is not reflected 
in the racial backgrounds of their nominees.
Table 6.5 shows that there is no difference between the 
patterns of nominations grouped according to the public roles of 
the ’judges.' In fact the distribution is similar to the general 
pattern previously observed, viz. Chinese nominees receive the 
highest proportion of the nominations, followed by Malay, Indian 
and Others nominees in that order.
Table 6.5
’Judges’’ Public Roles and Nominees' Race 
(in percentages)
'Judges'’ 
Public Roles
Nominees Total
Malay Chinese Indian Others
Politicians 35.9 50 c 2 13.4 0.5 100.0
Administrators 30.4 47.8 15.2 6.5 99.9
Journalists 26.0 48.8 19.5 5.7 100.0
Professionals 28.0 52.0 16.0 4.0 100.0
_
As for nominations in categories of leadership the
public roles of the judges appear to influence their nominations.
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Table 6.6 shows that 'judges' who are closer to the government (the 
politicians and the administrators) make more nominations in the 
Communal leadership category than those who are further away (the 
journalists and the professionals). As is to be expected the 
'judges' who are politicians are more familiar with communal 
leaders; hence the high proportion of their nominations in the 
Communal category« But a similarly high proportion of nominations 
in this category by the administrators is less expected though not 
inexplicable« Again the communalization of politics and its impact 
on the leadership structure cannot but affect the administrators 
as much as the politicians« In both cases they are brought closer 
to the traditional sector of the society than would otherwise have 
been the case« Correspondingly it is interesting to note that the 
proportions of their nominations in the Westernized category are 
comparatively smaller than those of the journalists and the 
professionals.
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Table 6.6
’Judges'' Public Roles 5 Categories of Leadership.
'Judges'' 
Public Roles
Categories of Leadership
I
Total
General Westernized Communal
Politicians No: 59 32 118 209
% : 28.2 15.3 56.5 100
Administrators No: 34 14 44 92
% : 37.0 15.2 47.8 100
Journalists No: 62 21 40 123
% : 50.4 17.1 32.5 100
Professionals No: 27 18 30 75
% : 36.0 24.0 40.0 100
Therefore if the proposition that the politicians and 
the administrators are more central to the governing process than 
the journalists and the professionals can be accepted, the data 
in Table 6.6 confirm the saliency of Communal leadership. There 
is too a further dimension: not only is the saliency appreciated
within the communities but also among those who have the most to 
do with the process of government. This being the case those who 
are in positions of formal authority, especially the civil servants, 
do not challenge those in positions of informal influence. In 
fact, the latter often find themselves playing the role 
of 'political brokers' between the administration and the
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masses.
Perception of Leadership Factors:
An earlier summary of the factors attribution of the 
‘judges’ reveals that 76 per cent of the nominations are credited 
with 'Involvemento' This is followed by 63 per cent for ’Decision- 
making,' 62 per cent for ’Respect,’ 35 per cent for 'Wealth' and 
29 per cent for 'Skill»’ This pattern is not surprising in the 
light of the observations made so far» If leaders are generally 
close to the masses it is only logical to expect that a most 
important factor in leadership is involvement with the masses»
There are, however, two broad exceptions to the overall pattern»
Firstly, the Chinese and Eurasian ‘judges' consider 
'Respect' to be more frequently a base of leadership than 'Decision- 
making,' Secondly, 'Wealth' is the least frequently attributed 
of the five factors by the Chinese 'judges,' As can be seen in 
Table 6.7 below, this is not because they consider this factor any 
less important since their percentage attribution of it is greater 
than all but that of the Indian 'judges;' rather it is accounted 
for by their greater frequency of attribution of 'Skills,'
36
36» Cf, Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, 
op, cit,, pp, 30-1. However, Pye generalizes that 'The 
political process operates largely without political "brokers,'"
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Table 6.7
Factor Attributions by Racial Background of
’Judges' and Nominees.
Racial Background Per Cent of Nominations with Attributions of:
'Judges' Nominees Wealth D - M Skill Respect Involvement
Malay 20,4 67.4 8.2 45.8 74.0
Chinese 47.5 49.2 16.4 45.9 57.4
MALAY Indian 26.7 66.7 20.0 20.0 60.0
Others 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3
All 33.1 56.7 13.4 42.5 63.0
Malay 18.7 60.4 22.9 64.6 75.0
Chinese 42.9 70.1 44.2 72.7 72.7
CHINESE Indian 34.8 82.6 52.2 78.3 73.9
Others 0.0 0.0 100,0 50.0 0.0
All 33,3 68.0 39.3 70.7 72.7
Malay 26.1 71.7 10.9 69.6 91.3
Chinese 54.7 73.6 50.9 62.3 81.1
INDIAN Indian 33.3 75.0 50,0 41.7 83.3
Others 25.0 25.0 100,0 75.0 50.0
All 39.4 71.7 37.8 61.4 84.3
Malay 0.0 64.3 7.1 92.9 92.9
Chinese 45.6 54.4 24.6 68.4 91.2
EURASIAN Indian 25.0 56.2 6.3 81.3 93.7
Others 0.0 50.0 75.0 87.5 62.5
All 31.6 55.8 23.2 75.8 89.5
All
'Judges'
All
Nominees 34 „5 63.7 29.3 62.1 76.4
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How do the attributions of the ’judges’ differ according 
to the racial background of their nominees? Or, to ask a more 
concrete question, do Malay 'judges' see Chinese leadership based 
on a different pattern of factors from Chinese 'judges,' and vice 
versa? Field observations indicate that this is likely to be the 
case. For example, Malays and Indians often consider that wealth 
is more important in Chinese leadership than do the Chinese.
The overall distribution of the attributions categorized according 
to the racial backgrounds of the 'judges' and nominees is given in 
Table 6.7 „ Here it can be seen that the Malay 'judges' consider 
Malay leadership to be predominantly based on 'Involvement' and 
'Decision-making'; they also think that very few Malays command 
leadership on account of 'Skill.' This view of Malay leadership 
is apparently not held exactly by the Chinese ’judges'; they think 
that more Malay leaders have 'Respect' and 'Skill' than the Malay 
'judges' are willing to concede. Conversely Malay 'judges' 
consider 'Wealth' to be the third most frequent factor of Chinese 
leadership while Chinese 'judges' attribute it the least. There 
is no doubt however that all our 'judges' agree that it is 
comparatively more important in Chinese leadership than others.
It is interesting to note that both the Malay and the 
Chinese 'judges' concur in attributing 'Decising-makmg' as the 
most common base of Indian leadership. The Indian and the
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Eurasian 'judges' disagree with this view. According to them 
Indian leaders are no different from Chinese or Malay leaders in 
depending mostly on 'Involvement.'
Outside of the Eurasian 'judges' there is a general 
consensus that 'Skill' is the most frequent base of leadership for 
the residual category of 'Others,' and the factor of 'Wealth' is 
the least significant, comparatively and absolutely.
So, once again, it is noticeable that the 'judges' 
perceive differently when it comes to the hierarchy of factors 
responsible for leadership among the leaders of the various 
communities. However, there is a broad agreement that the leader­
ship in Penang is not one of skill (professional qualification), 
nor is it one of economic power. Rather it is based on those 
values, such as involvement, participation in decision-making 
and respect, which do not systematically prejudice the 'leadership 
chances' of those who are either not very well off or not very well 
educated. The leadership structure predicated upon these 
considerations simply cannot be a monolithic one, if in fact this 
has not been obvious before.
Categories of Leadership and Leadership Factors:
It is to be expected that nominees in the most important 
category of leadership, viz. General, should receive proportionately
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more attributions of the leadership factors than those in the 
Westernized and Communal categories. This is, in fact, the case 
as shown in Table 6.8 below; the noticeable exception being the 
comparatively high proportion of attribution of 'Skill' in the 
Westernized category.
Table 6.8
Leadership Categories by Race of
Nominees and Leadership Factors.
Leadership Nominees' Per Cent of Nominations with Attributions of:
Category Race Wealth D - M Skill Respect Involvement
GENERAL Malay 23.9 78.3 21.7 82.6 84.8
Chinese 44.0 74.0 40.0 78.0 88.0
Indian 37.5 81.3 18.8 81.3 96.9
Others 25.0 25.0 50.0 100.0 100.0
All 37.4 75.3 31.9 80.2 89.0
WESTERNIZED Malay 15.4 61.6 23.1 61.5 30.8
Chinese 37.2 62.8 62.8 62.8 48.8
Indian 0.6 87.5 62.5 50.0 62.5
Others 0.0 30.8 84.6 61.5 30.8
All 22.4 62.4 60.0 60.0 45.9
COMMUNAL Malay 17.6 60.8 7.2 53.6 85.6
Chinese 54.3 50.5 17.1 48.6 73.3
Indian 36.7 53.3 40.0 33.3 66.7
Others
— — — — —
All 36.6 55.2
—
16.0 48.7 77.6
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Comparing the patterns of factor attribution between 
leadership categories it is interesting to note that the General 
and Communal categories have almost the same pattern. 'Involvement* 
is the most frequently attributed factor for General as well as 
Communal leadership, followed by 'Respect' in the former and 
'Decision-making' in the latter. Next comes 'Wealth,' with 
'Skill' being the least attributed factor for both categories.
In each instance, however, there is a higher frequency of 
attribution of factors in the General than the Communal category.
In fact the differences in terms of proportions constitute a basis 
for speculating about the bases of both types of leadership. It 
seems that General leaders command very much more respect (80 per 
cent compared to 49 per cent for Communal leaders) and twice the 
'amount' of skill. Other than these two factors it seems that the 
bases for General and Communal leadership are very much the same. 
Although the data cannot sustain this point properly, field 
observations appear to suggest that the higher frequency of 
reliance on 'Respect* by the General leaders is a result of cross­
community deference. So, in effect, General leaders command 
respect in their own communities as well as in the other communities. 
As a corollary, those who cannot command respect 
in communities other than their own are likely to remain Communal 
leaders. In the case of 'Skill' the explanation for the 
difference between General and Communal leadership is probably
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a straight-forward one: General leaders are those who have
sufficient training to permit them to perform comfortably in 
the modern sector of government, administration and general 
public affairsc This, of course, is in addition to their 
credentials in their respective communities. The other three 
factors - 'Wealth,' 'Decision-making,' and 'Involvement' - do 
not appear to be pivotal in determining the difference between 
General or Communal leadership status.
It is noticeable that the pattern of factor attribution 
for Westernized leadership is very different from the other two 
types of leadership, Here 'Skill,' 'Decision-making' and 'Respect' 
seem to be the most common bases. 'Wealth' is also the least 
frequently attributed factor. And less than half of the 
nominations carry the attribution of 'Involvement.' Westernized 
leaders, therefore, do not seem to be very much 'involved.'
In spite of this they still command a fairly high level of respect 
largely, one suspects, on account of their education and professions 
In a sense the communalization of politics and its consequences 
for the leadership structure have not totally excluded the local 
professionals from the pale of influence. Those among them who 
achieve leadership status do seem to rely to a considerable extent 
on their 'modern' background. They are different from their 
counterparts in other societies in that they neither dominate
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nor monopolize the leadership positions in the society.
Within each category of leadership there are some 
variations between the relative proportions of attributed 
factors categorized according to the racial background of the 
nominees. In the General category the factor attributions for 
the Malay nominees reveal an interesting pattern. According to 
the 'judges' they depend considerably upon 'Involvement,' 'Respect' 
and 'Decision-making' and only minimally upon 'Wealth' or 'Skill.' 
To what extent is this a function of the characteristics of the 
Malay community as a whole is difficult to say. The data are 
obviously incapable of sustaining such a hypothesise But we 
know that the Malay community in comparison with the Chinese or 
Indian community is not as wealthy, nor is the level of attainment 
of western education as high, Probably on account of these the 
absence of wealth and/or western education is not too severe a 
handicap for Malay aspirants of leadership status. But the same 
cannot be said of the Chinese nominees in the General category.
By and large all the factors are cited fairly frequently.
Certainly they depend upon 'Wealth' and 'Skill' more often than 
the Malay nominees. As for the Indian nominees the pattern of 
factor attribution for them is more like that of the Malay than 
the Chinese nominees. Rather surprisingly less than a fo,fth of 
them are credited with dependence upon 'Skill.'
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So in spite of the fact that General leadership implies 
general influence in the society at large there is no homogeneity 
in the factors which promote such a status, To be sure 
’Involvement,' 'Respect' and 'Decision-making' appear to be crucial 
determinants, but 'Wealth' and 'Skill' do not.
Moving on to the Westernized category it is suggested 
that the Malay nominees depend most frequently upon 'Decision- 
making' and 'Respect' for their status. But for the Chinese 
nominees these two factors plus 'Skill' are important, For both 
the Malay and the Chinese nominees 'Involvement' is not a hallmark 
of westernized leadership. This contrasts sharply with the 
Indian nominees, more than half of whom are credited with depending 
on 'Involvement,' As a matter of fact they are deemed to depend 
on all factors except 'Wealth' which is hardly mentioned in their 
case,
As for the nominations in the Communal category the 
most infrequently cited factors for the Malays are 'Skill' and 
'Wealth,' The former is also the factor which the Chinese communal 
leaders are considered to depend on the least. However, in sharp 
contrast to the Malay nominees they are credited with 'Wealth' more 
than half the time. This confirms observations made in the field 
that wealth and Chinese communal leadership are closely
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integrated. This is also partly true for Indian communal 
leadership, especially if a comparison of the attribution of 
’Wealth* between the Indian nominees in the Communal and the 
Westernized categories is made. Furthermore a comparatively 
higher proportion of the Indian nominees also receive the 
attribution of 'Skill' when this is the least frequently mentioned 
factor in the Communal category.
All these comparisons suggest that leadership from 
each of the three main racial communities depend on different 
hierarchies of factors for their status. On account of this 
it is reasonable to suggest that the internal characteristics, 
particularly the values, of each community exert an influence on 
the leadership recruitment process. For example, our data suggest 
that a Malay can be a leader without too much dependence on 'Skill' 
or 'Wealth.' But an Indian can hardly be without depending on 
one or the other factor. Similarly a Chinese leader appears to 
rely more on 'Wealth' or even connection with wealth than either 
a Malay or an Indian leader.
37. Although 'Wealth' is less frequently attributed to the Chinese 
nominees in the General and Westernized categories compared to 
the Communal category this frequency is still higher for them 
than for the other nominees in the respective categories.
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It is noticeable that levels or categories of leadership 
exert some influence on the factors supporting leadership. But 
this does not reach the extent of 'prescribing' leadership factors 
which cut across community lines. By and large certain common 
factors underline the status of all leaders, such as 'Involvement' 
and 'Decision-making.' But there are enough variations between 
the different racial communities to suggest that hierarchies of 
social values in these communities are significant. The theoretical 
implication here is very important. It means that the different 
levels of social achievement between the communities do not 
systematically preclude some members of each community from 
achieving leadership status in the society. Had there been a 
homogeneous set of requirements for leadership it is both con­
ceivable and likely that one or another of the communities would 
find itself systematically prejudiced. If, for example, English 
and/or tertiary education is a sine qua non for leadership the Malay 
community will be at a disadvantage. A different factor may have 
a similar impact on a different community. But different factors 
or values are of different significance in terms of leadership.
It is because of this that the leadership opportunity of the 
members of the various communities is not unduly restricted by 
extra-community requirements. This both results from and reinforces 
the compartmentalization of the leadership structure, and no doubt 
also contributes to its general stability. No community, therefore,
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questions the credentials of the leaders of another community;
least of all does any leader belonging to one community question
the credentials of his counterparts belonging to a different
community, This then explains the modus operandi whereby no
3 8attempt at cross-community influence is made.
Another implication which derives from this point is 
that each community tends to view the leaders differently. Some 
of the other reasons which contribute to the ambiguity in the 
perceptions of leadership by the various communities have already 
been mentioned. Here we need only add the point that, given the 
different leadership factors which reflect the different values 
of the communities, each community tends to estimate differently 
the significance of those leaders who belong to a different 
communityo If wealth is seen by the Chinese to be an important 
requirement of leadership then the lack of it on the part of Malay 
or Indian leaders would logically lead them to underrate their 
significance. This has the comfortable consequence of making
38., This point is even appreciated by the bureaucrats. On several 
occasions when I observed them in public activities in the 
rural areas it was clear that the most prominent roles were 
always performed by those whose racial backgrounds were the same 
as the majority of their audiences. Thus, for example, in a 
public information campaign in a 'Chinese' area the Chinese 
officials were more prominent than their Malay departmental 
head, and they did most of the talking.
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one believe what one wants to believe about the leadership structure,
To summarize, it may be said that perceptions of leader­
ship are functions of various factors or various combination of 
factors which operate to condition people's attitudes and orien­
tations o In this chapter we have resorted to what may be considered 
a less elegant but infinitely more feasible technique of drawing 
inferences on this score. The data obtained through the 
nominations, categorizations and attributions made by the panel of 
'judges' cannot, obviously, prove anything. If, as we have suggested, 
there is a significant element of ambiguity in the perceptions of 
leadership, it is this very quality which makes a more direct 
approach to the problem difficult. But the indirect approach 
adopted affords an analysis of the role such an ambiguity plays in 
generating support for the leadership structure„
So long as the different and often contradictory images 
of leadership are not challenged it does not matter much who 
actually have what amount of power in Penang. If there are 
inconsistencies in these images they are difficult to expose in a 
society which is as divided at the bottom as it is 'united' at the 
top. What is necessary is the precondition that each community 
does not consider itself deprived or prejudiced. The leaders 
themselves are very reluctant to make any cross-community claims of
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influence and authority lest they expose any discrepancy between 
39them. As a result, the leaders from any one community are
viewed by their co-members as real but by non-members as symbolic,,
Certainly such a predisposition is propagated by the leaders
themselves within the context of the broad understanding that they
must not interfere in another community’s affairs. Such an
understanding precludes any suggestion that the leaders are not what
40they appear to be to the members of their own community. However 
the leadership structure in Penang cannot be considered to be under­
pinned by these matters alone.
Our attempt to gauge the dimensions of leadership 
perceptions through the exercise performed by the ’judges’ reveals 
that the discrepancies in perception are not without their functional 
impact. Generally these discrepancies can take one of two forms,
The leaders of one community can be viewed as more numerous and/or
39, Thus the real challenge to the established elites arises from 
within the communities and is mounted by those who aspire to 
leadership positions. This is particularly the case in the 
Chinese community in Penang. Here the challenge is not on 
the basis that the established Chinese leaders are not 
influential but that they are not adequately representing the 
interests of the Chinese community.
40, We are reminded that ’If men define situations as real they
are real in their consequences,' Cited in Lewis A. Coser, 
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The
Free Press, 1967), p. 212.
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more influential by their own community than by another. Or the
opposite can be the case. Our data hint that both forms are
present in Penang. In terms of the number of leaders each
community, as reflected in the 'judges'' nominations, appears to
believe that the leadership structure consists more of its leaders
than other communities would concede. This can best be seen in 
41the graph on the following page. But in terms of the factors 
considered to underline the leaders' positions each community seems 
not to under-estimate the possession of these factors on the part 
of the leaders belonging to the other communities. The most 
dramatic example of this is the opinion of the Chinese 'judges' on 
the possession of 'Skill' by Malay leaders. The Malay 'judges'
41. The relative positions of the bars are the same if they are 
drawn according to the average number of nominations per 
'judge.' This can be deduced from the following table:
'Judges' Nominees
Chinese Malay Indian Others All Nominees
Chinese 15.4 9.6 4.6 0.4 30.0
Malay 15.3 12.0 3.8 0.8 31.8
Indian 17.7 15.3 8.0 1.3 42.3
Eurasian 28.5 7.0 8.0 4.0 47.5
All
'Judges' 17.7 11.1 5.6 1.2 35.6
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on the panel attribute this factor to only eight per cent of their
Malay nominees, whereas the Chinese 'judges' attribute it to 23
42per cent of their Malay nominees. Similarly the Indian 'judges' 
generally over-estimate the possession of leadership factors on the 
part of their Chinese nominees as compared to the attributions of 
the Chinese 'judges.' This over-estimation is reciprocated by the 
Chinese 'judges' in the case of their Indian nominees. Thus while 
the 'judges' tend to view the leadership structure as including 
a higher proportion of leaders from their own communities, they do 
not at the same time attribute higher proportions of leadership 
factors to them. This is somewhat surprising, but surely con­
tributes to the general acceptance of the leadership structure on 
an inter-community basis.
The differential perceptions of leadership between the 
racial communities are, therefore, at once logically contradictory 
and yet pragmatically compatible. They have been most useful in 
suggesting why the plural society in Penang can have, in a sense, 
a fragmented leadership structure and yet be able to avoid the 
logically divisive consequences arising from it* Such an 
'equilibrium,' however, is always threatened whenever either of the
42. See supra, Table 6.7.
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two main communities, the Chinese and the Malay, feels that its 
interests are no longer served. In the case of Penang such a 
feeling is present among the urban Chinese. Through the 
instrumentality of electoral competition they threaten to upset 
the prevailing ’system.’
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CHAPTER VII
THE POTENTIAL LEADERS: STUDENTS’ POLITICAL CULTURE
312
Introduction:
Elites are more dominant in developing than industrialized 
countries largely- because comparatively their rank is small and less 
complex. As a rule they exercise greater discretionary powers even 
though, paradoxically, their ability to get things done is limited. 
Their political prominence derives from the newness of the national 
institutions and the weakness of national political traditions. 
Another factor is the greater visibility of the elites vis-a-vis 
other countervailing groups in the society, It may be said that 
one of the problems in new nations is the 'participation gap.' By 
this we mean that only a very small proportion of the population is 
involved or wants to be involved in public affairs. Typically a 
large majority feels a sense of incompetence. In this sense elites 
are predominant because they are permitted to be so by the masses. 
The now too familiar notion of the elite-mass gap implies that the 
political mass man of the new nations has a parochial or subjective 
rather than a participant orientation,'*' The predominant influence 
of the established elites is therefore partially derived from the 
acquiescence of a large majority of the non-elites, This 
acquiescence, in turn, results from a failure to perceive the
1 . Cf„ Gabriel A, Almond and Sydney Verba, op, cit„, pp. 17-26.
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relevance of politics to their lives. Such a situation, however 
2is not static. Indeed certain concepts of political development
3
are built around the notion that this is not so„
If political development implies mobilization and 
participation, then certain groups are bound to be mobilized and 
to participate in the political process much earlier than others.
Of these the student population of the developing countries has
4been singled out as a crucial sector. Not only does the educational 
system perform a political socialization function more important 
than other social institutions'* and directly prepare students for
2. For a classic study on this see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of
Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958) .
3. Such as, for example, the concept of political development as 
increasing participation and mobilization. Cf. Lucian W, Pye, 
"The Concept of Political Development," The Annals, vol, 358 
(March, 1965), pp. 1-13.
4. Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, "The Political Behaviour of University
Students in Developing Nations," Social and Economic Studies, 
vol. XIV (March, 1965), pp. 35-75" See also David Easton and 
Robert D. Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in Seymour M. 
Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds,, Culture and Social Character 
(New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp, 226-51; Daniel Goldrich,
Sons of the Establishment (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); and
James S„ Coleman, ed„, Education and Political Development 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) .
5. On a relevant point James S, Coleman says that a ' „„„ striking
feature of the political socialization process in most of the 
developing countries is that the formal educational system bears 
a much heavier load of socialization than it does in older 
countries.' Ibid., p. 22, Cf. Robert Levine, "Political 
Socialization and Culture Change," in Clifford Geertz, ed ,,
op. cit,, pp. 280-303.
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participation, it also enables them to take up elite positions after 
graduation
If students are the potential elites or at least the future 
active participants, what about them is of research interest? There 
are obviously many things one can study about students in the context 
of new nations. Being accessible, comprehending, articulate,
intellectually involved and willing they constitute a natural target
7
for field researchers» As such they have been studied for their
8ideals and ambitions, as participants in a special socialization
6, See Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., op» cit», Part III 
("Education and Elite Formation: The University") and Part IV
("Secondary Schools"), pp, 343-513,
This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no field 
constraints on the direction of research, In countries where 
student activism has been banned one may not even be allowed to 
interview students or conduct a survey among them» Typically 
too social science research in new nations is not properly 
understood by those in authority, and the success or failure of 
gaining access to people or material is often conditioned by a 
host of factors such as one*s nationality, ethnic background m  
the case of plural society, personal diplomacy, ingenuity and 
resourcefulness, language, academic institution and open 
manifestation of status» In the last respect it is perhaps 
germane to mention that access to and co-operation from the 
bureaucratic and political elites in Malaysia are more forth­
coming if the researcher can manifest equivalent material status» 
Personal experience corroborated by another researcher indicates 
that the wearing of a tie, for example, is essential»
8 , See Julian Wohl and Josef Silverstem, "The Burmese University
Student: An Approach to Personality and Subculture," The Public
Opinion Quarterly, vol, XXX, No, 2 (Summer, 1966), pp, 237-48»
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9 10process, as battlers for political causes, as reflectors of
national political orientations,^  and, more generally, as politically 
12active groups. But as far as it can be determined there have
been few attempts to investigate systematically the political
13orientations or political culture of the students. If students 
are the future political activists then a systematic study of their
9. See Dwaine Marvick, "African University Students: A Presumptive
Elite," in James S. Coleman, ed„, op„ cit,, pp, 463-97,
10. See, for example, Michiya Shinbori, "Zengakuren: A Japanese
Case Study of a Student Political Movement," Sociology of 
Education, vol. 37, No, 3 (1964), pp, 229-53; Stanley Spector, 
"Students and Politics in Singapore," Far Eastern Survey, vol, 
XXV, No. 5 (May, 1956), pp. 65-73; and E. Tierno Galvan,
"Student Opposition in Spain," Government and Opposition, vol, 1, 
No, 4 (July-September, 1966), pp, 467-86.
11. See Daniel Goldrich, op. cit.
12. See S. Walter Washington, "Student Politics in Latin America:
The Venezuelan Example," Foreign Affairs, vol, 37, No, 3 (April, 
1959), pp. 463-73; W.A, Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," 
Asian Survey, vol. 3, No. 12 (December 1963), pp. 584-95; and 
Michaya Shinbori, "Comparison between Pre and Post-War Student 
Movements in Japan," Sociology of Education, vol. 37, No. 1 
(1963), pp. 59-70. See also "Students and Politics," Daedalus, 
vol. 97, No. 1, (Winter, 1968).
13. The exceptions known to me are the two studies undertaken by
Daniel Goldrich. See his books Sons of the Establishment, 
op, cit,, and Radical Nationalism: The Political Orientations
of Panamanian Law Students (East Lansing: Bureau of Social
and Political Research, Michigan State University, 1961),
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political culture will permit us to estimate their future relation­
ship to processes of political change,
An indication of the possibility of surveying the 
political orientations of the students in Penang came in a general 
discussion on current affairs with a group of them. This led to 
an agreement with their teachers to assign them a class essay on 
the general topic of government and politics. Not unexpectedly 
the essays revealed that they were generally dissatisfied and 
disenchanted with things political. The commonest complaint was 
against corruption and self-serving public officials. Con­
comitantly they also felt that intelligence and far-sightedness 
were not applied often enough to the formation and application of 
public policies. Other views and attitudes were more amorphous and 
personal. As a result it was decided to undertake a more systematic 
survey of the students' political culture. The subsequent analysis 
of the survey data is partly informed by the contents of their essays
Briefly, the concept of political culture used in the
survey follows that developed by Almond and Verba in The Civic 
14Culture. For Almond and Verba political culture consists of a
14, The broad theoretical framework for the application of this 
concept here has been spelt out in Chapter I»
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three dimensional orientation towards four major political objects. 
The three dimensions are derived from Parsons and ShiIs^  and 
consist of (1) cognitive orientation, (2) affective orientation, and 
(3) evaluational orientation. The four major political objects are 
(1) the political system as general object, (2) the input of the 
system as object, (3) the output of the system as object, and (4) 
self as object.
In this chapter the same three dimensions are adopted but 
the number of major objects is increased from four to five. These 
objects are (1) system as general object, (2) structures and roles 
as object, (3) political incumbents as objects, (4) policies, 
decisions and their enforcement as object, and (5) self as object.
The reason for increasing the major political objects 
about which we seek to map the orientations of the students is 
essentially to make the concept more precise and meaningful. There 
are intuitive reasons to suspect that the students do not understand 
the meaning and implication of such social science terminology as 
'input and output.' This is not to say that they fully comprehend 
such other terms as 'structures and roles' and 'policies, decisions
15. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Towards a General 
Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1951), pp. 53 ff.
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and their enforcement.’ At least this matter of comprehension 
was originally thought to be problematic; and the administration 
of the survey included special attention to this problem.
Thus the concept of political culture is defined here 
as the spectrum of cognitive, affective and evaluational 
orientations towards the five major political objects.
The Methodology of the Survey:
For reasons mentioned above it was decided that the 
survey could most efficaciously be conducted among students who 
had completed their secondary education. This would minimize 
the problem of comprehension. Moreover it would be unreasonable 
to expect students still in secondary schools to respond meaning­
fully to the kinds of questions in the survey. As it were, these 
twin problems of comprehension and developed political attitudes 
could not be taken for granted even among the students of this 
survey.
The survey was conducted in five schools in Penang with 
post-secondary Sixth form classes. In each instance it took about 
an hour and a quarter to administer. It was stressed that students 
should not write their names on the questionnaire, an assurance 
of anonymity which probably removed many students’ reluctance to
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participate in the survey. Each student was given a questionnaire 
with two pages. The first page sought information on their socio­
economic background, the newspapers they read, race, sex and interest
in politics. The second page had a matrix of 15 squares which they
16had to fill in in response to 15 questions orally delivered.
Very few students found difficulty in providing the information 
sought in the first page of the questionnaire. For the second 
page explanations were given as to how to respond to the questions 
asked. Students were told that for each question they should 
answer either positively (with a plus sign), or negatively (with a 
minus sign) or indicate they were neutral/indifferent (with a zero 
sign) or that they had no opinion (with 'N.O. ').
The 15 questions to which students were asked to summarize 
their response are as follows, the notations being the same as those
16. The matrix appears like this:
Cognitive
Orientation
Affective
Orientation
Evaluational
Orientation
1A IB 1C
2A 2B 2C
3A 3B 3C
4A 4B 4C
5A 5B 5C
320
in the matrix:
1A How much do you know of the characteristics of the 
nation and the state in general, their history, 
size, location, power, constitution and the like?
IB What are your feelings towards these characteristics?
1C What are your more or less considered opinions and 
judgement of them?
2A How much do you know about the structures of 
government and of politics, such as the Agong, 
Federal Parliament, Federal ministries, State 
assemblies, City Council, Rural District Councils, 
the electoral system, political parties, newspapers, 
etc „ ?
2B What are your feelings towards these structures?
2C What are your more or less considered opinion and 
judgement of them?
3A Do you know who occupy what offices at the Federal 
level, the State level, local government level, and 
in the various political parties?
3B How are you affected by these people and their per­
formances?
3C Do you think, that they are qualified and well-moti­
vated people?
4A Are you familiar with the policies, decisions and 
enforcement measures of the government?
4B What are your feelings towards these?
4C How would you evaluate them?
5A Do you think you can be a participant in the political 
process? What do you know of your rights, obligations 
and avenues of influence?
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5B How do you feel about your capabilities?
5C How do you evaluate your capabilities?
At this juncture it is useful to elaborate on the 
meaning of the students* responses to the questions put to them.
It should be noted at the outset that their responses were direct 
'summary* answers recorded by them and were not derived from an 
extended questionnaire seeking indirectly to determine their 
political orientations,, The latter, of course, would have been a 
very much more preferable procedure but field constraints clearly 
prevented its feasibility.,^
All the 'A' questions (such as 1A, 2A, 3A, etc.) seek 
information on their knowledge of political objects. A plus sign 
is meant to indicate that on the whole they know more rather than 
less about the particular class of political objects; a minus sign 
implies the opposite,
17. For one thing a long questionnaire with more specific questions 
would have taken more time to administer» This alone would 
have been objected to by the authorities concerned. Clearly 
the schools would not have co-operated if the survey were to 
take more than two 40 minutes class periods» Furthermore since 
participation was on a voluntary basis a more detailed 
questionnaire was likely to be answered only by those who were 
keenly political. Such a sample would be most unrepresentative.
322
Similarly the ' B ' questions seek to discover their 
affective orientation, or their emotional reaction as it were, to 
the political objects. Here the alternative responses are positive, 
negative, indifferent/neutral or no opinion. For subsequent 
purposes the latter two are treated as the same. The 'C* questions 
which tap their evaluation of the political objects are also opened 
to the same spectrum of alternative responses.
Now it should be clear that this survey is not without 
its limitations. No claim can logically be made other than the 
fact that crude as it is it nonetheless permits us to draw the broad 
outlines of the students' political culture. Even though the survey 
is more subjective than objective there is no reason to suspect that 
the answers were not consciously objective.^
18. In any case the instructions given to the students included 
requests of conscious striving for objectivity. When the 
questionnaires were completed they were again requested not 
to submit them if they were doubtful about the accuracy of 
their responses therein. This is not to argue that in a 
survey objectivity can be fully substituted by the voluntary 
co-operation of the respondents. But under the present 
circumstances, as previously explained, the procedure adopted 
seemed to be the optimum solution. The extent to which this 
request was followed was not determined for fear of contam­
inating the atmosphere of confidence. This was just as well 
since word about the survey soon got around to the other 
schools after the visit to the first one.
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The Population of the Survey:
The population of this survey is the Sixth Form students 
19in Penang. In the educational system of Malaysia the Sixth
Form is two years of post-secondary education, the successful
completion of which earns the student a Higher School Certificate.
This Certificate is an essential requirement for entry into the
20University of Malaya as well as the University of Singapore.
This implies that only the brighter students can find places in the
Sixth Form. Sixth Form education is conducted in English hitherto
but this does not mean that only students from English secondary
schools can enter the Sixth Form. In our total sample of 735 
21respondents, 151, or just over 20 per cent, reported that they had 
received their secondary education in Chinese schools and 22 were 
partly educated in Malay. The rest, 562, were from English 
secondary schools.
19. For a succinct account of the development of the educational
system in Malaya see T.H. Silcock, "The Role of Education in 
the Political and Economic Development of Southeast Asia," in 
Don C. Piper and Taylor Cole, eds., Post-Primary Education and 
Political and Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1964), pp. 200-30.
20. It has been estimated that about 66% of the Sixth Form students 
of Malaya continue on to university. See Doh Soon Sue, "The 
Estimated Student Population of the University of Malaya," 
(Academic Exercise, Department of Economics, University of 
Malaya, 1962), p. 43.
21. Total number of questionnaires returned is 746, but 11 were 
found to be spoilt.
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The racial composition of these students is as shown in 
the table below:
Table 7.1
Racial Composition of Sixth Form Students
No. Per Cent.
Malay 52 (165,092) 7.07 (28.86)
Chinese 649 (327,240) 88.30 (57.20)
Indian/
Ceylonese/
Pakistani
29 ( 69,035) 3.95 (12.07)
Others 5 ( 10,733) 0.68 ( 1.88)
TOTAL 735 (572,100) 100 (100.01)
Note: Figures and percentages in parenthesis are for
the general population of the state according 
to the 1957 Census»
It is clear from the table that of the three major racial 
groups the Chinese is disproportionately represented» Speculatively 
this appears to be a function of several demographic and 
educational factors. Other sociological and psychological 
factors may also contribute to the racial 'imbalance* in the Sixth
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Form student population. But the survey was not geared towards 
delineating these factors. Instead it sought information on the 
family background of the students.
The Family Background of the Students:
Generally speaking Sixth Form education is within the
means of most urban families. There is an increase in school fees
from secondary school but the opportunity of securing a scholarship
for further studies, now almost limited to those students who go
through the Sixth Form, more than offsets it. Indeed the cost of
continuing on after one has formally completed secondary school
23lies in the income foregone for not getting a job. In recent
years there is also a tendency for those with the necessary 
abilities to obtain Sixth Form qualification as a matter of course.
22. It is perhaps relevant to mention here that no systematic 
research has been done on the differences of opportunity in 
a host of fields - political, economic and educational - 
between the various racial communities. For a recent debate 
on the factors contributing to this imbalance but referring 
specifically to the Malays see Brian K. Parkinson, "Economic 
Retardation of the Malays," Modern Asian Studies, vol. 1, Pt,
1 (January, 1967), pp. 31 -46"; William Wilder, "Islam, other 
Factors and Malay backwardness: Comments on an Argument,"
Ibid., vol. II, Pt. 2 (April, 1968), pp. 155-64; and Brian 
K. Parkinson, "The Economic Retardation of the Malays - A 
Rejoinder," Ibid., vol. II, Pt. 3 (July, 1968), pp. 267-72.
23. To be sure, some continue on to Sixth Form primarily because 
they are unable to secure satisfactory jobs. This and other 
subsequent generalizations unsupported by data are informed
by my personal knowledge and experiences.
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For these reasons the survey population is not expected to come 
only from rich families,
This is indicated by their fathers' occupations presented 
in the table below:
Table 7.2
Fathers' Occupations.
No. Per Cent
Profession 87 11.8
Executive/Managerial 28 3,8
Commerce * 227 30.9
Clerical/Technical 166 22.6
Agriculture 16 2.2
Unskilled 57 7.8
Retired 48 6,5
Deceased 54 7.4
No answer 52 7 c 0
TOTAL 735 100,0
* Including salesmen and shopkeepers,,
If one assumes that the occupations of the fathers 
generally reflect the economic status of the family then the 
conclusion can be drawn that Sixth Form education is not a
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preserve of the upper economic classes. This generalization is 
partly supported by the data on the education of the fathers.
Just over half of the students reported that their fathers had 
received education at the secondary level; slightly over 10 per 
cent reported their fathers as having college or university 
education. But nearly 24 per cent of the fathers only had primary 
level education and two per cent had no formal education whatsoever. 
So a large majority of the students were already receiving higher 
education than their fathers.
The occupations and education of the fathers indicate that 
the students are likely to be socially more mobile and to pursue 
better paid occupations than their fathers. Are the students, 
however, by this token likely to be more politically active than 
they? The survey elicited certain information which could be used 
to suggest an answer.
To begin with, the students as a whole surprisingly
reported a higher proportion of their fathers interested in politics
24than of themselves. Two observations immediately suggested
24. Albeit, both cases were reported by the students themselves.
Even if they did not accurately report their fathers' political 
disposition this statistic is meaningful in that they would 
like to have their fathers interested in politics. Such a 
desirable norm must surely condition their own attitude to 
politics.
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themselves. In the first place politics is generally considered to
be a man’s activity and the students' responses here might merely be
projecting this norm. This is reflected in their report about their
mothers’ interest in politics. While there were 471 fathers
25interested in politics, there were only 173 mothers. Secondly
the figures on fathers' interest in politics might result from a
response set - in this case the tendency to project one's interest
26in politics to one's father. Certainly the correlation 
between those who reported their own and their fathers' positive
25. The full figures are:
Fathers Mothers
Interested in Politics 471 173
Not interested 148 424
Don't know 62 124
Deceased 54 14
26. Such a syndrome, however, did not operate in the case of 
reports on mothers' interest in politics. This reflects 
the common view that the political arena is no place for 
a woman. See below for the female students' interest in 
politics.
329
27interest in politics is very high0 Since the data were not 
independently obtained it is not possible to generalize about 
the political socialization role and influence of the fathers.
Other information sought on the fathers includes the 
types of newspapers they read, their medium of education, if any, 
their active participation in community affairs, voting and political 
party membership. These factors are examined in turn.
According to the students there is quite a difference 
between them and their parents as far as newspaper reading is 
concerned. This difference can be discerned from the table below:
27. The relevant figures in the cells of the 2 x 2  table for those 
who reported positively or negatively about themselves and their 
fathers are:-
Fathers* interest in politics
Yes No Total
Students’ interest in Yes 353 47 400
politics: No 84 98 182
Total 437 145 582
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Table 7.3
Newspaper Reading.
Nil English
only
English 
plus ano- 
ther lan- 
guage
Chinese
only
Malay
only
Tamil
only
No
Answer
Students 5 551 147 26 1 0 5
Fathers 7 282 58 282 21 3 28
Mothers 155 151 22 237 16 6
_
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If we assume that newspapers tend to influence the world-view of
their readers then the data above indicate that the students are
subjected to influences very different from those of their parents.
While there are only 27 students who read only one of the communal
language presses there are 11 times as many fathers who do just that.
This fact alone probably goes a long way to explain any difference
in political attitudes and perspectives between the students and 
28their fathers. Perhaps the factor which contributes to the 
discrepancy in newspaper readership is the conditioning role of the 
medium of education. Being now taught in the English medium all 
the students are capable of reading the English press and a large 
number of them obviously do. Their fathers, however, are handicapped
28. In the Malaysian context, the English language press alone can 
reasonably be considered as non-communal.
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in this respect and are, therefore, susceptible to the parochial 
influence of the communal language press.
While 76 per cent of the students are educated solely
in the English medium, only 36 per cent of their fathers have been
similarly educated. This implies that many fathers have received
their education in one of the communal language but sent their children
29to English schools. If nothing else the education and newspaper 
readership of the students reflect less of their ethnic background 
than in the case of their fathers. This testifies to the 
homogenizing influence of education through a non-communal medium.
In terms of overt public activities on the part of their
fathers the students reported a fairly meaningful pattern. As
mentioned earlier 64 per cent of their fathers were said to be
interested in politics. The proportion who have voted, however, is
much higher, being 87 per cent, while only 37 per cent have participated
30in community activities.
29, There are 324 fathers who have been solely educated in one of 
the communal languages compared to 151 students partly educated 
in Chinese and 22 students partly educated in Malay. One 
should be cautioned against viewing these comparative figures 
to mean that ’communally’ educated fathers have all sent their 
children to English medium school.
30. Slightly more than 23 per cent of the respondents indicated 
that they were not sure whether or not their fathers had 
participated in community affairs.
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Perhaps the best criterion of involvement in political 
activities is membership of a political party. This is so for 
two reasons. In the first place political parties are relatively 
new organizations and, as such, to belong to one of them is a clear 
indication of political activism. Secondly, unlike the other 
factors asked of the students there is no prevailing norm that says 
that it is desirable to be so identified with a political party. 
This being the case any tendency to portray the father as a civic­
conscious, well-rounded individual is not operative here. When 
asked about their fathers' involvement 33 per cent of them did not 
know whether their fathers were political party members (or if they 
did they did not reveal it), 18 per cent disclosed that their 
fathers belonged to a political party and 41 per cent claimed they 
did not.
The students gave a generally plausible picture of their 
fathers' political activism. The proportions across the board 
may be slightly inflated. But overall the degree of activism in 
the following descending order is not unreasonable:- voting, 
interest in politics, participation in community affairs and 
membership in political parties. Such a pattern is perhaps 
characteristic of the population at large although one suspects that 
the proportions of activism reported are slightly greater than for 
the general public. Even at this stage of their lives the students
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are probably less representative of the general public than their 
fathers. This is particularly so especially if the degree of 
political consciousness of their fathers was over-estimated by 
them. This implies that they thought it desirable to be active.
From this alone it is reasonable to speculate that their 
generation will be more politically active than their fathers.
Another picture which emerges is the disparity of their fathers' 
socio-economic positions in contrast to what is likely to be a 
fairly homogeneous one for them.
Inasmuch as Chinese students are over-represented in the 
survey population it is interesting to note that any parochial 
Chinese attitudes internalized by their fathers are unlikely to 
prevail among them. For, unlike their fathers, they are no longer 
solely educated in Chinese nor read only the Chinese press. Also 
being already better educated than a majority of their fathers the 
students will be more merit-conscious and, as such, be less willing 
to make the kind of political concessions that have helped to 
stabilize the Malaysian plural society to date. One cannot help 
thinking that these generational differences will be very significant 
for the future of Malaysian politics.
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Students* Political Orientations:
It is undeniable that within the Malaysian context racial
and cultural differences play a crucial role in political attitudes
and politics in general. These differences not only determine
political perspectives, they are also the central issues of
31Malaysian politics. This being the case the differences are 
both conditioning and precipitating factors. It will be useful 
to find out whether or not such considerations affect the political 
orientations of the students. Accordingly the data from the survey 
will be presented largely along the racial axis. Also it will be 
interesting to discover whether differences in sex and medium of 
secondary education are correlated with political attitudes,
Before analysing the data it is useful to characterize 
briefly the political environment of the students and their general 
political consciousness as shaped by the political world at large. 
With few exceptions the students were between 18 and 19 years of 
age. Being born after the war they did not live through the trauma 
of the Japanese occupation. It is unlikely, therefore, that the
31. Such as, for example, the question of national language, the 
place of Chinese and Tamil schools, and preferential treatment 
of Malay applicants for governmental jobs and scholarships in 
order to redress their inequality of opportunity vis-a-vis the 
non-Malays. On top of all these, there are the activities 
and pronouncements of communal-oriented political parties.
Cf. Cynthia H. Enloe, op, cit.
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Japanese period had any lasting political impact on them, Neither
is it likely that the ’Malaysian Union' period - perhaps the most
politically aroused period in Malayan history hitherto - had
influenced their subsequent political consciousness. Developments
32in this period clearly conditioned subsequent internal politics, 
but it is difficult to argue that the students could have been 
consciously analytical about them.
The next landmark of Malaysian politics is the Emergency. 
Since the Emergency began in 1948 and was not declared officially 
over until 1960 it was the first major political event about which 
the students have some personal knowledge. Even so it is rash to 
assume anything more than that they probably have the notion of the 
political illegality of communism. To them the periodic violence 
was the outstanding feature, As such the impact of the Emercency 
on the political perspectives of the students can be said to be 
minimal.
More recent political events naturally have a greater 
impact, not only because of the time factor but also on account of 
the nature of these events. The first of these was the achievement
32. See K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in 
Malaya, op. cit., esp. pp, 43-57,
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of independence in 1957. At this time all the student respondents
were in their third or fourth year of formal schooling and were*
therefore, in one way or another involved in organized celebrations
33of the event. If young minds were particularly impressionable 
there can be no doubt that the occasion of national independence 
left an indelible mark on their political memory. In fact the 
occasion might be the beginning of a political memory..
In another sense national independence in 1957 meant that
the respondents developed their political consciousness on a
different basis from that of the older generations. They have
come to take for granted the nation's independence and their own
status in it. More than that they, like the proverbial Chinese, have
tended to view the country as occupying a central place in the map
34of their political universe. This tendency was most evident when 
they verbally complained against the mundane preoccupations and 
pettiness of the politicians. This is not surprising as it merely 
reflected the idealism of youth. This idealism received a fillip 
when the proposal to form Malaysia was first articulated in 1961,
33. Cf, David Easton and Robert D„ Hess, op. cit., passim.
34, In contrast, one might add, to their fathers' generation who 
might just as likely view China or India as the centre of 
their political universe.
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The proposal to form Malaysia together with its
international tribulations must have been another major landmark
35in the students' expanding political consciousness» The twin 
threats of Indonesian confrontation and Philippine's claim to 
Sabah actually have a centripetal effect,"^ If anything students' 
reaction to confrontation shortly after Malaysia came into 
existence reflected the depth of their feelings. Malaysia was no 
longer a vague entity but a meaningful one with which they could 
easily identify, if for no other reason than the superficial fact
35. For a sample of the literature on the formation of Malaysia 
and the crisis of Indonesian confrontation see Willard Hanna,
The Formation of Malaysia (New York: American University
Field Staff, Inc., 1964); T.E. Smith, The Background to 
Malaysia (London: Chatham House Memorandum, 1963); Emily
Sadka, "Malaysia: The Political Background," in T.H. Silcock
and E.K. Fisk, eds., op. cit.,; H.F. Armstrong, "The Troubled 
Birth of Malaysia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, No. 4, (July,
1963), pp. 673-93; George Modelski, "Indonesia and the Malaysia 
Issue," International Year Book of World Affairs, 1964, pp. 128-49, 
For an official view of the place of Malaysia in Southeast 
Asia, see Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast
Asia," Foreign Affairs, (July, 1965), pp. 659-70.
36» On this point Robert 0. Tilman writes: 'For the first time,
Malaysians seemed occasionally at least to be viewing the 
world around them from the perspective of Malaysians. They 
seemed to be beginning to make a clear distinction between 
"we" and "they", which is probably the primary characteristic 
of nationhood. ' See the highly suggestive paper of Tilman,
"The Philippine-Indonesian Threat and the Growth of a Malaysian 
Nation," (delivered at the 1964 annual conference of the 
Association of Asian Studies, Washington, D.C.).
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that it made the nation less communal or so they thought» ' This 
new identification, however, was to receive a rude shock when in 
August 1965 the secession of Singapore was announced» Judging 
from unstructured conversations with some members of the survey 
population this development was baffling to them. If Singapore 
were the raison d ’etre of Malaysia then its secession made no sense» 
To a certain extent their disenchantment resulted from a basic 
sympathy with the concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' as articulated 
by the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew» In this respect it 
indicated their non-communal aspirations for the country,
In short this generation of students must have been quite
disconcerted by the intense political developments of the first half
of the 1960s» The inability of the Malayan and Singapore leadership 
38to work together, clearly evident after the General Election of 
1964, was viewed as the case of politicians putting their personal 
interests ahead of the nation's» Finally the other major 
international development that could be considered to have extended
37
37» The antithesis would have been a closer relationship with 
Indonesia with its overtones of Malay hegemony,
38, Cf» Milton E» Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia (Cornell
University: Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No, 53, 1964)
and Robert Catley, "Malaysia: The Lost Battle for Merger,"
Australian Outlook, vol» 21, No» 1, (April, 1967), pp» 44-60»
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their political horizon was the intensification of the Vietnam war. 
They viewed this conflict largely in non-ideological terms and they 
had an anti-American feeling not unlike an antipathy against an 
overwhelming 'upperdog.'
Turning to local matters, the students were generally 
conversant with the fact that two different political parties 
controlled the State and City government» In their conversations 
they did not sound at all endeared to the Alliance State government, 
whereas to the then Socialist Front-controlled City Council there 
were mixed reactions. But in the matter of the individual 
politicians involved they sounded uniformally critical irrespective 
of parties. They dismissed the State government as being too 
subservient to the dictates of the Federal government» As for the 
City government some felt that it was responsive to the difficulties 
of the hawkers and trishaw-riders and to this extent alone the 
Socialist Front 'was doing a good job»' Others were more critical 
of some of the councillors whose inabilities to articulate coherent 
views in English were taken to imply lack of qualification for the 
office.
These then were the issues behind the political 
consciousness of the students and some of their political attitudes 
randomly tapped. If one general statement can be made about their
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political consciousness it is this: they reached their adolescence
at a time of intense national and international political activity, 
and their’s is a generation with firm views about their own roles and 
'places in the sun.'
The presentation and analysis of the data from the 
survey follow.
Interest in Politics:
Students who answered the questionnaire were asked whether 
or not they were interested in politics. Out of the total, 463,
63 per cent indicated that they were; 208 said that they were not 
(28 per cent) and 64 (8 per cent) were indifferent. This interest 
does not vary greatly between the races as shown in the table below.
Table 7.4
Interest in Politics by Race.
Malay Chinese Indian Others
No. % No. % No % No, %
Interested 34 65.4 400 61.6 24 82.8 5 100
Not interested 15 28.9 189 29.1 4 13,8 - -
Indifferent 3 5.7 60 9.2 1 3.4 - -
52 100.0 649 99.9 29 100.0 5 100
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Perhaps it is useful to observe that as between the various racial 
groups there is an inverse relationship between their relative 
size in Penang society and the students' political interest, Thus 
the smaller the community the higher the political interest of 
the students from that community and vice versa.
Not unexpectedly the proportion of female students
interested in politics is smaller than that of the male students -
57 per cent as compared with 67 per cent« The interesting fact
is that a majority of the female students are interested. In
spite of the absence of concrete data it can hardly be said that
a majority of women in Penang or in the country is similarly
inclined. This difference hints at the politicization role of
education in the case of women. It does not imply, however, that
the female students are somehow going to be more active than their
mothers as far as politics is concerned; only that they are both
39capable and likely to have more interest in public affairs.
39. In spite of the activities of feminists to the contrary, the 
political world remains dominated by men,, This is so 
irrespective of actual political practices in any particular 
political system, Cf. Maurice Duverger, The Political Roles 
of Women (Paris: UNESCO, 1955), See also Angus Campbell
et_ al_,, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, abridged
version, 1964), pp, 255-61, and John A. Armstrong, The Soviet 
Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus 
(New York: Praeger, 1959), p, 45,
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Pattern of Political Cognition:
It is not unreasonable to say that political cognition in 
developing countries is generally low. For the general public the 
motivation to acquire information about government and politics is 
weak because the relevance of government and politics to their 
private lives is not perceived, There is certainly a mutual 
causation between these phenomena» Knowledge about politics and 
government begets perception of relevance which then leads to 
involvement, even if only periodically. Hence political cognition 
is an important orientation, Given the low rate of literacy 
pervasive in developing countries, schools play a central role in 
imparting political knowledge to the younger generations; at least 
this is indicated by our survey population.
As far as the national political system is concerned it
is expected that the students would have fairly extensive knowledge.
This is so not only because of the information gained from books
and in the classroom, but also because the formation of Malaysia was
a recent affair. The subsequent international and regional
repurcussions, including the attempt by the constituent state of
40Kelantan to block the formation of Malaysia in the court, have
40. Cf. Harry E„ Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore: 
Malaysia Publications, 1964), p, 132,
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greatly increased the publicity about the geographic, demographic,
international, political and constitutional ramifications of the
new Federation, It is not surprising, therefore, to note that
nearly all the students reported that they know more about the
41national political system rather than less. (This and sub­
sequent generalizations in this section are derived from Table 
7.5 which summarizes the overall pattern of political cognition,,) 
One can only conclude that if the responses were accurate these 
students represent one of the best informed groups in the country. 
Even among those students who profess an indifference to politics
the proportion of positive cognition is exceptionally high - almost 
4297 per cent. It may be said here that the process of nation­
forming, with the attendant issues of frontiers, jurisdiction and 
national authority, imparts a very significant amount of political
41. This is supported by the general content of the students' 
essays referred to earlier and random discussions with some 
of them,
42, This proportion is so high that one must suspect the general 
ability of the students' to estimate their political 
knowledge accurately. It can almost be taken for granted 
that more specific questions would have exposed a higher 
degree of ignorance. In any case it is useful to know 
that the students thought they know or should know,,
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Table 7.5
Political Cognition: Percentages by Various Indices»
Qu
es
ti
cn
No
.
POLITICAL
OBJECTS
RESPONSE ALL
STUDENTS
RACE
(N= 735) "
Malay Chinese Indian Others
(52) (649) (29) (5)
1A National
Political
System:
Positive
Negative
99.6 
0.4
100 99.9 93.1 100
0.1 6.9
2A Structures 
and roles:
Positive
Negative
82 o 2
17 o 8
86.5 82.1 82.8 40.0
13.5 17.9 17.2 60.0
3A Political 
Incumbents:
Positive
Negative
84.4
15.6
84.6 84.1 89.7 80.0
15.4 15.9 10.3 20.0
4A Policies, 
Decisions 
and their 
enforcement:
Positive
Negative
77.7
22.3
75.0 78.0 75.9 80.0
25.0 22.0 24.1 20.Ö
5A Self: Positive
Negative
55.8
44.2
59.6 54.7 65.5 100
40.4 45.3 34.5
. Table Cont.
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Table 7.5 (Continued)
Political Cognition: Percentages by Various Indices.
Qu
es
ti
on
No
.
RESPONSE MEDIUM OF SECONDARY 
EDUCATION
INTEREST IN 
POLITICS
SEX
English English English Yes No Indif- Male Female
only and and
Chinese Malay 
(562) (151) (22)
ferent
(463) (208) (64) (448) (287)
1A Positive
Negative
99.6 99.3 100
0.4 0.7
100 99.5 96.9
0.5 3.1
99.8 99.3
0.2 0.7
2A Positive
Negative
82.6 79.5 90.9
17.4 20.5 9.1
85.5 74.5 82.8
14.5 25.5 17.2
80.6 84.7
19.4 15.3
3A Positive
Negative
84.3 83.4 90.9
15.7 16.6 9.1
87.9 76.4 84.4
12.1 23.6 15.6
83.5 85.7
16.5 14.3
4A Positive
Negative
78.3 75.5 77.3
21.7 24.5 22.7
82.3 71.2 65.6
17.7 28.8 34.4
77.0 78.8
23.0 21.2
5A Positive
Negative
57.8 45.0 77.3
42.2 55.0 22.7
63.9 41.8 42.2
36.1 58.2 57.8
55.6 56.1
44.4 43.9
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information to the literate citizens^  (The propaganda of 
independence and nationalism probably informs even the illiterates,)
If the students were exceptionally well informed about
the broad features of the national political system, what about
their knowledge on the more specific aspects of it? The second
cognitive question (2A) seeks to discover how many of them know
about the various structures of government and of politics. Again
the positive responses to this question are very high. Overall,
4482 per cent of the answers are positive. Similarly 84 per cent 
of the students claim they know more than half of the political 
incumbents. That this should be the case can reasonably be 
attributed to the exposure and prominence of the formal political 
elites, and the general tendency to credit or castigate them for 
most governmental action or lack of it.
43. In this respect not only schools but also such other 
institutions as political parties, trade unions, voluntary 
organizations, the press and other communication media play 
an educational role,
44. One suspects that this reflects more about the knowledge of 
structures rather than the roles performed by them. This 
view, however, is not falsifiable. One piece of evidence which 
supports this view is the criticism by some students that the 
State Government is not doing enough for the proposed 
university in Penang. This criticism betrays their ignorance 
of the sole legislative competence of the Federal Government 
over education,
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In respect of knowledge about policies, decisions and their
enforcement procedures the students again indicate that they are well
informed» Roughly three-fourths of them claim knowledge of this
class of political objects. This proportion is slightly lower
than the previous cases but this is to be expected. In a sense
the political outputs concerned here are less 'tangible' than either
the general features of the national political system or its more
specific structures or the political incumbents. Actually for this
very reason it would not be surprising if fewer students claim
45knowledge here than they do.
In any political system the general orientation of 
members of the system towards their role in it is important.
This phenomenon has largely led Almond and Verba, in the Civic 
Culture, to characterize political culture as 'participant,'
'subject' or 'parochial.' As mentioned earlier, the population 
of the present survey is not active in politics. Hence they could 
not currently have, in relation to politics, either participant, 
subject or parochial orientations towards self as object. But 
they were asked to respond to this set of questions on the basis of 
what they thought would be their future roles in politics. 56 per
45. This again should remind us of the 'tentative' and indirect 
nature of the data here. While they are presented in the 
normal fashion in the table, their value lies in indicating 
the broad level of political knowledge rather than defining 
its actual limits.
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cent of them claim they know about their own future rights,
obligations and avenues of influence in politics. This pattern
of a small positive majority does not hold for those students
partly educated in Chinese. In this group only 45 per cent are
aware of their potential participation compared with 77 per cent
46among those partly educated in Malay, Interestingly too, those
who say they are interested in politics are more knowledgeable about 
their potential participation than those who are not or indifferent to 
politics. There is, therefore, some internal consistency in the 
response here. Whether or not the lack of interest gives rise to 
ignorance of one’s future participatory roles or vice versa is hard 
to tell.
To sum up, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
whether or not the students are actually very knowledgeable about 
politics they are at least anxious to convey an impression of it. 
As a group, the students claim to be one of the best informed 
sectors of the society. They are, of course, also a group 
with a high level of education. These facts marginally
46. As can be seen in Table 7.5 this disparity is less between 
Malay and Chinese students as a whole,
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support the generalization that ’The greater an individual’s
education, the more likely he is to attend to sources of political 
47information.’ One may also add that extensive knowledge of
politics is likely to lead to greater involvement and a sense of
48personal efficacy. Being informed about politics, however, 
does not reveal how emotionally disposed one is to it. Political 
cognition is one dimension of political culture which does not 
necessarily predict political affect,. This is the dimension we 
will examine next.
Pattern of Affective Orientation:
Here we seek to map the students’ feelings towards the 
five classes of political objects. In this respect it may be 
said that political affect or emotional feeling is strictly 
subjective. This being the case the ’accuracy’ of the response
47. Angus Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 251. However, see 
footnote 49 below.
48. On this point Campbell et_ al_ write that 'Interest grows 
from roots of information, and a continuing flow of 
information nourishes abiding interest.' Ibid., p„ 216.
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does not depend on the amount of knowledge possessed. But in this 
case it is useful to know that the students are well educated.
The data on political affect are summarized in Table 7.6 
below. Unlike the proportions obtained on political cognition, 
those on political feeling vary considerably between political 
objects, (This, by the way, is the first indication that the 
students are able to differentiate between the five political 
objects.) A majority of the students report that they have 
positive feeling towards only two of the political objects, namely 
the national political system and their potential role in politics. 
With respect to two other objects, the political incumbents and 
political outputs, a majority of them reports negative feeling.
As for the remaining object, political structures and roles, a 
plurality of them also reports negatively. Overall it can be said 
that about a fifth of them has no positive or negative feeling about 
each of the political objects, The outstanding feature about
49, In the survey reported in The Civic Culture, op. cit„, Almond 
and Verba discover that among their Mexican respondents the 
amount of political knowledge is not correlated with the 
willingness to form political opinions. In fact, they 
generalize that ' ... in all the countries but Italy, the
willingness to express political opinions is widespread, 
affecting even the uninformed, ' See their book, p, 98.
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Table 7.6
Affective Orientation: Percentages by Various Indices.
Qu
es
ti
on
 
No
 c
POLITICAL
OBJECTS
RESPONSE ALL
STUDENTS RACE
(N= 735)
Malay Chinese 
(52) (649)
Indian
(29)
Others
(5)
IB National Positive 56.0 73.1 54.4 72.4 -
Political Negative 25 o 2 11.5 26.0 20.7 80.0
System: No Opinion 18.8 15.4 19.6 6.9 20.0
2B Structures Positive 29.8 55.8 27.4 34.5 40.0
and roles: Negative 42.3 21.1 44.2 44.8 -
No Opinion 27.9 23.1 28.4 20.7 60.0
3B Political Positive 9.3 30.8 7.4 13.8
Incumbents: Negative 72.2 48.1 73.8 79.3 80.0
No Opinion 18.5 21.1 18.8 6.9 20.0
4B Policies, Positive 17.8 28.8 16.9 20.7
Decisions Negative 55.2 36.5 56.4 55.2 100
and their No Opinion 26,9 34.6 26.7 24.1 -
enforcement:
5B Self: Positive 55.2 55.8 54.4 69.0 80.0
Negative 21.6 25.0 21.9 10.3 20.0
No Opinion 23.1 19.2 23.7 20.7
c.. Table Cont.
352
Table 7,6 (Continued)
Affective Orientation: Percentages by Various Indices.
Qu
es
ti
on
No
,
RESPONSE MEDIUM OF SECONDARY 
EDUCATION
INTEREST IN 
POLITICS
SEX
English English English Yes No Indif- Male Female
only and
Chinese
(151)
and
(463) (208)
ferent
(448) (287)(562)
Malay
(22) (64)
IB Positive 57.1 50.3 68.2 58.5 50,0 57.8 56.7 55.1
Negative 25 o 3 27.2 9.1 29,2 18.7 17.2 27,9 20.9
No Opinion 17 o 6 22.5 22,7 12.3 31.3 25.0 15.4 24.0
2B Positive 27 .6 35.1 50.0 33.3 24.5 21.9 37.5 17,8
Negative 43.8 41.7 9.1 45.4 38.0 34.4 41.7 43.2
No Opinion 28 „6 23.2 40.9 21.4 37.5 43.7 20.8 39.0
3B Positive 8.4 9.9 27.3 9.5 7.7 12.5 11.6 5.6
Negative 74.0 69.6 45,4 76.7 66.3 59.4 69,6 76.3
No Opinion 17.6 20.5 27.3 13.8 26.0 28,1 18,8 18.1
4B Positive 17.8 17,9 18.2 19.9 13.0 18.7 21,4 12.2
Negative 55.9 55.6 36.4 55.1 57.2 50.0 54.5 56.4
No Opinion 26.3 26.5 45.4 25.0 29.8 31.3 24.1 31.4
5B Positive 56.2 49.0 72.7 60.3 44.7 53.1 59.1 49.1
Negative 21,2 23.2 22,7 18.8 27,4 23.4 21.0 22,7
No Opinion 22.6 27.8 4.6 20,9 27.9 23.4 19.9 28.2
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their political affect is the degree of their alienation from the 
political leadership. Here only nine per cent of the students are 
positively oriented and 72 per cent are critical of the leaders.
Since the ratio of positive to negative feeling varies 
considerably between objects as well as between sub-groupings on 
any single object it is useful to determine whether the 
variations bear any relationship to the selected indices.
Among all the political objects the national political 
system invokes the highest percentage of positive affect. The 
Malay and the Indian students are more positive than their Chinese 
counterpart. Conversely the degree of negative response is higher 
among the Chinese students than among the other two racial groups.^ 
It is noticeable that sex does not cause any large variation 
between the proportions, with the exception that female students 
are more reticent than male about their feeling towards the 
national political system. Such a predisposition is also evident 
among those who have no interest in politics. Whereas among 
those who have, the proportion of negative affect is one of the
50. One is tempted to speculate that this represents the negative 
reaction to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia since 
the former is a Chinese dominated city-state. But this is 
pure speculation as the survey gives us no hint of the probable 
reason behind the differences between the Chinese and the non- 
Chinese students.
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highest. On the whole, however, the 56 per cent of positive 
feeling towards the system represents a reasonable degree of 
acceptance of it.^ And about a fifth of them has no definite 
emotional attitude, one way or the other, towards the national 
political system.
When it comes to feeling towards the structures of 
government, political parties, media of communication, etc., only 
30 per cent of the students react to them favourably. In fact, a 
plurality of them, 42 per cent, is critical and 28 per cent express 
no opinion on the matter. If one were to judge from the contents 
of some of the essays written by some of the students and referred 
to earlier, the following general complaints underline the degree 
of their disaffection: federal domination of the state government,
administrative inefficiency, too many political parties, biased 
newspapers, fear of uttering political complaints, and weak local
51. Although not strictly comparable, the equivalent proportions 
obtained by Almond and Verba for the five countries are:
U.S. - 85%; U.K. - 46%; Germany - 7%; Italy - 3%; 
and Mexico - 30%. See ibid,, p, 102, Table 1.
355
52government structures. It is likely that these complaints, 
singly or otherwise, induce their disaffection. But among the
Malay students, categorized under race or English and Malay medium
52. To quote some complaints made in the students’ essays
The State government is slow moving 
and subjected to too much control 
by the Central government.
The City Council is in a sorry state. 
Evidently, it is just a second-class 
political arena.
[One of our national newspapers] is 
an instrument of certain foreign 
countries and is not serving us, the 
Malaysian citizens, as it claims to 
do.
It is a general view that the 
educational system ... is quite 
good. But ... it is not.
Malaysia is said to be a 'democratic' 
country. Government officials claim 
that ... racial problems should not 
be raised [in public] ... but let 
everyone think over 'calmly.' 'Calmly' 
means 'shut up.'
Only when we have an opposition party 
which is powerful will the government 
think twice before [making] a move.
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of secondary education, the degree of disaffection is the lowest» 
Indeed more than half of the Malay students are quite happy with 
the political structures» Such a majority of positive feeling is 
absent under any other sub-grouping. The Chinese and Indian 
students respond very differently compared to the Malay, Thus, 
race differentiates political affect more than any of the other 
indices. Whether or not one is interested in politics does not 
make much difference here; except, once again, that those who are 
interested are also more opinionated.
Feelings about political incumbents are stronger still:
72 per cent of the students are alienated from them and fewer than 
10 per cent approve, while there is less affective neutrality than 
about any other aspect of the political system. This could reflect 
the usual rebellious attitude of youth toward their authoritative 
elders; or the fact that the power-holders seem to be mostly Malays 
while the students are mainly Chinese, However, the difference 
between the Malay and Chinese students is only one of degree: a
majority of each is unfavourably disposed towards the political 
leaders, though this is not quite so great in the case of the Malay 
students.
How far does the racial background of the respondents 
condition their feelings towards the political incumbents? One
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possible test is to compare the responses of those of each race 
educated in English with those of their fellows educated partly in 
the respective communal language - on the assumption that the latter 
groups would be more communally oriented. Table 7.7 below gives 
the data for the Malay and Chinese students.
Table 7.7
Racialism and Affective Orientation 
Towards Political Incumbents.
Malay Chinese
Educated 
solely in 
English
Educated 
partly in 
Malay
Educated 
solely in 
English
Educated 
partly in 
Chinese
Response No. % No. % No. % No. %
Positive 10 33 6 27 33 7 15 10
Negative 15 50 10 45 374 75 105 70
No Opinion 5 17 6 27 91 18 31 20
TOTAL 30 100 22 99 498 100 151 100
However the table shows the reverse of what might be expected. 
English educated Malays are rather more favourable to the political 
incumbents, and English educated Chinese rather less favourable, 
than their respective fellows educated partly in the language of 
their own race. Given the assumption made earlier it is possible
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to interpret the above conclusion this way. Those Malay students 
who are partly educated in Malay are guided by more communal and 
traditional criteria in their attitudes towards the political 
incumbents. If this is true it is easy to see why they are less
favourably disposed towards the leaders and more demanding on them 
In short, they ideally expect them to do more for the Malays. (The 
percentage difference between the responses of the two groups of 
Chinese students is too small to warrant any broad generalization.)
53
Certainly English education tends to orient the students
towards the western world, whereas Malay or Chinese education tends
to be less so. If such an orientation influences the yardstick with
which the political incumbents are emotionally judged, it is not
surprising for the solely English educated students to find them 
54wanting. An orientation towards the western world idealizes 
the place of merit, rationality and efficiency in social 
policies and human conducts. Where such qualities are 
judged to be absent or inadequately personified by the 
elites the positive feeling towards them is necessarily low.
53. One suspects that this is certainly the case if the students 
were to view the political incumbents in comparison with the 
political leaders of the Southeast Asian states.
54. In this connection see the points made by Lucian W. Pye about
the standard-setting influence of what he calls the ’world' or 
’cosmopolitan’ culture. See his books, Politics, Personality 
and Nation-Building, op. cit., Ch. 1, and Aspects of Political 
Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 9-11. Cf. J.P. 
Nettl, Political Mobilization (London: Faber and Faber, 1967),
esp. pp. 388-92.
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This appears to be the case here/
Even though there is no good ground to suggest that race 
is the controlling factor in the students' feeling towards the 
political incumbents, it is noticeable that on the whole Malay 
students are not as critical as the non-Malay students.
Turning next to their attitudes towards the decisions, 
policies and the enforcement procedures, in short, the political 
outputs, the students are again not so well disposed. A majority 
of them is clearly unhappy about these 'outputs,' and about a 
quarter of them is ambivalent. Once again only a fairly small 
proportion of them, 18 per cent, feels satisfied. This 
distribution of responses does not vary significantly in the sub­
groupings. There is, however, one observable pattern of anomaly.
55. This conclusion is supported by complaints against the political 
incumbents expressed in the students' essays. Thus one 
student writes: ' ... the calibre of our politicians is
pretty low - intellectually or otherwise. How many of them 
can really grasp the economic decisions [made] by the ... 
government.' One student considers the Tunku to be the 
only 'fair' leader. He is also considered by another student 
to be a 'most respected, just and honourable man, but his 
subordinates ... you just have to open your eyes wide to 
observe.' Yet another student feels that leaders are 
elected not because of their intelligence or abilities 'but 
because they have the money,' The view is also expressed 
that politicians from all political parties are seeking their 
personal fame and fortune.
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Only among Malay students and those who are partly educated in
Malay is there less than a majority of negative affect; they are
also more affectively neutral,, Why they are less critical and
more ambivalent in their attitudes towards the political outputs
is a question for which we have only speculative answers. Judging
from the contents of the students’ essays again, the commonest
cause of student dissatisfaction here is 'Malay privilege’ in
56scholarships and jobs. This implies that the affective
orientation towards political outputs, currently quite negative,
may undergo some changes once students are not obsessed with the
57issue of 'Malay privilege,' But at the moment they are and 
this has contributed to their general disenchantment, particularly 
on the part of the non-Malay students.
56, To quote a randomly selected statement on this from one of the 
essays:
If this nation were more unbiased and fair in the 
choosing of scholarship holders she would have better 
politicians, better economists, better social workers 
and hence better progress,
57. Perhaps quite typically the position of the students on these
points is uncompromising, On the question of 'Malay privilege' - 
always a central issue in Malaysian politics - there is no simple 
answer. The dilemma can be characterized thus: to abandon
the concept is to give rise to inequalities favouring the non- 
Malays, but to perpetuate it is to prejudice the non-Malays 
permanently. That the concept is guaranteed in the Constitution 
(Article 153) without a time limit or a provision for review 
makes it all the more difficult to change. Cf. K.J. Ratnam, 
Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, op, cit.,
Ch. IV. See also R.S. Milne, Government and Politics in 
Malaysia, op. cit„, pp„ 39-41.
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Given a high level of political knowledge and a fairly
critical view on politics, it is significant to ask how the
5 8respondents view their own roles in politics. A sense of
personal efficacy or the lack of it may tip the scale between
(potential) support for the political system and total alienation from 
59it. Political knowledge not only creates a capacity for demands and 
grievances but also the capability to act politically, including taking 
actions which may subvert the political order.^
58. Legitimacy or general support for the political system is partly 
a function of the perception of personal efficacy among those who 
are highly politicized, Very few political systems are legitimate 
and stable because a vast majority of the population is deliberately 
supporting them. Most systems rest on the political indifference 
or acquiescence of a majority of the people. Cf. David Easton,
"An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 
vol. IX (April, 1957), pp, 383-400, and his book, A Systems 
Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), esp.
Ch. 10.
59. For numerous references to the role students and intellectuals 
played in undermining the political order, see Seymour Martin 
Lipset, "The Political Behaviour of University Students in 
Developing Nations," op, cit,, passim,
60. There is also the implication that by not being involved the
politically influential and capable members of the society deny 
the regime their advice, knowledge and expertise and thus 
indirectly contribute to its inefficiency and even demise. Cf. 
Edward A, Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development 
of the New States," op, cit., and his book, The Intellectual 
between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, (The
Hague: Mouton, 1961),
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In spite of their inability to act politically,61
cent of the students report that they are satisfied with their 
potential roles in politics. This represents the second highest 
degree of positive affect towards all the political objects. Those 
who are disenchanted by their own future roles comprise slightly 
more than a fifth of the students, And the rest, 23 per cent, probably 
find it difficult to define their feelings about something which they 
have not yet experienced. So, in effect, only a small minority of the 
students at this stage can see no promising future as potential actors.6
Thus however widespread their dissatisfaction towards the
other political objects a clear majority of the students do not doubt
6 3their future competence and ability to participate in politics.
This is perhaps the most significant aspect of their political
61- This extends to joining any type of political organizations, even 
at the university. For an expression of dissatisifaction with 
this, see Shih Jen Pao, "Pantai Cries for a Political Club," 
Varsity (The Annual Magazine of the University of Malaya Student's 
Union), vol. 1, No, 5 (n,d,), PP- 29-30.
62. Incidentally, this proportion of negative affect is the smallest 
among all five, and contrasts sharply with the 72 per cent towards 
the political incumbents.
63, On this point, Almond and Verba remark that 'The more subjectively 
competent an individual considers himself, the more likely he is 
to be politically active, ' Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, 
op. cit,, p „ 236.
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orientation. For to perceive that one can, in a future date, 
meaningfully participate is a strong psychological barrier against 
total alienation. As it is, the 'alienation' represented by high 
proportions of negative affect extends to only what we may call the 
regime (political incumbents and political outputs). These are 
not only changeable but also, in the natural course of political 
life, likely to undergo changes without necessitating the transformation 
of the political framework. Therefore, politics for them is likely 
to be participation within the framework of the political system and 
not contests about the political system. This is assuming, of course, 
that their present sense of self confidence is not eroded. Such a 
development is unlikely if only because their current feeling towards 
the political incumbents and political outputs is already very negative.
The degree of self confidence evident among the students does 
not vary very much among the sub-groupings. There are three sub­
groupings where those who are satisfied with their future role comprise 
less than a majority. This occurs among those who are not interested 
in politics, among those who are partly educated in Chinese, and among 
the female students. Even here the proportions of positive response 
are not very much smaller than from the others. Neither are the 
corresponding proportions of negative response very much larger. In 
fact, among these three sub-groupings the proportions who record no 
opinion are the highest, indicating not so much a greater degree of
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dissatisfaction as one of ambivalence. All these justify the 
observation that feeling about self as a potential participant in the 
political process does not appear to correlate with any of the 
selected indices. No particular group seems to believe that its 
political future has been prejudiced.
In general, we may sum up the students’ affective 
orientation as negative but hopeful. They are clearly not enthusiastic 
about the political incumbents and the political outputs; neither are 
they happy about the structural elements of the society. But they 
are not totally alienated as they are quite confident of the broad 
framework of the national political system and of their own future 
roles in politics, Such a pattern of political affect, combined 
with a high degree of self-estimated knowledge about politics, is likely
to ensure that a large number of them will become what David Easton has
64called 'politically relevant members' of the society.
Pattern of Evaluational Orientation:
We now move on to consider the third main aspect of the 
students' political culture. While political cognition is clearly 
differentiated from political affect, the distinction is not so clear
64. Easton defines this concept as meaning 'those members of a system 
who can be said to count or whose attitudes need to be taken into 
consideration in the processing of demands. ' David Easton,
A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit,, p. 154.
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between the latter and evaluation. The difficulty arises from 
the typical interaction between emotion and intellect when judgement 
about political things are made. What one may'think is an unbiased 
judgement may in fact be influenced by an emotional attitude. For 
this reason the evaluational orientation is never really free of 
subjective feelings. But the affective and the evaluational 
orientation are not just the same thing, The latter 'typically 
involve[s] the combination of value standards and criteria with 
information and feelings.'65 This being the case it is possible to 
feel happy about a particular political object and yet evaluate it 
negatively, and vice versa. An example of this would be to feel 
satisfied when the governing party of the central government is 
defeated in a local election, and yet to evaluate the consequences 
as detrimental for the development of the local government area. It 
is because the two orientations, affective and evaluational, are 
related but distinct that it is useful to begin by comparing the 
students' responses, (The data on the evaluational orientation is 
summarized in Table 7.8),
There is some degree of variation in the responses for all 
students in Tables 7.6 and 7.8. This is particularly so in the case
of responses to two political objects - the national political system 
and self. By and large, the variation for the other three political
65, Gabriel A, Almond and Sydney Verba, op. cit,, p. 15.
366
Table 7.8
Evaluational Orientation: Percentages by Various Indices.
Qu
es
ti
on
 
No
.
POLITICAL
OBJECTS
RESPONSE ALL
STUDENTS
(N=735)
RACE
Malay Chinese 
(52) (649)
Indian
(29)
Others
(5)
1C National Positive 38 o 2 50.0 37.1 JS» oo 20
Political Negative 30 o 5 21.1 31.1 31.0 40
System: No Opinion 31.3 28.9 31.7 24,1 40
2C Structures Positive 23.3 T--1oo 21.3 24.1 20
and roles: Negative 47.4 26.9 48,4 55.2 80
No Opinion 29.4 25.0 30.3 20.7 -
3C Political Positive 7,1 23.1 5.6 13.8 -
Incumbents: Negative 78.9 51.9 80.7 82,8 100
No Opinion 14,0 25.0 13.7 3.4 -
4C Policies, Positive 22.7 40,4 21.3 17.2 60
Decisions Negative 48.8 26.9 50.7 48.3 40
and their No Opinion 28.4 32.7 oooCM 34.5 -
Enforcement:
5C Self: Positive 48.8 r—) 00 47.9 65.5 80
Negative 18,4 21.1 18.3 13.8 20
No Opinion 32,8 30.8 33.7 20.7 -
..o Table Cont.
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Table 7.8 (Continued)
Evaluational Orientation: Percentages by Various Indices.
Qu
es
ti
on
No
.
RESPONSE MEDIUM OF SECONDARY 
EDUCATION
INTEREST
POLITICS
IN SEX
English English English Yes No Indif- Male Female
only and and
Malay
(22) (463) (208)
ferent
(448) (287)(562)
Chinese
(151) (64)
1C Positive 37 o 4 38.4 59.1 39.5 33.2 45.3 42.0 32.4
Negative 31 o 0 31.8 9.1 35.4 23.1 18.7 33.0 26.5
No Opinion 31 o 7 29.8 31.8 25.1 43.7 36.0 25.0 41.1
2C Positive 22 „6 22.5 45.5 25.7 16.8 26.6 26.8 17.8
Negative 48.6 47.0 18.2 49.7 48.6 26.6 46.4 48.8
No Opinion 28.8 30.5 36.4 24.6 34.6 46.9 26.8 33.4
3C Positive 7.1 4.6 22.7 6.7 6.2 12.5 8.9 4.2
Negative 79 „ 0 81.5 59.1 81.6 77.4 64.1 76.1 83.3
No Opinion 13.9 13.9 18.2 11.7 16.4 23.4 15.0 12.5
4C Positive 24.1 17.2 27.3 24.2 18.3 26.6 27.2 15.7
Negative 49.5 49.0 31.8 50.1 49.0 39.1 47.5 50.9
No Opinion 26.5 33.8 40.9 25.7 32.7 34.4 25.2 33.4
5C Positive 47.7 51.0 63.6 53.8 38.5 46.9 55.1 39.0
Negative 18.0 19.2 22.7 15.3 23.1 25.0 14.7 24.0
1_
No Opinion 34.3 29.8 13.6 30.9 38.5 28.1 30.1 37.0
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objects - structures, incumbents and policies - is not significantly 
large. It can, therefore, be assumed that the students are able to 
differentiate between how they feel about and how they judge the 
political objects.
By and large the students are much more positive in their 
subjective feeling about the political objects than in their evaluation 
of them. The only exception is in the case of their attitude to the 
political outputs. Here a higher proportion of them evaluate the 
policies and decisions of the government positively than feel happy 
about them. This fact further strengthens the observation that while 
they may generally be disenchanted by politics they are not totally 
alienated from it. Their emotional committment, as it were, is slightly 
more positive than their judgement. Moreover with the exception of 
their attitude towards the political incumbents, they are more prepared 
to express their feeling towards the political objects than to 
evaluate them.
In terms of the individual political object, the students' 
evaluation of the national political system is not too favourable.
Slightly more than a third of them are positive and slightly less than 
a third are negative, The remainder apparently cannot make up their 
mind. In this sense the national political system has not been 
considered wanting.
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The students are somewhat more critical of the second 
political object, structures and roles, than of the first. Close 
to half of them are unfavourable while only 23 per cent are positive.
Once again a large number of them, 29 per cent, do not make a 
judgement. It is again observable, among the sub-groupings, that the 
Malay students are more positively oriented here than the non-Malays. 
Otherwise the variation in the responses under each sub-grouping reflects 
the pattern for the whole group. The only 'inconsistency* is the high 
proportion of the politically indifferent who are unwilling to make a 
judgement„
When it comes to their evaluation of the political incumbents 
it is useful to recall that only nine per cent of the students are 
positive in their political affect. If this reflects their personal 
prejudices it can be expected that their evaluation of the leaders is 
going to be more positive. This, however, is not the case. An even 
smaller proportion, seven per cent, evaluate the leaders positively.
The obverse is also true: 79 per cent of them are critical in their
evaluation while 72 per cent are unhappy in their affect. Once more 
their reaction to the incumbents is much more definite than to any of 
the other political objects - only 14 per cent have no opinion on this
issue«
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The outstanding pattern of the evaluation of the political 
incumbents is the different responses of the Malay students and the 
non-Malay students« In the first place, a higher proportion -
though not a majority - of the Malays are unprepared to evaluate 
the leaders. Secondly, the former are also less critical than 
the latter. But both groups clearly think that the political 
leaders are inadequate.
When it comes to judgement about the policies, decisions 
and their enforcement procedures, in short the political outputs, the 
students' orientation is more favourable. Still only a little more 
than a fifth of them consider the outputs satisfactory, and almost 
half of them are critical. Once more the Malay students evaluate 
the political outputs much less critically than the non-Malay students.
Earlier we emphasized the fact that in spite of their 
negative affect to the other political objects the students are not 
despondent about their own political future. In the case of their 
more deliberate evaluation of this factor almost half of them consider 
it positively. This represents a higher level of positive orientation 
than the responses to any of the other four objects.
That it is difficult to make a judgement on a role which 
has yet to be exercised is evident. Fully a third of the students are
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incapable of deciding the issue and consequently opts for the ’no 
opinion’ response, But among those who do decide, roughly two out 
of three evaluate their future political roles positively. This is 
more evident among those who are not solely educated in English, among 
the Indian students, and among the male students.
Given the western political framework in Malaysia it is 
difficult to guess the reason behind the comparatively lower proportion 
of positive responses among those who are solely educated in English 
and who, presumably, are more conversant with 'the rules of the game,’ 
But they are not any more critical than the others, merely doubtful and 
hence the high proportion (34 per cent) who suspend any judgement at 
this stage, A similar tendency is also evident among the Chinese 
students,
As in the case of their affective orientation towards self, 
their evaluation of their own political future is more positive than 
that of the other political objects, Thus they are hopeful, despite 
being surrounded by what they think is a host of political wrongs and 
inadequacies, A favourable disposition of this nature is likely to 
ensure that quite a number of them will be attentive to, and even 
active in, politics. It is difficult to determine the proportion of 
them who will eventually become, in Easton's term, politically 
relevant members of the society, But one thing is sure: our analysis
of the students' political culture intimates that they are both capable 
of and favourably disposed to eventual involvement in politics.
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Conclusion:
What remains to be considered is the factor of race in 
the political orientation of the students. Because politics to date 
is conditioned by racial considerations the political orientation 
of the students cannot fail to reflect this fact. The Malay students 
are generally better disposed than the non-Malays, but not very much 
more: at least not to the extent where the former is loyal and
allegiant and the latter alienated and ambivalent. A relevant 
question for all of them is the continuing validity of the racial 
'bargain* made between the Malays and non-Malays almost 15 years ago. 
Will they see in it the redress of inequalities or the cause of 
inefficiency and irrationality? Perhaps there will be no simple 
answer. What is important, however, is whether there will be a 
single answer from the students' generation.
Until very recently post=-secondary and tertiary education 
has been pursued in the de-communalizing medium of English. This 
has had the effect of homogenizing the political orientation of the 
students as well as relating them to the modern technological world. 
But the rapid development of post-secondary and tertiary education 
in the Malay stream may divide the incoming activists and potential 
leaders along the old Malay/non-Malay line. If this were to happen 
it might retard what appears to be an emergent political orientation - 
one dictated more by the canons of modernity and validated less by
the traditional factor of race.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
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This study of political leadership in Penang, which 
is obviously not an autonomous political system by itself, is not 
a case study of Malaysian politics, But by concentrating on a 
sub-unit of the national political system it has been possible 
to focus more closely on the phenomenon of leadership in a 
pluralistic context and at the grass-root level. By and large 
it is safe to say that Penang, like the nation, has seen a period 
of political stability since the end of colonial dependency.
This has largely been a function of the leadership structure.
The analysis of leadership in Penang cannot logically explain this 
stability in the country as a whole, but it can explain how the 
inter-communal 'formula' as applied to Penang has worked. However, 
Penang is not a typical Malaysian state.
The physical and, more importantly, social dimensions 
of the state make it unique. It is the only state which has a 
Chinese majority in the population. Its high degree of
urbanization and commerce-oriented economy are untypical. These 
factors have important repercussions for leadership and politics. 
And yet, like all the Malaysian states except Kelantan the 
'formula* of power has been the pro-Malay inter-communalism of the 
Alliance Party. What have been the factors behind this and how 
long can this 'formula' remain viable?
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The communalization of politics and the politicization 
of communities qua communities have prevented the small stratum 
of the western-oriented 'intellectuals’ from extending their 
influence from the colonial to the post-colonial era. Momentarily 
in Penang this stratum, represented by the Radical Party in the 
early 1950s, appeared to be moving towards the centre of the 
political stage. On most counts they were better qualified than 
most groups to take over the reins of power and government. But 
in the absence of a nationalistic struggle through which they 
could e4-aim their own legitimacy and primacy they were confronted 
by the social realities of a plural society. Their response, or 
lack of response, was predicated on the denial of the relevancy of 
particularistic communalism. This was singularly inappropriate 
and inadequate in an atmosphere precisely charged by such 
particularistic sentiments. As a result they were dislodged by 
a new set of leaders who were not so much motivated to define the 
future as to defend the present, men who have all along exercised 
informal influence in their respective communities. Their claim 
to power was predicated on the preservation of communal interests 
and not the propagation of a set of noncommunal priorities. But 
the assertion of communalism was also perceived to risk communal 
conflicts. The solution was an inter-communal alliance. The 
success of the Alliance's 'formula' is well known. But the 
capture of power at the federal and state level by the Alliance
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Party has important implications,
In the first place electoral victory by the party has 
ensured that the different communal interests are not threatened 
by a westernized elite which would most likely be noncommunal in 
its perspective, The leadership structure is therefore primarily 
motivated in two directions: to protect the communal interests
and to ameliorate the divisive consequences of the plural society. 
These two aims are compatible so long as the orientation is not 
to promote new communal interests but merely to protect existing 
ones. Hence, by and large, the leadership seeks the status quo 
except where national policies dictate otherwise. (It is this 
latter situation that challenges the contemporary inter-communal 
leadership structure in Penang.)
On account of the ability of the communal leaders to 
pre-empt the leadership claims of the westernized professionals 
there is a separation between the leadership structure and the 
administration. This has had the effect of making it unnecessary 
for the former to claim legitimacy on the basis of formal-legal 
authority. The leaders are, after all, mostly men who enjoy 
influential statuses in their respective communities. Their 
leadership, as it were, is superimposed on the governing 
administration without interrupting or depending on it. There is,
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therefore, a discontinuity between politics as an exercise of power 
competition and the actual governing process« And such a dis­
continuity is viable precisely because the elite is more status quo- 
than achievement-oriented« Moreover in a society which is itself 
more traditional than modern it is not so important that power is 
exercised as that it is seen to be exercised. For this reason the 
differential perceptions of leadership are not logically con­
tradictory. Nor are they a source of instability. Instead they 
play a useful role in generating support for the leadership 
structure. But the separation between the leadership structure 
and the administration has several important consequences.
In the first instance, the tradition and practice of the 
administration remain largely uncontaminated by communal 
(particularistic) considerations although these are the motivating 
forces of politics. By and large, the bureaucrats are uninvolved 
with the actual processes of communal politics. The political 
bargaining and compromises of communal politics are not enacted 
withir. the administration. Secondly, despite the federal structure, 
the state administration carries on largely through directives 
from the federal government, seemingly unconcerned with the 
pervasive communalism or racial heterogeneity of the state. Where 
the leaders and administrators interact, therefore, is not so 
much in the sphere of policy formation (except when the former
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accept the recommendations of the latter) as in that of policy 
application. Thus although the leaders are mostly communally 
based they intercede with the administration on behalf of their 
constituents and not communities. For the most part they see 
their role as general political 'watch-dog' for their communities. 
Their positions are less dependent upon what they can do for their 
communities than what they can prevent adversely happening to 
them, In all these things one can see a definite pattern: the
formal government is not over-loaded with the function of repressing 
or even mediating between particularistic demands. And the con­
sequent presence of relative order in the state supports the 
leaders' claim of harmonizing the different communities. It is 
therefore not surprising to hear them talk less in terms of what 
they have been able to do than what they have been able to prevent, 
viz. the outbreak of communal disharmony.
Does this mean that the leadership structure consists 
solely or even predominantly of 'traditional' leaders, men who 
are parochially-oriented because of their social characteristics? 
Our analysis of the leaders' backgrounds shows that they are not. 
Although on the whole they are not very well educated they are more 
'cosmopolitan' than one would have suspected by virtue of their 
communal leadership, But not all leaders are communally based. 
Despite the failure of the westernized professionals to capture
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formal power as a group some of them still retain some measure of 
influence. This is to be expected in a state as urbanized and 
cosmopolitan as Penang. Thus there are various elements in the 
leadership structure which is made all the more ambiguous by its 
lack of close articulation with formal authority. To be sure 
most leaders are members of the Alliance. But even though the 
party is in power most leaders are without formal-legal positions.
In terms of community we made the interesting discovery that all 
Malay and Indian leaders with party affiliations are members of the 
U.M.N.O. and the M.I.C. respectively. The same is not true of 
their Chinese counterparts some of whom do not belong to the M.C.A. 
Herein lies the challenge to the Alliance hegemony in Penang. For 
competition for leadership, through the electoral process, is intra- 
communal. In the case of Penang the predominance of the Chinese 
makes the party split among the Chinese leaders a threat to the 
Alliance state government. There are, of course, other con­
tributing factors.
and not formal-legally based has meant that it is epate. uninvolved 
with policy matters. Thus the broad policies for the state are 
made by the national Alliance leadership. This is facilitated not 
only by the same party being in power at the state and federal 
level, but also by the fact that the powers of the state government
The existence of a leadership structure which is socially
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are constitutionally circumscribed. As a result nationally 
appropriate policies, such as the emphasis on the agricultural 
and rural sector to better the economic position of the Malays, 
are inappropriate to Penang as far as a majority of the population 
is concerned. Moreover, since the state is both more-urban 
and more-Chinese, nationally-defined policies are bound to be 
criticized by some as too particularistic and others as not 
particularistic enough. In other words, the generally pro-Malay 
policies are viewed by the urban, modernity-oriented elements as 
compromising standards of achievement and efficiency; whereas 
others view them as ignoring specifically Chinese interests. In 
both cases the dissatisfaction comes from the urban areas where 
most of the people in Penang live. Thus if the inter-communalism 
of the Alliance is appropriate at the level of leadership it is not 
so at the level of government policies and planning. It is tempting 
to suggest that this explains the electoral defeat of the Alliance 
in George Town, But that would be too simple an explanation.
Our analysis of the leadership structure in Penang 
indicates that the Alliance Party is predominant because it includes 
a majority of those who have influence and not because of its 
policies. Why then should consideration of policies be a threat 
to its hegemony?
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In the first place, as noted earlier, not all Chinese 
leaders in Penang belong to the M.C.A. In fact some of the most 
influential of them are leaders of opposition parties» This is an 
important fact since our analysis of electoral competition shows 
that it is not a process of promoting leadership but one of 
ratifying it» For these reasons electoral challenges to the 
Alliance have been more successfully waged against its M.C.A. 
partner» Thus besides the Alliance party the opposition parties 
also enjoy some amount of social legitimacy. On this basis they 
are capable of upsetting the Alliance in Penang. Ironically this 
is likely to come about as a result of the effectiveness of the 
Alliance leaders in preventing racial conflict. The more racial 
disharmony is absent the more other factors gain significance.
In this sense the racial riots which have broken out in recent 
years (1964. have the paradoxical effect of reiterating
the relevance of the inter-communalism of the Alliance. However 
despite the lack of integration between the various communities 
and hence the potential racial conflict Penang is too urban a 
state to go without planning on industrialization and employment, 
and trade. These are matters to which the Alliance leadership 
will have to make a more purposive response and on which it can 
be challenged. In this sense Penang is undergoing a period of 
political transition: from concern with the preservation of the
status quo to deliberate planning for economic growth.
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So regardless of the fact that the electoral process 
hitherto has been primarily one of ratifying leadership it will 
increasingly be an instrument of leadership competition. As 
we have seen this will take place mostly in the urban areas and 
within the Chinese community. Already Chinese leaders who do 
not belong to the Alliance are attempting to promote the leader­
ship claims of their party colleagues in elections. If and when 
they can succeed in capturing power in Penang, the structure of 
leadership will surely undergo some changes.
In the first place electoral defeat of the Alliance 
would imply that the M.C.A. leaders are losing their influence 
with the urban and Chinese population. Since their leadership 
statuses are not based on formal-legal but communal positions 
this would mean a bifurcation in the leadership structure: between
those who would control the government and base their positions 
accordingly and those who would remain communally influential.
In fact it might even mean that communal influence would no longer 
be politically meaningful. (This appears to have taken place in 
Singapore in the 1950s.) But if this were to come about it is un­
likely to concern the Malay community not because it is any more 
rural or backward but because its leaders are unlikely to be 
defeated electorally.
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Secondly, the linkage functions performed by the inter- 
communal leadership - between the different communities and between 
them and the government - would be in jeopardy. Without them the 
governing party would have to legitimize itself through its 
achievements. Our survey of the political orientation of a section 
of the future participants indicates that already achievement is 
becoming an important criterion and communalism less so.
But a noncommunally-oriented (as opposed to an inter- 
communally-oriented) government is unlikely to be elected by achieve­
ment-oriented voters alone. The dissatisfaction with the M.C.A. 
is also present among the more chauvinistic elements of the Chinese 
community who view it as misrepresenting their interests. Hence 
a non-Alliance government would also face particularistic demands 
from a section of the community; and rather than being able to 
subsume these at the level of the party it would have to meet them 
at the level of the government. And if the Alliance Party itself 
found it impossible ’to run the government on the basis of race,' 
how much more possible would it be for its opponents? We know 
that the only non-Alliance government in Malaysia is doing exactly 
that in Kelantan, but then the Chinese community there is smaller 
and less powerful than the Malay community in Penang. Besides 
while the Alliance can tolerate a Malay-oriented government it can 
hardly do so if it is a Chinese-oriented one. Moreover the non-
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Alliance leaders are mostly noncommunally-oriented even if they 
were to exploit particularistic sentiments in their electoral 
strategy. On all counts, therefore, it would seem that they 
would deny the relevance of particularism and seek to legitimate 
themselves on the basis of achievement and universalism. It 
might mean in fact that in the end they would have served the 
urban and Chinese interests simultaneously.
If leadership is formalized, legitimated primarily on 
the basis of formal-legal authority and achievement-oriented, it 
would represent a developmental change. A parallel change also 
appears to be taking place in the society at large.
Given the lack of a common political experience among 
the communal groups until the country became independent, and since 
then a structure of leadership constructed to ameliorate the 
divisive potentials between them, an important need of Malaysian 
political modernization is the diminution of specifically racial 
orientations in politics. This is difficult to obtain as far as 
the older generations are concerned. For one thing, the explicit 
as well as implicit recognition of race in Malaysian politics tends 
to reinforce rather than erode the racial divisions and differences. 
That such a consequence is unwanted in the long run is recognized 
even by the ruling Alliance Party which has proclaimed its goal as
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the fostering of a noncommunal Malaysia, Thus the more it succeeds 
the more the future generations of participants will have non­
communal orientations. In this perspective, political change in 
Malaysia is the progressive inclusion of new participants with new 
orientations, people who are persuaded more by such canons of 
modernity as merit, efficiency and rationality than by the trad­
itional factor of race. But such a development cannot be assumed 
to produce growth rather than decay.
To a large extent it will depend on two things: first,
whether the small stratum of non-Alliance leaders can capture power 
electorally and put their talents to the test; and second, whether 
the established regime can recruit such leaders and/or respond 
effectively to the new demands for modernity and general progress.
As for the first condition, analysis of the electoral 
record in Penang suggests it is possible there. This is not because 
the state is more modern but simply that it is more cosmopolitan 
and Chinese. Being so urbanized the urgency for growth and 
development is greater; being more Chinese a pro-Malay inter- 
communalism is less persuasive. As for the second condition, our 
analysis of the students' political culture indicates that it will 
depend on the reaction of the established regime to the emerging 
noncommunally-oriented demands and interests, It is not in-
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conceivable that it will react negatively, in the sense of not 
wanting to or not being able to attract new talent and new leaders. 
It may also consider noncommunal demands and interests as 
irrelevant, premature or provocative. These developments are 
not altogether unlikely especially if it were to view them as 
challenging the basis of its authority heretofore organized and 
exercised on a cpiasi-racial basis. But new political aspirants 
and activists are coming into the political system all the time. 
Their arrival on the political scene will lead to co-operation or 
confrontation with the 'old' leaders. The outcome will not 
necessarily be a stable transition from a leadership structure 
traditionally and socially legitimated to one formal-legally 
legitimated and oriented towards achievement. But then we do 
not know enough to say that political instability is necessarily 
inimical to political development.
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Leaders
Note:
Column
(2-4)
5
APPENDIX I
and Codification of Background Factors.
(1) All those who receive one or more nominations from 
the panel of judges are included in this list.
(2) Numerical identification was originally given 
to each leader in a rough alphabetical order.
Since this order does not affect any statistical 
compilation, it is simply retained here.
(3) Even where it is not obvious, categories within 
each factor are mutually exclusive, but they are 
sometimes combined in statistical compilations.
(4) Overlapping factors were originally chosen to 
safeguard against inconsistency and coding error.
Explanation of Codes
(Identification numbers from 001 to 145 not included 
below.)
Honours: 0 = no
1 = yes
Age: 0 = below 30
1 = 31-35
2 = 36-40
3 = 41-45
6
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Column (cont,)
6 Age: 4 = 46-50
5 = 51-55
6 = 56-60
7 = 61 and over
7 Place of Birth: 0 = Penang
1 = Rest of Malaysia and Singapore
2 * Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Philippines
3 = China
4 * India/Ceylon/Pakistan
5 * Others
8 Occupation: 0 = Commerce
1 a Professional (including Teaching)
2 = Religion
3 « Government Service (and full-time elected
office-holders)
4 a Managerial/Executive
5 = Clerical/Technical
6 = Land-owner
7 = Retail trade (small business)
8 = Retired
9 = Others
9
10
Education: ) 0 a No formal education
) 1 = Primary level
Father’s ) 2 = Secondary level
Education: ) 3 = Tertiary Level
4 a No answer
11 Medium of ) 0 = English
Education: ) 1 * Malay
) 2 a  Chinese
12 Father’s ) 3 = Tamil/Hindi
Medium of ) 4 = English/Malay
Education: ) 5 = English/Chinese
6 = English/Tamil
7 = Malay/Chinese
8 » Mai ay/Tamil
9 = Nil or no answer
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Column (cont.)
13
14
15
16
17
18 
19
LANGUAGE ABILITY: Malay )
English  ^
Chinese ) 
Tamil j 
Other )
0 = No ability
1 = Speak only
2 = Read and write
4 = Speak and read
5 = Speak, read and write
Colonial Appointment: 0 = no
1 = yes
Election Record: 0 = never stood for election
1 = stood but never elected
2 = elected at Federal level
3 = elected at Federal and State level
4 = elected at State level
5 = elected at City Council level
6 = elected at State and Local level
7 = elected at Federal and Local level
8 = elected at Local level only
9 = elected at all levels
20
21
Membership of Political Party: 
(If no present affiliation, 
immediate past one)
0 = not relevant
1 = UMNO
2 = MCA
3 = MIC
4 = Labour
5 * Ra'ayat
6 = UDP/Gerakan
7 = PPP
8 * DAP
9 = PMIP
Year of joining Political Party: 0 = not relevant
1 = before 1957
2 = after 1957
3 = no answer or unknown
22 Level of Political Party office ever held:
0 = not relevant
1 = below State level
2 = State level
3 = National level
4 = National and State level
5 = None
6 * no answer or unknown
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Column (oont.J
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Year interested in Politics: )
)
Year of involvement in Party ) 
Politics! )
Method of involvement in 0
Politics: 1
2
3
4
5
6 
7
0 = not relevant
1 = before Japanese Occupation
2 * during Japanese Occupation
3 = after Japanese Occupation
4 = after 1957
5 * no answer
a not relevant
= by joining a political party 
= campaign participation 
= standing for election 
a contribution to party fund 
= by appointment to political 
office
= others 
= no answer
By Whom persuaded to 
become involved in 
Party Politics:
0 a not relevant
1 * by relative
2 = by friend
3 = by personal initiative
4 a no answer
Active Community Activities: 0 a not engaged
1 = communal only
2 = non-communal only
3 = communal and non-communal
4 = no answer or unknown
Father's Economic Class: )
)
Economic Class: )
0 = Upper
1 = Upper middle
2 = Middle
3 = Lower middle
4 = Lower
5 a no answer or unknown
Government Service: 0 = never
1 = in the past
2 = currently
Involvement in Affairs or other 0 = no
racial groups: 1 = yes
2 = no answer or unknown
32 Length of stay in Penang: 0 = under 10 years
1 a 10 - 20 years
2 = over 20 years
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Column (cont.)
33 Father as a leader in Penang: 0 * no
1 = yes
2 b no answer or unknown
34 Father’s Occupation: 0 = Commerce
1 = Professional (including Teaching)
2 = Religion
3 = Government Service
4 * Managerial/Executive
5 = Clerical/Technical
6 = Landowner
7 = Retail trade
8 = Others
9 = no answer or unknown
35 Father interested in public affairs: 0 = no
1 = yes
2 = no answer
36 Father’s Place of Birth: 0 * Penang
1 = Malaysia, outside of Penang
2 * Others
3 a no answer or unknown
37 Race: 0 = Malay
1 = Chinese
2 = Indian
3 = Others
38 Classification of leadership 0 = f0’ or general leader
position by nominations: 1 * »1* 
2 = '2'
or non-communal leader 
or communal leader
39-40 Total number of nominations 0 = 0
received: 14 = 14
41-42 No. of WEALTH attributions: )
43-44 No. of DECISION-MAKING attributions: ) 0 = 0 
14 - 1445-46 No. of SKILL attributions: )47-48 No. of RESPECT attributions: )
49-50 No. of INVOLVEMENT attributions: )
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Column (oont,)
51 Present Elective Political Position: 0 = none
1 * Federal Parliament
2 = State Assembly
3 = Local Government
4 = Federal, State
5 = Federal and Local
6 s State and Local
7 « Federal, State and
Local
52 Past Elective Political Position: 0 * none
1 a Federal Parliament
2 = State Assembly
3 a Local Government
4 = Federal, State
5 = Federal and Local
6 = State and Local
7 = Federal, State and
Local
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APPENDIX II
Biographical Notes.
These notes are intended to give brief sketches of the 
political careers of some of Penang contemporary leaders.
Wong Pow Nee.
Tan Sri Wong was born in 1911 and grew up in Bukit 
Mertajam. He was educated at the St. Xavier’s Institution,
Penang and was a school teacher from 1937 to 1957 when he became 
the first Chief Minister of Penang. An active member of the 
Scout Movement he first became active in public affairs in the 
early 1950’s by joining the M.C.A. Although he was not appointed 
to the Bukit Mertajam Town Council or any higher bodies he 
successfully contested his first election in 1955 in the Penang 
Settlement Council Election. After this election he was appointed 
to the Nominated (Executive) Council on March 1st, 1955. (Besides 
the esc officio members, the Nominated Council consisted of one 
appointed and four elected members. Of the latter there were 
two Malays and two Chinese. The other Chinese member was Dr. Lim 
Chong Eu.) In the following year he successfully contested the 
Bukit Mertajam Town Council election; he served on this Council 
for less than a year. He was a Nominated Settlement Councillor
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until August 31st, when he was appointed Chief Minister. He 
retained this position after the 1959 and 1964 elections. As 
a result of his formal position he was elected one of the vice- 
presidents of Penang M.C.A. and a member of the M.C.A. Central 
General Working Committee.
Dr. Lim Chong Eu.
A son of a highly respected medical practitioner*
Dr. Lim was b o m  in Penang in 1919. He was educated at the Penang 
Free School and the University of Edinburgh where he obtained his 
medical qualification. After graduation he went to China during 
the Second World War. Upon his return to Penang after the war he 
helped found the Radical Party in 1951 and became its first 
Secretary-General. In that same year he was appointed to the 
Penang Settlement Council. He was subsequently re-appointed and 
in 1954 he became Penang’s representative on the Federal Legislative 
Council. After the electoral demise of the Radical Party he joined 
the M.C.A. in 1955. In the first Settlement Council election of
* Dr. Lim Chwee Leong graduated from King Edward VII Medical School 
in Singapore. After serving a year in the Penang General 
Hospital as assistant surgeon he started a private practice.
He was the elder brother of Dr. Sir Lim Han Hoe, one time 
Chinese member from Singapore in the Straits Settlement 
Legislative Council.
399
that year he stood as an Alliance candidate and was elected. He 
served on the State Nominated (and later, Executive) Council from 
1955 to 1959. In 1956 he became Chairman of the Political 
Affairs Committee of both the M.C.A. and the Alliance in Penang 
as well as nationally. He was also elected to the Alliance National 
Council and became its chief whip in parliament from 1957 to 1959.
He was elected National President of the M.C.A. in 1958, but 
resigned from this and every other position after the Alliance 
crisis of 1959. He formed the U.D.P. in 1962 and became its 
first Secretary-General. In 1964 he successfully contested 
the state and parliamentary elections. In 1968 Dr. Lim helped 
found the Gerakan Ra*ayat Malaysia and the U.D.P. was dissolved.
He became a vice-chairman of the Gerakan and its leader in Penang. 
Partly on account of his stature the Gerakan entertained high 
hopes of capturing power in Penang in the 1969 election.
Saw Seng Kew.
Born in China in 1904, Saw Seng Kew migrated to Malaysia 
in his youth. A self-made millionaire with business interests 
in rubber, banking and property, he has been an active supporter 
of Chinese communal associations such as the Chin Kang Hoay Kuan, 
The Penang Chinese Swimming Club, the United Hokkien Association, 
and numberous Chinese schools in Penang. At one time or another 
he has been Patron or Chairman of the Board of Governors of Chung
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Ling High School, Penang Chinese Girls' High School, Chong Cheng 
School, Li Teck School, Phor Tay School and several other lesser 
known Chinese schools. Currently President of the Penang Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce he has also served in this capacity previously. 
He was also a past President of the Penang Rubber Trade Association. 
He first joined the M.C.A. in 1949, but he has never stood for 
elective office. His only colonial appointment was to the Rubber
/-— v
Lisencing Board. Known to be one of the biggest financial 
supporters of the M.C.A. and the Alliance, he became President 
of the M.C.A. Penang in 1960. To date he has retained this 
position and concurrently a national vice-presidency of the party. 
Mr. Saw was educated in Chinese.
S.M. Aidid.
A member of the Jawi Peranakan community, S.M. Aidid was 
born in Penang in 1906. Although he received his formal education 
in Malay, he also speaks English, Arabic and Hokkien. A successful 
businessman, he was one of the first to join U.M.N.O. in 1946. In 
1948 he was elected President of U.M.N.O. in Penang. He held this 
office until 1951. During this period he was appointed to the 
Rural Board, Penang Island, the Penang Settlement Council and the 
Federal Legislative Council. A leading member of the Penang 
Malay Chamber of Commerce, he has also been active in the Muslim
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Orphanage, the Penang Malay Association and their Malay Communal 
organizations. With the introduction of elections he ceased to 
hold formal political office and has confined his political activities 
to U.M.N.O. affairs. Since 1964 he has been a Branch and Divisional 
Vice-President of U.M.N.O. in Penang.
Lim Kean Siew.
Born in 1922 in Penang Lim Kean Siew was educated at the 
Penang Free School, Raffles College and Cambridge University where 
he qualified as a lawyer, besides obtaining a degree in English 
Literature. He is a son of Lim Cheng Ean, a prominent lawyer 
who was one time Penang Chinese member in the Straits Settlement 
Legislative Council. He practices law in Penang and has been the 
legal advisor to numerous labour unions. In 1957 he joined the 
Labour Party and won his first election in December 1957 when he 
became a City Councillor. He was subsequently re-elected to the 
City Council until 1963 when he lost narrowly to the only successful 
U.D.P. candidate in the Council election. In 1959 he was elected 
to the State Assembly and the Federal Parliament. He retained the 
Federal scat in 1964 but lost his state seat to a U.D.P. candidate. 
He returned to the State Assembly in 1965 after successfully 
contesting the Ayer Itam By-election. Over the years lie has held 
numerous top positions in the Labour Party and the Socialist Front.
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Ooi Thiam Slew.
He was b o m  in 1914 and became active in politics through 
trade union activities in 1951. Educated in English he was one of 
the founding members of the Labour Party in Penang. Between 1952 
and 1953 he was also a member of the Independence of Malaya Party. 
During this period he was the State Secretary of the I.M.P. and was 
also on the National Committee of the Party. His party activities 
since then have all been in the Labour Party/Socialist Front. He 
was first elected to the City Council in 1957, re-elected in 1961 
and 1963. From 1960 to 1963 he was the Socialist Front Mayor of 
George Town. In 1959 he was elected to the State Assembly but 
lost his seat in 1964. A few days before the Mayoral election 
towards the end of 1965, he left the Labour Party and stood as 
an independent. He was elected Mayor with the support of the 
Party Ra’ayat and the Alliance councillors.
D.S. Ramanthan.-----------A----
A school teacher all his adult life, Ramanathan was b o m  in 
India 59 years ago. He came to Malaya in his childhood and was 
educated in English. A founding member of the Labour Party in 
Penang in 1951 he was elected to the City Council in 1957. In 
1958 and 1959 he served two terms as the Socialist Front Mayor 
and was re-elected to the Council in 1961. He contested both the
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state and parliamentary elections in 1959, being successful only 
in the former. In 1962 he left the Labour Party/Socialist Front; 
and in the following year he joined the M.I.C. In 1964 he 
contested his old state seat of Sungei Pinang and was re-elected 
under the Alliance ticket.
Between 1953 and 1959 he also acted as national and 
state President of the Labour Party.
Ahmad Sa'aid.
B o m  in 1917 in Province Wellesley he was educated both 
in Malay and English schools. He was in government service before 
he retired to take an active part in politics. He first joined 
U.M.N.O. in 1946 and became a leading figure of the party in the 
north Province Wellesley area. Active in Malay community affairs 
such as the Malay Youth Movement and the P.W. branch of the Malay 
Association, he successfully contested his first parliamentary 
election in 1959. He was re-elected in the Seberang Utara seat 
in 1964. In 1961 he won a seat in the P.W. North District Council 
and became its chairman. He has held this post to date. Since 
1961 he has devoted full-time to his political career.
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Cheah Seng Khim.
A very successful businessman, Cheah Seng Khim was born, 
and educated in English, in Penang. He joined the M.C.A. in 1955 
and in that year was appointed to the North East District (Penang 
Island) Advisory Board on transport. In 1956 he was appointed 
to the Settlement Council and its Nominated Council. He served 
in both these bodies until 1959. He successfully contested the 
state seat of Tanjong Bungah in 1959 and 1964. He left the 
Executive Council in 1959 upon his election as one of the two 
State representatives in the Federal Senate.
In party affairs he was a Branch Chairman and a 
state Vice-Chairman of the M.C.A. since 1956,
Tan Cheng Bee.
Born in Province Wellesley in 1910, he is a member of a 
rich family with rubber and property interests. Educated in English 
he first became politically active in 1952 when he joined the 
Radical Party. From 1953 to 1960 he was a member of the Bukit 
Mertajam Town Council. He joined the M.C.A. in 1954 and became 
a leading figure of the party in Butterworth and Bukit Mertajam.
In 1959 he successfully contested the parliamentary seat of Bagan 
and was re-elected in 1964. He also contested the local elections
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in 1961 and 1963 and was elected to the P.W. Central District 
Council. Since 1963 he has been a state Vice-Chairman of the M.C.A.
C.C. Ismail.
A retired government servant, C.C. Ismail was born in 
Butterworth in 1905. He attended both Malay and English schools.
He joined U.M.NO. in 1948 and since then has acted as branch, division 
and state Chairman of the party. Before 1959 he did not stand for 
any election. In that year and 1964 he was elected to the state
seat of Muda. Upon his election to the State Assembly he was made
a member of the ExecutiveCouncil. Besides his political career he 
also has business and property interests.
Kee Yong Chin.
A descendant of a Chinese Capitan family in southern 
Province Wellesley, he was born in Sungei Bakap in 1917. After 
attending the Penang Free School he became a planter and merchant.
He first became politically active in 1950 when he joined the M.C.A. 
In 1959 he successfully contested his first election in the state 
constituency of Sungei Bakap. He was re-elected in 1964. Upon his 
initial election he was made a member of the Executive Council and 
was re-appointed in 1964. In 1959 he became leader of the M.C.A. in
406
the southern part of Province Wellesley and 1964 he was elected a 
state Vice-Chairman of the party.
Ismail Idris.
Born in Penang in 1919 and educated both in Malay and 
English, Ismail Idris was in government service before he retired 
to enter politics. He joined U.M.N.O. in 1949 and became its 
Youth leader. Since 1963 he has been a member of U.M.N.O. State 
Executive Committee. He did not contest any election until 1959 
when he won the parliamentary seat of Penang Selatan. He was re­
elected in 1964.
C.Y, Choy.
A retired office executive, C.Y. Choy was born in Penang 
in 1906 and educated in English. A former treasurer of the now 
defunct Fabian Society of Malay, he was one of the founding members 
of the Labour Party in 1951. As such he has occupied numerous 
party offices since 1952. He won his first elective office in 1956 
when he was electee to the City Council. Since then he has been 
re-elected to the Council. He served a term as Deputy Mayor in 
1953 and two terms as Mayor in 1964 and 1965. He was also elected 
to the State Assembly in 1959 but lost his seat in 1964.
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Besides his political activities, C.Y. Choy has been 
active in several Cantonese associations. He has also served 
as Chairman of the Board of Governors, Georgetown Secondary School 
and several goodwill committees.
Teh Ewe Lim.
He was born in Penang in 1924 and educated in English 
and Chinese. A businessman he only became active in politics in 
1962 when he joined the U.D.P. In the following year he became 
state secretary of the party and successfully contested the 1963 
City Council election. (He was the only successful U.D.P. 
candidate in this election). In 1964 he contested both the 
state and parliamentary election. He was only successful in the 
former. In 1966 he served a term as National Chairman of the 
U.D.P. He is active in numerous communal (Chinese) and non- 
communal organizations.
P.A. Das.
A school teacher by profession, P.A. Das was born in 
Penang in 1911 and educated in English. He first became politically 
active by joining the Radical Party in 1951. In 1952 he joined 
Party Negara but he finally left the party and became a member of the
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rf-I’C. in 1959• Before the introduction of rural council election 
he was appointed to the Penang Rural Board for three years; after 
its introduction he was elected to the Rural District Council, 
Penang Island. He has never run for higher office. Since 1960 
he has been Vice-Chairman of the M.I.C. in Penang.
Chcong Ewe Leong.
A son of one of the most prominent families in Penang, 
he was born in 1930 and educated at the Penang Free School and 
Cambridge University where he obtained his law degree. Before 
pi noticing law in Penang lie won international fame as a badminton 
player. He joined the M.C.A. in 1960 and was the sole successful 
Alliance candidate in the 1961 City Council election. He was re­
elected to the Council in 1963, He unsuccessfully contested both 
the state and parliamentary elections of 1964. He was National 
Deputy Youth Leader of the M.C.A. in 1963. Two years later he was 
appointed to the National Working Committee of the party and in 
1965 he became a member of the Alliance National Council.
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